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PREFACE 
The situation in which the "hero" of history finds himself is as important as his 
personality and his actions. The leader neither behaves in a vacuum, nor is he an en­
tirely free individual. He acts in a milieu which has been shaped by the past, and the 
success or failure of his career must, to some extent, depend upon his individual re­
sponse to historical and cultural forces which he encounters. The man ·around whom this 
study is built is Sultan Anwarud-din Uto, known in Spanish records and by his people as 
Datu Uto, a Magindanao prince who first appears in Spanish accounts in the year 1860. 
To understand him requires an examination of Magindanao society, whose political, eco­
nomic and social structures, values, and sentiments find expression in a nineteenth­
century situation dominated by this man. Furthermore, we must consider not only the 
times in which he lived, but also a span of the Magindanao past from as early as the 
sixteenth century. By uncovering the roots of conflict in his society and by understand­
ing continuities with the past, we can get beyond the less imaginative Spanish viewpoint 
that Datu Uto's career was an eccentric episode in a glorious era of Spanish conquest in 
the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu. The Spaniards could grudgingly acknowledge Rizal 
and Aguinaldo as expressions of a budding Filipino national sentiment; Datu Uto, however, 
was to the bulk of Spanish writers and policy makers a stubborn, half-civilized "Moro,o" 
a descendant of dreaded pirate chiefs who brought terror to the Christian settlements,
whose cunning and cruelty made h1m the leader of a rebellion against Spain. If we 
attempt to see Uto in the context of Magindanao history and society, a different picture 
emerges. He is seen to exhibit the attributes of an exemplary Magindanao datu. The con­
flict of which he was a part ceases to be merely an isolated rebellion against Spain. 
It takes on a wider significance as part of a complex situation involving tensions be­
tween various segments of the Magindanao world, between personal loyalties and Islam, 
and includes within its scope the external world with which Magindanao was linked. 
For this type of study, the traditional narrative approach in historical writing is 
inadequate, although it still plays an important role in giving life and substance to the 
treatment which follows. We must always bear in mind that the documentary materials used 
here are all European, mainly Spanish, and they do not reflect the Magindanao viewpoint, 
which is our primary interest in this study. Rather than shying awayo.from such sources, 
however, we can avoid writing "Europocentric" or colonial history by making use of ethno­
graphic accounts and by borrowing some analytical tools from related social science 
disciplines. 
Unfortunately, the study of Magindanao history and society has not progressed much 
since Najeeb Saleeby published his Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion in 1905. 
Jose Maceda's full-scale study of Magindanao music,o1 a landmark in Philippine ethnomusi­
cology, is probably the only in-depth study of some aspect of Magindanao society that 
has appeared in recent years. Some scholars have preferred to delve into the sociologi­
cal aspects of mission work and may sometimes have been influenced by their own. "Chris­
tian" biases and therefore unable to view Philippine Muslim society in its own terms.o2 
Several Filipino scholarso3 have recently shown an interest in "Moro" history for its own 
sake, but so far they have hardly begun.to tap the vast amount of documentary materials 
in archives and libraries both in the Philippines and abroad. 
1. "The Music of the Magindanao in the Philippines" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California in Los Angeles, 2 vols.o, 1962). 
2. E. g. , Francis Madigan, S.J. and Nicholas Cushner, S. J. , "Tamontaka: a sociological 
experiment,o" American Catholic SocioZogical Review, XIX, 4 (1958), pp. 322-336; also,
by the same authors, "Tamontaka reduction: a community approach to Mission work," 
Neue Zeitschrift fur Missions-wissenschaft, XVII, 2 (1961), pp. 81-94. Other works 
which show the "Christian" bias are: Rev. T. O'Shaughnessy, "Philippine Islam and 
the Society of Jesus,o" PS, IV, 2 (1956), pp. 214-245; Peter Gowing, Mosque and Moro; 
a Study of Muslims in the Philippines (Manila, 1964). An example of a study of colo­
nial policy is Clifford Smith, "A History of the Moros" (unpublished M. A. thesis,
University of Chicago, 1948). 
3. F. Delor Angeles, Mindanao; the Story of an Island (Davao City, 1964); Mamitua Saber,
"Four papers on Mindanao-Sulu,o" undated mimeographed copy in Olin Library, Cornell 
University. 
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Horacio de la Costa's accounts4 have contributed a great deal towards bringing the 
Magindanao into the light of modern historical knowledge, but this Jesuit historian has 
only dealt with the Muslim peoples in a peripheral sense except for a notable article on 
an eighteenth-century Sulu Sultan. Cesar Majul's pioneering studieso5 have rightly 
stressed the need for looking at the Muslim Filipinos through less biased spectacles;
Majul, however, has focused on Sulu rather than on Mindanao. A young scholar who, like 
Majul, has used a sociological orientation in viewing Sulu history is Anne L. Reber.i 
In the introduction to her work, she has acknowledged the influence of Melvin Mednick, 
an anthropologist who has written a seminal article on "Moro" history and society and 
also a thorough study of the Maranao social system in which valuable references to the 
Magindanaos are made.o7 Miss Reber also mentions John Gullick, whose study of indigenous 
Malay political systems8 has influenced a number of Southeast Asian specialists, includ­
ing the present author. In a way, most of the studies we have mentioned, while dealing 
only marginally with Magindanao, have contributed to the present work. But they by no 
means represent the entire list of modern studies of Southeast Asian history and anthro­
pology which have greatly stimulated the author's thinking about that tiny segment of the 
region which is Magindanao. 
The reader must bear in mind the limited scope of this study. What follows is an 
attempt to explore a largely uncharted realm of Philippine history.9 We do not claim to 
have exhausted the store of materials in American archives and libraries, riot to mention 
those in the Philippines, Spain, the Netherlands and Great Britain which we have not 
even seen. The Newberry Library at Chicago, which is the most important source of mate­
rials for this study, contains an impressive collection of manuscripts and published 
works awaiting the perusal of the researcher;o10 only a fraction of these materials have 
been used by the present author. The most serious limitation, however, 'is the fact that 
the author lacks first-hand knowledge about the land and people of the Pulangi valley. 
This becomes particularly evident in the chapter on Islam. The available Spanish mate­
rials can give a limited and external perspective. A more accurate description can be 
had only when indigenous texts have been analyzed and when actual fieldwork has been 
carried out. Furthermore, the subject of Islam is a very complex one, the study of which 
necessitates familiarity with Arabic texts and with the extensive scholarship on Islam,
particularly when it deals with the forms in which the religion has manifested itself in 
Southeast Asia. The author lacks these qualification. 
A significant step can, however, be made toward a fuller knowledge of Magindanao if 
the available Spanish sources are properly handled by the historian. Within the whole. 
range of sources at hand, one finds a gradation in degree of reliability and usefulness. 
Manuscripts, for example, tend to be more valuable than published materials for the sim­
ple reason that they probably have not been edited to suit the perspectives of the read­
ing public or prevailing government policies. And among the published sources, the more 
reliable ones are, naturally, those written by actual participants in the events them-
4. The Jesuits in the PhiZippines, 1581-1768 (Cambridge, 1961); "A Spanish Jesuit among
the Maguindanaus, " Comment, XII, 1 (1961), pp. 19-41. His best study on the Muslims 
has been "Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735-1773,o" JRASMB, XXXVIII (July,
1965), pp. 43-76. 
5. "The role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People,o" AS, IV (Aug.o, 1966), pp.
303-315; "Chinese relationship with the Sultanate of Sulu," in Alfonso F elixt Jr. 
(ed.), The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770 (Manila, 1966), vol. I, pp. 143-159;
"Political and historical notes on the old Sulu Sultanate," JRASMB, XXXVIII (July,
1965), pp. 23-42. 
6. "The Sulu world in the 18th and early 19th centuries: A historiographical problem in 
British writings on Malay piracy" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1966). 
7. Encampment of the Lake; The Social Organization of a Moslem-Philippine (Moro) PeopZe
(Research Series, No. 5, Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, 1965); 
"Some Problems of Moro history and political organization,o" PSR, V, 1 (1957), pp. 39-
52. 
8. Indigenous PoZitical Systems of Western MaZaya (London, 1965). 
9. The only "direct" predecessor of this study is the short survey by Paul Lietz, "Min­
danao in the nineteenth century,o" Conference on Mindanao, Papers (Chicago, 1955). 
10. A good example of a study based almost entirely on Newberry Library materials is 
Eliodoro Robles' The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century (Quezon City, 1969).
Robles' emphasis is on institutions, organizational structures, bureaucracy, and 
mechanisms of action and control. 
vi 
selves. In the course of this study, certain "informants,.' will be seen to stand out. 
Almost without exception, these are individu.als who had been "on the scene," so to speak,
such as the Jesuit missionary Pablo Pestells, the public servant and "Magindanaophile"
Ladislao Nieto, the forestry engineer Sebastian Vidal y Soler, the soldier Alfonso 
Perinat, and the French explorer Joseph Montano. The missionaries, government officials,
explorers and others who had occasion to write about the Magindanaos certainly brought
with them their own biases and perspectives, ranging from extreme sympathy to outright
prejudice. It is in the assessment of a variety of perspectives, often contradictory,
that the historian's judgment comes into play. One would certainly not want merely to 
parrot the statements of the Spanish historian Jose Montero y Vidal, no matter how sig­
nificant his nineteenth ... century work on the Muslim "pirates" has been. For Montero y
Vidal is often mistaken, and generally unsympathetic. Fortunately, among the number of 
foreigners who wrote .about the Muslims there have been the Nietos and the Vidal y Solers 
who sought to understand, in however limited a manner, a strange people's view of things. 
The present monograph is based on an M.A. thesis submitted to Cornell University in 
September, 1970. Thanks are due to the various staff members of the Olin Library in 
Cornell, the Newberry Library and the Library of Congress who patiently helped the author 
in securing materials; to the Southeast Asia Program for financing research at the 
Library of Congress; to Prof. James Siegel, Bruce Fenner, Edilberto de Jesus and Aurora 
Roxas-Lim for their helpful comments; and to the author's wife, Maria, who has helped 
him in countless ways and to whom this work is dedicated� 
Vll 
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND--SA-ILUD AND SA-RAYA 
The homeland of the Magindanao people is the basin of the Pulangi river, ''Rio 
Grande'' in Spanish accounts, which spills down the so�thern slopes of the Bukidnon massif 
in north-central Mindanao, snaking south and west across a low-lying marshy plain to 
!Ilana bay. The word "magindanao,"  which means "to be inundated, "  comes from the propen­
sity of the Pulangi to overflow its banks periodically, flooding the whole countryside
and giving the impression that the Magindanao heartland is one vast lake, or danao. The 
whole length of the Pulangi from its mouth to Matincauan in the northeast is inhabited 
by the Muslim Magindanao people who live. in ranaherias or settlements, characterized by
strongly knit kinship associations presided over by a datu who is the head of the domi­
nant lineage. During the course of its history, there have evolved .in the Pulangi three 
major centers of population. Twenty miles from the coast the river splits into two 
branches at a point which is associated with the settlement of Tumbao. Twelve miles 
above the fork stands the town of Dulawan, or Datu-Piang. Near the mouth of the north 
branch of the Pulangi stands the city of Cotabato. 
Fundamental to this. study is the notion that Dulawan in the interior and Cotabato 
in the delta were once rival centers of power with which specific territories were asso­
ciated. Dulawan was once the approximate site of Buayan, capital of a sultanate by that 
name. Its influence was felt above Tumbao, in the upper reaches of the river and in the 
region of the two lakes--Liguasan and Buluan--which feed it. To the Magindanaos this 
territory is known as sa-raya, or "in the upper valley.o"o1 The better and sometimes only
known center of power was Cotabato,o2 capital of the sultanate of Mindanao. The sultanate 
of Mindanao, which we shall call the Cotabato Sultanate, was essentially a coastal state. 
Backed by a powerful navy, her influence was once felt as far west as the Zamboanga 
peninsula and as far south as the Sangir islands. In Magindanao itself, its sphere of 
influence was associated with the delta formed by the twin branches of the Pulangi. This 
territory is known to the Magindanaos as sa-ilud, which means "in the lower valley.o"o3 
The identification of Cotabato and Buayan as coastal and inland stateso·has its dan­
gers, the most obvious of which is the exaggeration of contrasts between the two. As 
will become increasingly evident later, Cotabato also had an agricultural base in the 
delta, which became more prominent as trade languished, and Buayan had other e�its to the 
sea besides the outlets of the Pulangi which enabled her to reap the benefits of commerce 
and piracy. Some framework, however, is needed to explain the significance of the scanty
historical records we have at our disposal. The division into sa-ilud. and sa-raya, Cota­
bato and Buayan, in which not only geographic factors but also political and economic 
ones influenced the separate development of the two regions of Magindanao, enables us to 
detect a pattern in the historical record which helps in explaining why the Magindanaos 
themselves may see a more than geographic distinction between the two territories. More-
1. Najeeb Saleeby, Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion (Manila, 1905), pp. 41 and 
passim. The notion is stated more succinctly by the same author in "The Moros (a
general account)" (Manila, 1906), p. 15. The article is part of Otley Beyer's col­
lection on Philippine customary law, vol. V, no. 161. 
2. The word "Cotabato,o" which is derived from the Magindanao kuta watu, or the Malay
kota batu ("stone fort"), is a relatively modern name for the city, most probably
coming into common usage only after the Spanish occupation of the city in 1861. In 
old maps and early accounts "Mindanao, "  "Magindanao" or "Magindano" are used. [Cf.
C. A. Gibson-Hill, "Magindano,o" JRASMB, XXIX, 1 (1956), p. 184.] This, however, is 
confusing since "Mindanao" and "Magindanao" are now the names of the island and the 
ethnic group which traditionally inhabits the pulangi valley, respectively. Using
the name "Magindanao" for the capital of the sultanate would tend to obscure the 
existence of another Magindanao power in the interior. "Cotabato" is therefore used 
throughout this study to refer to the capital of the sultanate of Mindanao even in 
its pre-nineteenth century days. 
3. Saleeby, Zoa. ait. 
1 
2 
over, a reconstruction along these lines places the main topic of this study in its 
proper context. Historians have tended to examine Magindanao history in terms of the 
Cotabato Sultanate alone. This tendency is because the best known accounts of the area 
in English, not to mention those in other languages, are by explorers and traders who 
dared not venture beyond Cotabato into the interior.o4 Buayan may have appeared to be 
absorbed into the world of the Sultanate of Mindanao at Cotabato, but a closer look at 
the sources reveals the existence of a single power center in Magindanao to be a myth. 
When the Magindanao world is first revealed to us in Spanish sources of the late 
sixteenth century, it is evident that Buayan was then, as Morga puts it, "the principal 
settlement in the island.o"o5 This is hardly surprising, since later nineteenth-century 
sources tell us how favorable Buayan's position was, being surrounded by fertile agricul­
tural lands and mountain ranges populated by pagan tribes. There was no lack of manpower
in Buayan because occasionally the hill tribes would be raided for slaves, who were 
brought down to the river valley to serve as tillers of the soil, as bodyguards of high­
ranking individuals, and as objects of trade. The importance of slaves in the society 
will be discussed more fully in later sections; at this point it is merely necessary to 
note the role of agriculture and manpower in the development of a wealthy ruling class in 
Buayan, which would account for its early paramontcy. 
The first Magindanao ruler with whom the Spaniards dealt was Rajah Sirongan of
Buayan. He was the most powerful chief in the Pulangi and also the head of a confederacy 
of Buayan, Cotabato and Tamontaka. Sirongan traced his lineage to a pre-Islamic ances­
tor, Mamu, the first ruler of Buayan. Mamuo' s  grandson married a daughter of Sarip 
Kabungsuwan; Sirongan was begotten from this marriage.o6 
Sarip Kabunsuwan is credited with having brought Islam to Magindanao and having 
founded a kingdom in the delta whose capital was Cotabato. Saleeby notes that the com­
bination of the genealogy of Buayan with the story of the conversion of Magindanao­
Cotabato to Islam "brings the history of Buayan into attention before that of Mindanao 
[Cotabato] . " o7 Although Saleeby finds this detail insignificant, it is worthwhile to note 
it in conjunction with Gainza's thesis of 1851 regarding the introduction of Islam to the 
area. 
Gainza says that the early Arab missionaries initially found themselves in an infer­
ior position vis-a-vis the original datus of the Pulangi valley. They had to adjust
themselves to the existing social order. In time, capitalizing on their greater unity, 
skill and coordination, they were able to accumulate slaves, increase their prestige and 
join the ranks of the datus. As their power increased they introduced more sophisticated
forms of political organization, meanwhile entering into compromises with the traditional 
datus.o8 Judging from the tarsilas, or genealogical records, such a process appears to 
have taken place in Buayan. Pulwa, the grandson of the first datu of Buayan, Mamu, by 
virtue of his marriage to the daughter of Sarip Kabungsuwan became the first Mohammedan 
datu of Buayan. His son, Sirongan, in turn declared his superiority by assuming the 
Hindu title rajah.r9 While the Cotabato tarsilas start with Sarip Kabungsuwan and Islam, 
that of Buayan traces itself further back to a pre-Islamic ancestor and also describes 
the transition to Islam. 
The above-mentioned marriage between members of the Cotabato and Buayan ruling fami­
lies symbolizes the relationship of the two centers of power for centuries to come. 
Though rivals, their relationship was generally eased by kinship ties between their rul­
ing families. Furthermore, a preliminary examination of the tarsilas seems to indicate 
that marriages reveal the relative prestige of the two parties involved; that is, the 
4. The "classic" descriptions of early Magindanao are in: William Dampier, Dampier's
Voyages, . . .  (reprinted in New York, 1906, 2 vols.) (Dampier visited Cotabato in 
1686); Thomas Forrest, A Voyage to New Guinea .r • •  (London, 1779). Most subsequent 
authors have quoted extensively from both, especially Forrest. 
5. Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, 1609. The edition I have used is 
the English translation of Rizal's 1890 edition (Manila, 1962), p. 51. 
6. Saleeby, Studies, pp. 24-27. 7. Ibid., p. 21. 
8. Francisco Gainza, Memoria y Antecedentes sobre las Expediciones de Balanguingi y
Jolo, 1851, p. 131. Also Majul, "Political and historical notes," p. 36. According
to Majul, the election of a Sultan by datus in Magindanao is a compromise to the 
claim that the Sultanate resided in a particular family by right, as in Sulu. 
9. Saleeby, Studies, p. 26. 
3 
13. 
giving of a daughter in marriage is an implicit acknowledgment of the greater prestige of 
the recipient's line.o10 The early Muslim rulers of .Cotabato may very well have appeased,
and in the process converted, certain powerful datus in the interior by giving away a 
daughter in marriage. In any case, there is nothing besides the claims of the Cotabato 
Sultanate itself to support Saleeby's contention that Sarip Kabungsuwan conquered Buayan
by force. 11 It seems more likely that, by the acceptance of Islam, the ancient datus of 
Buayan reaped the benefits of superior political organization and contacts with the many 
Islamic kingdoms that blossomed in the archipelago in the wake of Majapahit's decline. 
Early Spanish accounts give sufficient evidence of Buayan's paramouncy in the Magin­
danao world. An expedition led by Captain Rodriguez de Figueroa in 1596 met with ciush­
ing defeat in Buayan. Figueroa himself was slain by a "Buhahayen" named Ubal. Antici­
pating a second invasion, Rajah Sirongan and the other Buayans sent a chieftain named 
Buisan to Ternate to ask for help, 
. • •  whereupon the king of Ternate sent to Mindanao a fleet of many aaraaoas 
or rowing-barges and other vessels commanded by aaahils with selected sol­
diers numbering over one thousand warriors and a-number of light artillery 
pieces with which to compel the Spaniards to break their camp [near the 
mouth of the Pulangi] and go away • . • .  12 
In spite of the Buayan-Ternate alliance, the Spaniards were victorious, but problems of 
logistics forced them to withdraw to La Caldera, at the southern tip of the Zamboanga
peninsula, leaving the prestige of Buayan intact. When, by 1599, the Spanish contingent 
had to withdraw from the area altogether owing to lack of funds and supplies, it was with 
Buayan that Sulu joined in a confederacy which fitted out a fleet of fifty vintas bearing 
over three thousand well-armed warriors. Under the leadership of the ''pilots of the 
Mindanao River," Sali and Sirongan, the joint fleet headed north to ravage Oton and Panay 
islands.o13 
In spite of the clarity of Morga's account, Saleeby finds it impossible to believe 
that Buayan was an. important kingdom in its own right. Criticizing Morga, he says: "A 
careful review of the Spanish reports referring to these early campaigns in Mindanao 
indicates that Buayan has been erroneously used in place of Magindanao [Cotabato], the 
ancient capital of the Sultanate of Magindanao.o" 14 The fact is that, at the turn of the 
century, Cotabato was merely an important seaport and a ·staging area for Magindanao 
pirate fleets. Its ruler was a descendant of Sarip Kabungsuwan, Datu Kapitan Laut 
Buisan, who led a powerful Magindanao fleet and so distinguished himself that he was re­
garded by Saleeby as "the most powerful enemy Spain encountered in her first effort to 
reduce Moro land.o"o15 But in spite of such fame, Buisan was for many years subordinate to 
Rajah Sirongan of Buayan. For example, after a celebrated raid in which a Spanish Jesuit 
was captured, Buisan had to present his prize to Sirongan and the Buayan court. All the 
datus of the Pulangi were at Buayan, and there were also present ambassadors from the 
Sultan of Brunei and the heir of the Rajah of Sulu. Also, in a letter of June 1606 sent 
by the Magindanao princes to Manila, Capitan Laut Buisan's name is listed after Raja 
Mura (Mudah?) and the Lord of Buayan, Sirongan, suggesting that Buisan had a rank ·similar 
to Zaksamana (admiral) .o16 
The Spanish Jesuits perceived the superiority of Sirongan in the Magindanao hier-
10. During the "eclipse" of Buayan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, several 
Cotabato sultans married Buayan princesses, while the reverse does not seem to be 
true of the Buayan rulers. Much later, Datu Uto of Buayan regarded his marriage to 
a Cotabato princess as a sign of his superiority. 
11. Saleeby, Studies, p. 56. All of the subsequent writers who have commented on Minda­
nao's early history seem to have followed Saleeby in equating Kabungsuwan (signify­
ing Islam) and Cotabato with the birth of Magindanao history. 
12. Morga, p. 57. 
Ibid., pp. 132-133. Detailed accounts of the early Spanish assaults on Magindanao 
and of the raids on the Visayas can be found in de la Costa, The Jesuits, particu-
larly chapter 12. 
14. Saleeby, The History of SuZu (Manila, 1963, reprint of 1905 ed.), p. 
15. Saleeby, Studies, p. 57. 
16. de la Costa, "A Spanish Jesuit," pp. 29, 36 and passim. 
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archy, and they managed to persuade him to sign a peace treaty in 1605 by dangling before 
him the pros�ect of being recognized and supported by Spain as the paramount lord of 
Magindanao.1 Sirongan's desire to be recognized and supported by Spain, however, is 
symptomatic of the internal strains in the Magindanao polity, the ever-present centrifu­
gal forces which make any political unification a tenuous affair. Some months before the 
signing of the treaty Kapitan Laut Buisan had made an angry speech at the Buayan court 
which broufht to light his jealousy of the special treatment given by the Spaniards to 
Sirongan.1 
The treaty with Sirongan was never ratified by Spain. In 1606 a Spanish fleet cap­
tured Ternate and brought the defeated sultan to Manila. This was the prelude to an 
alliance between the rulers of Magindanao, Sulu and Ternate against Spain. This was also 
the prelude to the rise of the Cotabato kingdom. 
De la Costa notes that the period from about 1607 to 1635, in which large-scale
Magindanao raids were generally absent, was a transition point in Magindanao history. He 
suspects that, because by 1634 the confederacy headed by Sirongan of Buayan had dis� 
appeared and a unified sultanate had appeared in its wake at Cotabato, during this period 
"the communities of the Great River were passing through a period of internal reorganiza­
tion.''19 Indeed, a 1638 account says that Buisan had come to rule all the coast, while 
Sirongan was the petty-king (reyezuelo) of the river valley region.20 By the 1630's, at 
least, Cotabato had become a coastal power in its own right. It had eclipsed Buayan, 
though an alliance was still maintained between them.21 How does one explain this sudden 
development? 
Majul, who dates the eclipse of Buayan at around 1619, sees a synchronism between 
the coming of the Portuguese to the East Indies and the rise of Magindanao-Cotabato. 
Specifically, he says that military alliances and religious contacts were made between 
Cotabato and the Macassar and Moluccas kingdoms.22 This explanation is substantially 
correct, but perhaps the matter can be pursued further. The mysterious 1607-1635 period,
mentioned by de la Costa, saw the height of Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the East Indies and 
Dutch attempts to enforce a commercial monopoly in the Moluccas. Ternate came under 
Dutch protection in 1607. The Banda islands, including Amboina which was a dependency of 
Ternate, were completely subdued by 1623. Dutch control over the Moluccas destroyed the 
indigenous system of cultivation and trade. The inhabitants were compelled to grow
products suitable for export, whether it was profitable for the growers or not; at times 
production would be limited or certain crops would be forbidden in response to the vaga­
ries of the European market. The production of the more valuable commodities, such as 
cloves and nutmegs, was confined to areas directly controlled by the Dutch; force was 
used to prevent their cultivation elsewhere. Islanders who violated the monopoly by 
selling to the English or the Portuguese were severely punished.e23 
Some effects of the Dutch methods were a serious lowering of the standard of living 
of the inhabitants and a disruption of the established patterns of trade. Malay seamen 
and sea nomads, whose sole livelihood was commerce, found that the Dutch had destroyed
the export trade from some islands and in the case of other islands.had monopolized it 
for themselves. The period in discussion was one of great flux, with sea-faring peoples 
set adrift by external circumstances and forced to seek other trading centers and other 
rulers to whom they might offer their services. Chinese and Arab traders, too, were on 
the lookout for free ports. The shifts in population and trade patterns in response to 
the European intrusion brought about the rise and flourishing of such Muslim kingdoms as 
Acheh, Makassar and Sulu in the first half of the seventeenth century.e2� Recent 
17. Ibid.r, p. 34. 18. Ibid., p. 33. 19. Ibidr. ,  p. 40. 
20. "Relaci6n de la Gran Isla de Mindanao y de su conquista por los Espaiioles,e" BSGM, 
XXII (1887), p. 112. The article is a reprint of a fragment of a book published in 
Mexico in 1638. 
21. Ibid. 
22. "The role of Islam,e" p. 311; "Islamic and Arab cultural influences in the south of 
the Philippines," JSEAH, VII, 2 (1966), pp. 62, 68. 
23. For one of the many available accounts cf. D. G. E. Hall, A History of South-East 
Asia (London, 1968), chapters 15 and 16. 
24. Cf. A. K. DasGu{>ta, "Acheh in Indonesian trade and politics: 1600-41" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1962), chapter I; B. Schrieke, Indonesian 
Sociological Studies (The Hague, 1957), vol. I, chapter III. 
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historians do not seem , however , to have noticed that the sudden rise of the Magindanao
kingdom of Cotabato is part of the same pattern. 
The seventeenth- century Jesuit historian ,  Francisco Combes, attributes the rise of 
Cotabato to the aggregation in that kingdom of a sea-faring people called Lutao, 
. . .  the meaning of which is well explained by their occupation, for Lutao 
signifies in these tongues he who swims or bounds over water. Such is the 
nature of these people , and they know no house save the boat . . . .  2 5  
Combes , who lived in Mindanao from 1645 to 165 7 ,  states that the Lutaos were of recent 
arrival and that they were the "most foreign" of the peoples of the southern Philippinese. 
Because of their "Moorist dress of turban and marlota (i . e . ,  a Moorish robe)e, their arms 
and worship , "  Combes suspects that they were of Arab or Indian origin, but elsewhere he 
points out their links with the king of Ternat e .  The Ternate influence in Mindanao , 
Jolo, Bohol and a part of Cebu was strong at this time .  Not only trade but also reli­
gious ties linked these areas together in spite of the consolidation of Spanish rule . 
Ternate was the Muslim center for the Moluccas and the southern Philippines ,e2 6  and this 
may have been due to its own links with the Islamic center of Giri in northern Java.e2 7  
The Ternate-Moluccas origin of the Lutaos which is suggested by Combes is disputed by 
David Sopher ,e2 8  but what is known of the situation in the Moluccas at this time,  where 
Dutch tactics there were causing migrations of the original inhabitants to other places , 
lends more weight to Combese' theorye. 
The Lutaos distinguished themselves as pirates and traders , and they had extensive 
communications with all of the kingdoms in the area .  They lived together with the kings
of Magindanao and Sulu and with the minor chiefs inhabiting the coasts .  They were ac­
knowledged as the most knowledgeable and versatile people in the islands , and their 
services were much sought after in wars, shipbuilding , navigation and commercee. No 
wonder then, says Combes , that the king who had the most Lutao followers was considered 
the most powerful and the most feared , for " [the Lutaos] have power to invest the seas 
and coasts, making captives and pillaging , and making themselves masters of the crossings
and passages necessary for communication with the other islands . ' 'e2 9  It was precisely 
because the Cotabato king commanded such a large Lutao following that his kingdom flour­
ished at the expense of Buayan in the interior : 
. . .  the Mindanao [Cotabato] king has become so feared in these latter 
years that although he of Buhayen is the true and legitimate king , he is 
coming to be  less esteemed ; for since the Mindanao king has many Lutaos, he 
has also the power to make ware. And although the king of Buhayen has twenty­
fold more vassals , he can make no one uneasy because he has no subj ects of 
this [Lutao] nation; consequently he has no weight in these islands .e3 0  
Combes ' statement above clearly underlines the foundation of Cotabato 's  power : the 
ability to attract maritime peoples who served under the ruler and gave him the naval 
strength with which to extract tribute from coastal townse3 1  and channel trade to the 
2 5 .  HiBtoria de taB IstaB de Mindanao, Ioto, y BUB Adyaaentes ( 166 7 , edited by W .  Retana 
in 1887)e. Book I ,  chapters 9 - 1 3  are translated in BRPI, XL , pp . 9 9 - 1 8 2 .  Also trans­
lated by J .  H .  Sutherland in Mindanao Heratd, VI , Feb . 3 ,  190 9 ,  pp . 8 - 1 6 .  Certain 
differences in translation were checked against the originale. The present quotation 
is from the Sutherland translation, p .  1 2 .  
2 6 .  Francisco Col!n, Labor Evangetiaa, ed.  Pablo Pastells (Barcelona, 190 0 - 190 2)e, vol .  
I ,  p .  1 7 .  Colfn ' s  work was first published in 1666 .  
2 7 .  Soemarsaid Moertono , State and Statecraft in Otd Java ( I thaca , Cornell University
Modern Indonesia Proj ect , Monograph series , 1968)e, p .  3 1 .  
2 8 .  The real identity of the Lutao (Orang laut , Samal laut , Ilanos or Badjaus?) is dis­
cussed in BRPI, XL , p .  100 ; David Sopher , The Sea Nomads, 1 9 6 5 ,  pp . 3 0 7 - 3 14e. Sopher 
seems to have confused Combese' account with that of an earlier migration from Johore 
mentioned in the tarsitas and dated by Saleeby as fourteenth century. Sopher more­
over located Buayan in Sarangani bay ,  not in the Pulangi valley, thus placing
Comb�s • account in the wrong context .  
2 9 .  Combes , in BRPI, XL , p .  108 . 3 0 .  Ibid. 
3 1 .  Ibid. The special relationship that exists today between the Cotabato royal family
and the Lutangans , allegedly a former sea-nomad people , in the Zamboanga peninsula , 
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flourishing coastal city. Buayan, on the other hand, while it could boast of "twenty­
fold more vassals," was " locked in" by the Cotabato kingdom and thus received less of the 
benefits of trade and piracy. 
Being a maritime power was not wi thout its attendant problems. Cotabato had to 
define its relations with the rival center of power in the interior, which was the source 
of foodstuffs for consumption and export and of minerals and forest products which were 
the stables of the China trade. Buayan , on the other hand , was dependent on Cotabato for 
salt,  metals and Chinese goods. This interdependence, combeined with their rivalry for 
prestige in the Magindanao world, helps to explain the alternati on of conflicts and alli­
ances which is the pattern of their internal relations as late as the nineteenth century. 
In the seventeenth century, however , there is no question of Cotabato' s  superiority on 
account of its navy and its revenue from trade. The more pressing probelem it faced 
during its initial flourishing was that of keeping the sea lanes open for the free move­
ment of shipping. It was typical, for example, for the Badjaus to bring their productse. 
to Cotabato and for Chinese junks to pick them up there. 3 2  Magindanao traders were them­
selves busily carrying their produce in their own vessels to Batavia, Malacca, Manila and 
even Siam.3 3  De la Costa ' s  observation that large-scale slave raids were conspicuously
absent during the period from 1614 to 1634 can perhaps be explained by the flouri shing of 
the China trade in Cotabato. It was in the best interests of the ruler to control piracy
rather than • encourage it. 3 ' 
The Spaniards sought a foothold i n  southern Mindanao precisely in order to curtail 
the flourishing of the China trade in Cotabato. By the end of the sixteenth century they
had singled out the tip of the Z amboanga peninsula as the site of a naval station and 
fort, the first in a series of strategic points designed to impede navigation and to 
carry the sword and cross into the heart of the unsubjected peoples of the south. Two 
specific reasons are given by Morga for Z amboanga ' s  establishment; these must be  borne in 
mind because they were still operative in the nineteenth century. The first reason was 
"so that the friendly Tampacans and Lumaguans be maintained in enmity to the 
Buhahayens."3 5  The Tampacans and Lumaguans were people of the delta ' s  south branch, 
distinct from those of Cotabato in the north branch. They were enemies of Buayan; when 
Figueroa ' s  expedition encountered them in 1596, they contributed their resources to the 
Spanish cause.e3 6  The Spaniards realized, at this early stage , the efficacy of sowing
animosities among the Magindanaos and simultaneously cultivating allies among them. 
Z amboanga ' s  proximity meant that friendships could be  maintained; opportunities for 
intervention could be  exploited.3 7  The second reason for the establishment of Zamboanga 
was to impede navigation and trade. La Caldera, as the fort was called, commanded the 
channel between the peninsula and the island of Basilan. This channel was the normal 
route of Magindanao piratical and trading vessels communicating with the rest of the 
may be a reflection of past conditions. The Lutangans claim to have been the dis­
patch bearers and freight carriers of the Sultaness of Mindanao. E. B. Christie, 
"The non-Christians of the northern half of the Z amboanga peninsula,e" Customary Law 
Papers, VI, p. 162. 
3 2 .  J. Hunt, "Some particulars relating to Sula . . . , " in Moor, Notices of the Indian 
ArchipeZago and Adjacent Countriesr, 1837, p. 50. 
33. Excerpts from F. Valentijn, Oud en Nieuw Dost Indien (1724-6) in Forrest, p. 309. 
34. This idea is developed by O. W. Wolters, "China irredenta: the south,"  The WorZd 
Today (Dec. , 1963). Referring particularly to Srivijaya and Malacca, Wolters 
states :  " It would not be surprising, therefore, i f  the [Chinese] emperors came to 
realize the value to them of a strong maritime kingdom not far from the Straits of 
Malacca, whose rulers could absorb in their fleets the Malay pirate potential and 
maintain well- stocked entrep8ts and good harbour facili�ies, and whose general
stability ensured it a dominating position in the network of Asian maritime communi­
cations converging on China" (pp. 543- 544)e. In her thesis, Reber uses this perspec­
tive in re -examining the writings of Raffles and other Britishers, and thus demol­
ishes many false notions about Sulu "piracy." 
35. Morga, p. 56. 36. Ibid.r, pp. 50-51. 
37. Jose Rizal notes (in Morga, p. 56, footnote 3) : "Because with the continuance of 
the enmity [between the Lumaguans-Tampacans and Buayan]e, it was easier to subdue 
them afterward than when they are united, as i t  happened later [ under Cotabato] , 
doing great damage to the disarmed islands subject to the crown of Castille. For 
this reason we have said that the word "pacify, "  which the author [Morga] uses so 
often, seems to be synonymous with " make war" or "sow animosities." 
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archipelago, the east coast of Mindanao being "next to impossible" for navigation by 
sailing vessels.o3 8  It was also in the itinerary of Chinese junks making for Cotabato.o3 9  
Patrol boats based at La Caldera could give warning of approaching Magindanao ships and 
re-route Chinese junks to Sulu. 
Such was Zamboanga's importance that, when the temporary Spanish garrison was aban­
doned in 1599 owing to intelligence reports that English ships were heading for the 
Visayas, it was like "removing the stopper from the bottle.o" Toward the end of the year 
a Magindanao expedition fell "with fury long repressed" upon the Visayas.o4 0  It is sig­
nificant that the rise of Cotabato in the first half of the seventeenth century took 
place at a time when Z amboanga was abandoned and Spanish activity in the area was almost 
nil. While pressure was being exerted in the Moluccas by the Dutch, Cotabato was an open
port. It attracted traders whose usual range of operations was farther south. No wonder, 
then, that this was the "golden age" of Magindanao commerce which saw the rise of Magin­
danao's most famous historical figure, Yang Dipertuan Kudrat. 
Unfortunately for the Magindanaos, the Jesuits had long analyzed the situation cor­
rectly. In 1635, the central government implemented a Jesuit plan for the permanent 
establishment of a base at Zamboanga.o4 1  This development had repercussions in Magindanao 
shortly afterwards. Sultan Kudrat suffered a military defeat at the hands of a Zamboanga­
based force, in spite of the fact that he had a formidable array of allies, who included 
Sulus, Ternateans, Borneans, Javanese and Dutch.o4 2  Not unexpectedly Cachil Moncay, then 
ruler of Buayan, offered to help the Spaniards capture his rival Kudrat. In returno, the 
Spanish government recognized the Rajah of Buayan as the paramount ruler of Mindanao.o4 3  
Kudrat, however, soon recovered his prestige and, in fact, became more powerful than ever 
owing to his skillful use of diplomacy in dealing with Spain. He signed a treaty in 1645 
which was in the nature of an alliance with Spain for mutual aid and protection. The 
situation became stabilized; Spain once again recognized the paramouncy of Cotabato over 
Buayan. 4 4 
The general outlines, so far, are clear enough. Dislocations caused by the intru­
sion of the colonial powers, specially the Dutch, into the Moluccas brought a consider­
able number of sea nomads and traders to alternative centers, notably Macassar, Sulu and 
38. de la Costa, The Jesuits, p. 281. 
39. Sei Wada, "The Philippine Islands as known to the Chinese before the Ming period ," 
Toyo Bunko, Memoirs, IV, 1929, p. 159. 
40. de la Costa, The Jesuits, pp. 281-282. 
41. Ibid.r, p. 325; Claudio Montero y Gay, "Los moros malayo-mahometanos de Mindanao y
Jolo," Conferenaia sabre Zas Islas Filipinas, BSGM, I, 1876, p. 328; John L. Phelan 
(The Hispanization of the Philippines [Madison, 1967] , p. 138) says that Zamboanga 
was strategic because "leadership among the Moros had passed from the Magindanaus to 
the Sulus . . . .  In order to combat the Sulu menace, the Spaniards chose Zamboanga 
as their principal offensive and defensive base in that region.o" I would agree more 
with de la Costa's version, according. to which Zamboanga was established with the 
Magindanaus, rather than the Sulus, in mind. 
42. On the role of the Javanese and Ternateans see Carta de P. Francisco Lopez, 1636 y
1637, in Vicente Barrantes, Guerras Piratiaas de Filipinas (Madrid, 1878), appendix 
I, pp. 298, 302; "Relaci6n de la Gran Isla de Mindanao,r" p. 113; Delor-Angeles, p.
27; de la Costa, The Jesuitsr, pp. 384-386. 
43. Carta de P. Marcelo Francisco Mastrillo a P. Salazar, BSGM, XXII, 1887, pp. 1 15-116. 
Moncay is regarded as the legitimate ruler of Mindanao, whic�, indeed, is justifi­
able in view of Buayan's previous supremacy. Delor-Angeles thinks, however, that 
Moncay was "obviously a puppet of the Spaniards" (p. 33). The implication is that 
Moncay has absolutely no claim to the title "Sultan of Mindanao" because this natur­
ally resides in th� Cotabato ruling family. But is this really so? While Cotabato 
was powerful it certainly could justify its prerogatives to the title. As it de­
clined, the title no longer coincided with reality. When title and reality became 
so divorced in the late nineteenth century, the Spanish government solved the dilemma 
by recognizing, de faoto, two Sul tans of Mindanao. (Ferdinand Blumentri tt, "Los 
maguindanaos, estudio etnografico ," BSGM, XXXV, 1893, p. 27 7 . )  The Moncay incident 
must be seen as part of a rivalry for control of the Sultanate. (Cf. Gullick, pp.o.
120 - 121 . )  
44. de la Costa, The Jesuits, p. 442; Saleeby, Studies, p. 57. 
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Cotabato. Their aggregation in Cotabato gave the ruler a powerful navy and attracted 
trade, thereby causing the eclipse of once-dominant Buayan and heightening tensions be­
tween the two distinct centers of power in the Pulangi valley. The establishment of 
Zamboanga brought another source of tensions into the Magindanao scene. A coercive in­
fluence began to be exercised upon Cotabato as Magindanao navigation was impeded and 
Chinese junks kept out. Moreover, Spain took advantage of internal rivalries to maintain 
some influence in Magindanao, pitting Cotabato and Buayan, both of which aspired to 
leadership of the Magindanao world, against each other. 
According to de la Costa, when Zamboanga was abandoned from 1663 to 1718, the inter­
vening fifty years saw a considerable development in the socio- political structures of 
Magindanao and Sulu. The "semi-feudal" confederacies of the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries "were now full-fledged sultanates with a fiscal administration,
courts of justice, and a bureaucracy of a rudimentary kind.o" The Cotabato and Sulu sul­
tans began to see themselves as "heads of state,o" no longer petty datus holding roughly 
equal power with a multitude of others.o4 5  While it is true that Cotabato trade and com­
munications with the Muslim world reached its peak in the 1660's, a decline seems to have 
set in by the end of the century. When Dampier visited Cotabato in 1686, he found the 
sultan most anxious for the East India Company to establish a factory there; the Sultan 
needed trade to recapture the glory which his city had known under Kudrat. 
The Sultan is absolute in his power over all his subjects. He is but a 
poor prince; for as I mentioned before, they have but little trade and 
therefore cannot be rich.o4 6  
The Magindanaos openly expressed their praise and friendship for the British. Their 
attitude toward the Dutch was more reserved. But for the Spaniards they had nothing but 
resentment and fear.o4 7  Was it because of the damage Zamboanga's presence had inflicted 
upon their trade? Majul states that the Cotabato Sultanate ' s  prestige reached its peak
under the rule of Kudrat, the first to arrogate to himself the title "Sultan,o" and that 
his death in 1671 marked the beginning of the sultanateo' s  fragmentation into smaller 
units.o4 8  In fact, by the eighteenth century it is hardly accurate to speak of a unified 
Magindanao world under the Sultan of Mindanao at Cotabato. 
In 1701, mutual jealousy and distrust bet.ween the sultans of Cotabato and Sulu 
during a visit of the latter to Cotabato erupted into bloody hand-to-hand combat between 
the two, in which both combatants are said to have been killed. The result was a declara­
tion of war between the two sultanates.o4 9  At this point the new Cotabato Sultan embarked 
upon a course of action which betrayed his weakness and set the precedent for similar 
actions by his successors for the next century and a half; he demanded, by virtue of the 
1645 Lopez-Kudrat treaty, that the Spanish government aid him in destroying his enemy, 
Sulu.o5 0  The Spanish government thought it unpolitic at this time to interfere in such 
internal matters. But when Zamboangao' s  garrison was re-established in 1718, the road was 
open for Spanish intervention. In 1719, a fresh treaty was drawn up between the Cotabato 
Sultan and the governor of Zamboanga.o5 1  Twelve years later, a Spanish naval force 
entered Magindanao waters in response to a plea from the Sultan, who was threatened with 
internal strife. 
The Magindanao civil war of the 1730's is a watershed in Mindanao history, for it 
exposes the fragility of Cotabatoo' s  control over the interior and also marks the begin­
ning of the Sultan ' s  mounting reliance on Spain for the maintenance of his prestige. 
Historians who have dealt with this period have not rendered a satisfactory assessment 
of it. The_ account which has been accepted by Saleeby, Blair and Robertson, and 
45. de la Costa, The Jesuitse, p. 541. 
46. Ibid.e, pp. 341-342. 47. Ibid., p. 363. 
48. "The role of Islam,o" p. 311. Referring, it seems, to Zamboanga Majul states: 
"Spanish presence in Mindanao frustrated the natural course of events for the 
gradual integration of various minor Moslem principalities under one centralized 
authority" (ibid.e) .  
49. BRPI, XL, p .  316. 
SO. Emilio Bernaldez, Resena Historiaa de la Guerra a l  Sur de Filipinas (Madrid, 1857),
p. 119. 
5 1 .  Ibid., p. 1 3 8 .  
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otherso5 2  is that which the Cotabato Sultan's elder brother narrated to Thomas Forrest in 
1776.o5 3  In this version,  the civil war is reduced to the proportions of a succession 
dispute. The rightful sultan ' s  uncle usurps the throne, which is then passed on to the 
usurper's son and grandson. The Sulus side with one or the other contender in order to 
keep the sultanate in turmoil. In the end the rightful heir, Pakir Mawlana , drives the 
usurper Malinog to Buayan and restores peace to the land. It is a petty dispute, no more. 
We hear a different story, however , from four Spanish historians.o5 4  Instead of 
being just another ambitious member of the royal family, the usurper Malinog is said to 
be "a prominent chief of Mindanao" who rebelled against the Sultan, having secured the 
support of more than thirty of the principal villages of the Pulangi. The Forrest, or 
Cotabato , account seems to deny Malinog external. support, and also completely ignores the 
Spanish role in the civil war. According to the Spanish version ,  Malinog's rebellion was 
caused by his refusal to obey the Sultan's demand that he restore to the Spaniards the 
captives and spoils which he, together with the Sulus , had plundered from the Visayas 
from 1722 to 1723. The Sultan, powerless to stem the tide of revolt, sought the help of 
his allies at Zamboanga who , when they learned that Malinog, in turn , was being aided by 
the Dutcho, decided in 1731 to send a fleet to Tamontakao, where the deposed Sultan was 
residing. Malinog's fort, built by a Dutch engineer, was destroyed after a long battle; 
his heavily defended principal kota farther upriver was devastated. In 1733, however,
Malinog suddenly descended on Tamontaka and slew the Sultan. The Rajah Mudah refused to 
be crowned successor until Manila sent help; he complained that it was his friendship 
with Spain that had brought upon him the hatred of both Malinog and the Sultan of Sulu. 
The Spanish government finally bowed to his demands, raised a sum of nine thousand pesos, 
and dispatched a fleet of forty-eight vessels to the Pulangi. 
An excellent gauge of the "legitimate" Cotabato Sultan's prestige is the isolation 
in which the Rajah Mudah found himself , forcing him to cry to the Spaniards for help. 
The rebel and usurper Malinogo) on the other hand, was backed by a considerable number of 
Magindanao chiefs, and was allied with the king of the Illanuns, the Sultan of Tawi-tawi , 
the Sultan of Sulu, and the Dutch. The Rajah Mudah was saved when the Spanish fleet from 
Manila arrived. A Dutch vessel was captured near Malinog's stronghold, and, although the 
Sulu-Balanini-Illanun relief contingent was not defeated, it had to turn back for some 
reason or other. Malinog was pushed back to his stronghold upriver near Buayan. In 
April 1734, the Rajah Mudah was crowned Sultan by the Spaniards.o5 5  
What role, if any, did Buayan play in the civil war? Evidently the version which 
Forrest took down conceals the existence of a rival power in the interior. On the con­
trary, there is strong evidence to suggest that Malinog had links with the Buayan king­
dom. A Spanish writer, Campos Tomas, claims that Malinog was "a prince reigning in 
Buayan.o"5 6 The tarsiias place Malinog within the Cotabato royal family, but, given the 
relations between the Cotabato and Buayan ruling families, he may well have had affinal 
ties with the latter. This possibility is strongly hinted at in the fact that Malinog's 
three half-brothers (he was an only son) are all linked with Buayan: one was named Raja 
Bwayan Manuk, and may well have been Buayan's ruler at the time of the revolt; .the other 
two were born of a Buayan princess.o5 7  It must also be noted that Malinog's power base 
was located just below the apex of the delta , a region which, says Saleeby, was in the 
"middle zone" between sa-i'lus and sa-raya and looked either to Cotabato or Buayan, which­
ever was more powerful.o5 8  This evidence, including the fact that in all the sources 
52. Saleeby, Studies, p. 58; BRPIr, XLVI, pp. 45-48 , footnote 6; a more recent example is 
Reber, p. 185. 
53. See Forrest, pp. 201-206. Saleeby and Blair and Robertson were aware of other, con­
flicting versions but, for some reason or other , rejected them in favor of Forrest's. 
54. Joseph Torrubiao, Dissrertacion Historico-poZttica (1753) , pp. 68-90, trans. in BRPI,
XLVI, pp. 38-43; Jose Montero y Vidal , Historia de Fi'lipinas (1889-95), I ,  pp. 438-
452, trans. in BRPI, XLVI , pp. 44-51 (this account is based on Juan de la Concepci6n, 
Historia de Fi'lipinas ( 1788-92]o, X ,  pp. 198-238 , 337-375); "Capitulo de carta escrita 
por el Provincial de la Compania de Jesus de Filipinas al Comisario de su orden en 
Madrid, "  in Barrantes, app. III ,  pp. 311-342; Mariano Campos Tomas, "Estudio del 
Pulangi (Mindanao) , "  La Po'lrltica de Espana en FiZipinas, VIII , no. 184 ( 1898), pp.
165- 167. The account we give is a composite of all four. 
55. Ibid. 56. p. 165. 57. Cf. tarsiia in Saleeby, Studies, p. 38. 
58. The Sultan of Tumbao , at the delta's apex , had close kinship, economic and political 
ties with both Cotabato and Buayan. " . . •  The Intermediate position between Saylud
and Saraya have been very prominent factors in the history-making events of the 
valley.o" (Saleeby, Studies, p. 47. ) 
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Malinog is said to have been driven upriver and prevented from ever descending , indicates 
that this Magindanao rebel prince was a protege of the Buayan ruler who perceived his 
rival ' s  weakness and de faato dependence upon Spain. 
The main accomplishment of the Spanish relief expedition was the closure of the 
Pulangi passages to the upriver Magindanaos , who were thus "shut in from [ their] allies 
the Joloans and Camucones . " r5 9  At bes t ,  the rebellion was contained by exploiting the 
geographic factor which had always placed Cotabato in a favored position vis -a-vis 
Buayan . Meanwhile , the Sultan fel.1 more and more into the net of Spanish influence: 
. . .  he agreed to allow the entrance o f  Christian missionariesr, the bui ld­
ing of churches ,  and the establishment of Spanish forts and garrisons , in 
his territories ; also to acknowledge his vassalage to Spain by furnishing a 
quantity of wax , cacao and other products of his country.r6 0  
Thus , the civil war had increased the polarization of the Magindanao world into sa-iiud 
and sa-raya. Cotabato began to look more and more to Zamboanga and Spain for the mainte­
nance o f  its power .  Buayan in the interior was locked in ,  harboring the rebels who had 
attempted to take over Cotabat o .  But if Malino g ,  now in Buayan, was forcibly cut off 
from his Sulu and I l l anun allies , this measure , undertaken by the Cotabato Sultan with 
the help of the Spanish navy , could at best be temporary. 
One maj or account of Magindanao remains to be  reviewed before we move on to the 
nineteenth century , and this i s  Thomas Forres t ' s ,  who visited the area from 1 7 7 5 - 1 7 7 6 .  
From 1718  to the time of his vis i t ,  Zamboanga had been evacuated for only a few years
during the British occupation of Manil a  ( 1 762 - 1764 )r. The perceptive Forrest concludes 
that Zamboanga was the cause of the Sultan ' s  poverty and weakness. Spanish patrol boats 
prevented Chinese j unks from calling at Cotabat o .  Thus , Chinese goods had to enter via 
Sulu ; the little  trade that was carried on by the Chinese was confined to that of a few 
country traders called "Orang Sangley . " r6 1  Some sixty years later another Britisher, J. 
Hunt ,  attributed the Sultanate ' s  decline to the departure from the area of the Badjaus , 
who , he said , were the original orang soiok of the eas t of Subanos and Lutas : 
. . .  The prohibi tion of the j unk trade at Magindanao . . .  by which they
[the Badjraus ] were prevented from s e l ling their produc e ,  compelled them to 
resort to Macassar and to make that the center of their annual operations.r6 2  
Forrest has little  to s ay regarding the general internal s i tuation, i . e . , the condi­
tions in sa-raya, because he was caught up in the world of Cotabator. Because of friendly 
relations between the Cotabato royal family and s ome Illanun raj ahs , he was abl e  to visit  
some of the dreaded pirate areasr. Forrest ' s  inab i l ity to visit  the upper Pulangi may
have been owing to the Sultan ' s  lack o f  control over it  and inabi l i ty to guarantee his 
safety. But what Forrest heard about Buayan is interes ting , confirming the existence of 
that inland power- center : 
Many of the countries above Boyan are subj ect to the Rajah of Boyan. He is 
a Mahometan, and his subjrects , called by the Magindanao peopl e  Oran Selam 
de Oolo (inland Musselmen)r, may be about twenty- thousand males .r6 3  
Buayan , then , control led a considerable territory and population which the Magiridanaos of 
the delta regarded as dis tinct and inland-dwelling . Forrest ' s  mention of the great num­
ber of his subj ects recalls Combesr' comment that the Buayan ruler had "twenty - fold more 
vassals" than the Cotabato Sultan. But in the matter of status or rank the ruler of 
Buayan, being a mere rajah, was theoretically inferior to the Cotabato Sultan. Forrestr· 
adds that the Rajah of Buayan was obliged to supply the sultanate with a certain number 
of men in times of war , the impl ication being that the former was in some sort of vassal­
age status relative to  Cotabat o . r6 � 
59. Torrubia,  1n BRPI, XLVI , p .  4 3 .  60. Ibid. 
61. p .  2 8 0 .  6 2 .  "Some particulars , "  p .  SOr. 
63. pp. 188- 189. The population figure o f  20 , 000  males is reasonab l e .  Figures in the 
1870 ' s  place at 3 5 , r267 the total population under Buayan ' s  control. The comparative
figure for the area controlled by Cotabato (then under Spanish rule) is 29 , 115 .  
Antonio Martel de Gayangos , "La Ysla de Mindanao" (undated,  ca .  1878) , MS , Newberry
Library , c f .  chart in appendix. 
6 4 .  p .  189 . 
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Differences in rank notwithstanding, b y  by the end of the eighteenth century the 
Sultan of Mindanao at Cotabato was undoubtedly suffering an erosion in the basis of his 
power, a powerful navy and control of trade, as a result of the presence of Spanish 
Zamboanga, while the Rajah of Buayan, although locked up in the interior, preserved the 
basis of his power, which was a sizeable population and vast natural resources. Forrest 
himself points out that the Cotabato Sultan ' s  greatest asset was his superior geographi­
cal situation: 
. . •  The Rajah of Boyan can have no connection with any body of water out 
of the river, without leave of Magindanao. As all egress must be by water,
the Sultan has him in a manner locked up; unless he go by the lake Buloan,
and the harbor of Sugud Boyan (Sarangani bay) , between which there is a 
communication by land over flat c.ountry. . . . 6 5 
We can assume that a great portion of the. Sultan's wealth was in fact derived from the 
collection of tolls from vessels coming to and from the interior,o6 6  implying that Cota­
bato was beginning to rely on the upriver people for income as well as foodstuffs. The 
stable situation which Forrest witnessed, in contrast to the turmoil of the civil war 
years, is perhaps due to the interdependence of sa-iZud and sa-raya, not to the Sultan's 
control over the interior. But the Spaniards were to alter the situation in the nine­
teenth century. The sudden outburst of energy from Buayan, at a time when the Magindanao 
interior was threatened with Spanish conquest, should be seen in the light of the preced­
ing summary and re-interpretation of Magindanao's early history. By looking at Magin­
danao history not merely in terms of the ·sultanate of Mindanao at Cotabato but also 
taking into account the existence of a rival power center in the interior, we need no 
\o.r\g,er .?e�. . the rise of Datu Uto of Buayan as an "accidental occurrence"; his rise becomes .
another expression of the tension that exists in the Magindanao world between its two 
territories, sa-i Zud and sa-raya .  
65. Ibid.  The significance of Sarangani bay is dealt with 1n Chapter III. 
66. See Chapter III, p. 23. 
CHAPTER II 
THE SPANISH ADVANCE AND THE RISE OF DATU UTO (1861-1878) 
The rise of Buayan under Datu Uto in the second half of the nineteenth century was 
largely a response to the situation created by the Spaniards in their attempt to subdue 
the Philippine Muslims by force or diplomacy. The renewed vigor in Spanish policy toward 
the Muslims in the nineteenth century was influenced by several factors. The most press­
ing, perhaps, was the search for a solution to the problem of piracy and slave-raiding in 
the Christian territories. Although the bulk of these deeds was known to be perpetrated 
by Illanun and Samal (i.oe.o, Balanini) pirates, blame was heaped· upon the Sulus and 
Magindanaos for their acquiescence and even outright participation in such acts. Solu­
tions to this problem tended to oscillate between what can be termed the "military" and 
the "diplomatic" solutions. The former was, generally, speaking, a revival of governor­
general Corcuera's successful tactic in the later sixteenth century, which was: 
To watch the departure of Moro fleets; to be in full observation of their 
movements, and to try to attack them before they arrive at the ports which 
they intend to assault with the intention of pillage and slave-raiding.o1 
The policy which can be loosely termed "diplomatic" or "liberal "  involved the setting up 
of treaties with the major sultans with the purpose of, among other things, using their 
influence upon their subjects to suppress piratical activity. This policy tended to be 
applied when Spanish military weakness precluded armed intervention, although the genuine 
liberal outlooks of some governors-general must not be underestimated. In any case, the 
"diplomatic" approach tended to be ineffective owing to the nature of the sultans' politi­
cal control; suppression of piracy was generally a dead letter in the treaties as a re­
sult of the sultans' lack of authority, as distinguished from influence, over their sub­
jects. 
Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Spanish military capability 
was considerably enhanced by the introduction of steamships, shifts in policy along the 
lines mentioned above tended to reflect the varying outlooks of the Manila government.
We must bear in mind that throughout the nineteenth century Spain was involved in a 
struggle between liberalism and constitutionalism, on the one hand, and conservatism and 
absolutism on the other. As one side gained power momentarily, a new governor-general
would be sent to the Philippines. Thus, a policy of armed conquest might be initiated by 
a conservative governor-general, only to be superseded a few years later by a liberal 
policy of coexistence.o2 Such vacillations in Manila had repercussions in the Magindanao 
scene. 
The desire to control the independent territories of Sulu and Magindanao, whether by 
peaceful or armed means, was also a response to the changing nature of the Philippine 
foreign trade. The galleon trade monopoly, which had confined the Philippine trade to a 
few Spaniards resident in Manila and their backers in Mexico who regarded Manila only as 
a depot of exchange for Chinese and other exotic oriental goods, was fin�lly dissolved 
when Mexican insurgents occupied Acapulco in 1815. Attention began to be paid to direct 
commercial links between the Philippines and Spain and to the exportation of crude prod­
ucts of the archipelago. Agricultural development was stimulated. Manila-based foreign­
ers were encouraged to develop the export trade. Eventually, ports in the Visayas, such 
as Cebu and Iloilo, were opened and foreigners were allowed to trade and traffiG in the 
provinces.o3 With the hope of deriving revenue from trade Spaniards were beginning to 
think of the fertile plains and forests of Mindanao, where cacao and tobacco might be 
cultivated and where such traditional exports as beeswax, resins and rice were plentiful.
Jolo, too, the entrepot par exaeZtenae and center of the slave trade, had to be brought 
into the Spanish sphere of influence. The Spaniards had to face the fact that the trade 
1. Bernaldez, p. 145. 
2. For a good survey of the Liberal-Conservative dispute see Horacio de la Costa, Read­
ings in PhiZippine History (Manila, 1965), chapter X, pp. 168-182. 
3. James A. Leroy, "The Philippines, 1860-1898--some comment and bibliographical notes,o" 
BRPI, LII, p. 113. 
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of these areas was directed to Batavia and Singapore . Moreover , the British and French 
were already knocking at the doors of Sulu and Basilan respectively. Thus, for Manila it  
was a race to secure the southern boundaries of  the colonye. 
The first s ignificant development was the signing of  treaties with the Sulu and Cota­
bato sultans in 1836 and 183 7 .  The dual motives of resetraining piracy and opening up
trade were clearly involved here; moreovere, the Spaniards seem to have been unable to use 
force because of the sorry s tate of  their navy at this time .e4 Bernaldez says that gover­
nor- general Salazar , who originated the idea of the treaties, was fascinated by the idea 
of encouraging commercial traffic with the Muslim areas in order to give the sultans and 
datus other incentives, besides piracy, to acquire wealth .5 With regard to Sulu, agree­
ments were made to regulate the licensing of shipping and duties to be paid by Sulu boats 
in Manila and Zamboanga and Spanish vessels in Jolo . An alliance was declared for guar­
anteeing peace and safety in both Philippine and Sulu waterse.e6 Such "concess ions" made 
by the Sulu Sultan were relatively minor compared with those of the Cotabato Sultan. 
Besides de facto control of Cotabato trade by Zamboanga, the Sultan had to accept the 
title "Feudatory King of Tamontaka" from the Spanish government, which also chose his 
successor .e7 A big s tep was now made towards the incorporation of Cotabato into the Span­
ish colonial domainse. As J .  Hunt observed in 1837, the English might s till have a free 
hand at Sulu and its posesess ions, but Magindanao was considered a part of the Philippines,
"and although restored to the Sultan , it was under an express  stipulation that his majes­
ty should not cede or permit the introduction of  any European without the express consent 
and license of the Spanish government . " e8 
Manila was delighted that the Cotabato Sultan should have easily and perhaps will­
ingly come under its wing , for the Sultan was believed to be the key to the eventual 
domination of the whole Pulangi valleye. Only gradually did the Spanish government accept
the fact that the "Sultan of Mindanao,e" as they believed .etheir protege to be , really con­
trolled only the deltae. Former tributaries were quick to repudiate their relationship
with Cotabato when they recognized that the Sultan was being used to further Spain' s  
imperialist ambitionse. This was done by the Muslims of Davao gulf, on the east side of 
Mindanao . e9 In 1844, the Cotabato Sultan ceded Davao to Spain;  it was to be colonized 
sometime later by Jose Oyanguren. Around the year 1847, the vessel San Rufor, captained
by a Spaniard, came to Davao to tradee. It carried a letter of recommendation from the 
Cotabato Sultan, charging the datus of Davao to receive those of the San Rufo as friendse. 
The Davao Muslims pretended to respect the Sultan ' s  letter, and engaged in trade . Btit 
when the majority of the ship ' s  crew were at some disetance away from the vessel, they 
were attacked by the inhabitantse. Only two of the San Rufo ' s  crew escaped to tell the 
talee. The Manila government angrily demanded satisfaction from the Cotabato Sultan . But 
what could the latter do except to admit that the inhabitants of Davao were no longer his 
subj ects , s ince they had disobeyed his orders, and that the Spanish government had to 
deal with the Davao da tus directly?.1 0 
I n  1848, a powerful Spanish force led by the colonizer Oyanguren invaded Davao .  To 
the aid of the Davao datus came hundreds of Magindanaos from the upper Pulangi ,  or s a� 
raya; after all, the harassed Davao Sultan was the fathere- in- law of the sultan of Cabakan , 
a rancheria near the upper limit of sa-raya which was under the influence of Buayan. In 
spite of the assistance from Magindanao, the Spanish conquest was inevitable owing to 
superior weaponrye. The top-ranking Davao datus retreated to Cabakan with their followers .  
4 .  In 1835, Captain general Enrile made a regulation, the most salient feature of which 
was that no naval encounter was to be accepted or offered to the Morose, because of 
the certainty of defeat .  Agustin Santayana, La Isla de Mindanao (Madrid, 1862)e, p .
41e. 
5 .  p .  1 4 7 .  6 .  Saleeby , History of SuZu, pp . 194- 1 9 9 .  
7 .  Delor-Angeles , p .  SOe. Unfortunately , I do not have a copy of the treaty itself. 
Other writers who refer to some of its provisions are Santayana (p. 41) and Saleeby, 
(Studiesr, p.  60) . 
8 .  p .  5 3 .  
9 .  According to Blumentritt ,  the Muslim inhabitants of Davao gulf were ethnically
Magindanao ("Los maguindanaos , "  p .  267)e. Evident!Y, they had the greatest renown 
as pirates in the seventeenth centurye. (See Combese, in BRPI, XL , pp . 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 .  
1 0 .  Quirico More to Father Superior, Jan. 20 , 1 885 , BRPIr, XL , pp . 1 9 4 - 1 9 6 . The letter 
alseo appears in CMSJ, VIIe. 
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Others withdrew southwes t to the Liguasean-Buluan areas and Sarangani bay.e1 1  These terri­
tories became foci of strong anti-Spanis h  and anti-Cotabato sentiments ; they were a poten­
tial source of support for future resisetance movements .e1 2  
When the use of steam vessels in 1846 finally establis hed the Spanish Navy's superi­
ority over native vintas and praus, there was no stopping the Spanish advance through
forceful means. The destruction of the Balanini pirate haunts i n  1848 brought a distinct 
lull in piratical activities, which was used to advantage by the establishment of fac­
tories and the dispatch of trading vessels to Mindanao.e1 3  In  1851, Jolo was razed by a 
Spanish force in reaction to alleged violations of the 1836 treaty and to attempts by
Sir James Brooke to draw Sulu into the British sphere of influence.� � After another vic­
tory over the Calamianes pirates , the Spanis h government took the first step toward the 
actual occupation of Magindanao by implanting a fort and naval base at Pollok, north of 
Cotabato, i n  1851. This measure was welcomed by the Sultan, who felt the need for Span­
ish support i n  order to bolster his prestige. Ironically, however, the Cotabato-Spain 
alliance only resulted in a further loss of the Sultan's subje cts and allies. The revolt 
of the inhabitants of Sugut in 1852e, for example, was prompted not only by enmity toward 
the Spaniards at Pollok but also by enmity toward the Sultan, who was now regarded a 
puppet of Spain.1 5  
The exploration teams which set out from Pollok in 1854 and 1855 to look into condi­
tions in the Pulangi valley finally put an end to illusions the government had of the 
Magindanao political and social s i tuation. As Romualdo Crespo, one of the explorers, 
puts it:  "The government's lack of knowledge, up to this day, of the social organization 
of the Mindanao Moros has been the s ole cause of the great i mportance we have given to 
the Cotabato Sultan i n  the treaty of 183 7 . " 1 6  Indeed, for the first time since the s even­
teenth century we are provided with a succinct account of i nternal relations i n  the whole 
of Magindanao, knowledge which was beyond the capability of Forrest, who had not dared to 
venture inland. 
In the 17 7 0 's Forrest could s till sens e  that the Cotabato Sultanate had pres tige and 
maintained its hold over the s ymbols of power even if  i t  lacked authority over its "sub­
jects." By the 1850's however, radical changes in the internal s i tuation seem to have 
taken place. There were no less than thirteen sultans in the river valley living in 
mutual rivalry. The absence of a s trong central power had induced many princelings to 
as sert their independence, styling themselves "sultan,e" whether or not they had the pres­
tige and genealogy to bear such as sertions. As Montero y Gay puts it :  
11. Claudio Montero y Gay, "Exploracion en Mindanao, "  BSGM, XV ( 1883) , p. 122 ;  Santayana, 
p. 111; Joaquin Rajeal y Larre, Exploracion del territorio de Davao (Madrid, 1891) , 
p. 16 (based on explorations made i n  1859 and 1882) .  Santayana adds that the datus 
of Davao all fled because under Spanis h  rule they would not have been able to main­
tain their arisetocratic s tatus based on piracy and slavery. Only 6 ,000  sakops
(vassal or client class)  remained i n  the towns (ibid.r) .  
12. In June 1861, the governor of Davao received reports that more than 600 Moros from 
the lake Buluan region were setting out to attack Davao. The threat was averted 
with the help of pro-Spanish pagan tribes, but Buluan was not occupied and later 
came under Buayan's control; Montero y Vidal, Historia, III, pp. 335- 336e. 
13. Bernaldez, pp. 17 1-17 2 .  On Feb. 2 5 ,  1849, the Governor- general of the Dutch Eas t  
Indies sent a congratulatory letter to the Count of Manila. 
14e. Cf. Saleeby, History of Sulu, pp. 93 - 10 6, 2 3 7-250. 
15. Bernaldez, p. 2 19. 
16. Romaldo Crespo y Guerra to the Gov. and Captain- general, Manila , June 3 1  [sic]r, 1885, 
MS, Newberry Library , p. 90. The firs t expedeition was undertaken in August 1854 by
Juan de Cordoba, Captain of Engineers s tationed at Pollok. The second, from Febru­
ary to March, 185 5 ,  was led by Staff Colonel Ramon Mascaro, and i ncluded Infantry 
Commander Romaldo Crespo, Naval Lieutenant Claudio Montero y Gay, Lt. Col. of 
Artillery Fernando Fernandez de Cordova, and Jose Oyanguren, conqueror and Mayor of 
Davao. Individual manuscript reports of the above-mentioned are collected in a 
single volume: Jos e Cruz de Oyanguren, "Primer reconocimiento de gran rio Minda­
nao," July 7 ,  185 5 ,  MSS, Newberry Library. Montero's account, which has been cited 
(above, note 11)e, is repriented i n  BSGM, XV. Oyangure n ' s  account is in Benito 
Francia and Julian Parrado, La Islas Filipinas: Mindanao (Havana, 1898)e, vol. II,  
appendix. 
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I believe that a chief who is known for his valor, who has led a prescribed
number of individuals on an expedition, who possesses some Zantakas and 
slaves, has a valid claim to proclaim himself Sultan of his pueb lo . 1 7  
The Spanish observers could still perceive the figments of a past situation: a sa-iZud 
dominated by Cotabato , a sa-raya dominated by Buayan. But they had to admit that even in 
the delta , the Cotabato Sultan ' s  vassals only paid him nominal respect, ignoring his com­
mands and contributing the barest minimum for his support. The Sultan was , in Montero ' s  
harsh terms, "a fake , a ridiculous figure whom no one obeys but his slaves; a king with­
out soldiers or slaves,owhose palace is a miserable hovel."o1 8  His principal sources of 
support were Cotabato itself; Paiguan, residence of the traditional commander of the 
Magindanao fleet, the Datu Amirol (formerly Raja Laut); and Supangan, whose datu had both 
the military title of maramaya and the religious title of pandita.  Some years later even 
Supangan was to rise against the Sultan and his Spanish friends. Other localities that 
looked nominally to Cotabato were Simuay to the north ,  and those on the Pulangi's south 
branch, Limapalay and Taviran. These were settlements which maintained friendly relations 
with Zamboanga,o1 9  but it did not mean that they would continue to respect the Sultan. 
Finally , Tumbao, the strategic settlement at the apex of the delta ,  was in open revolt 
against Cotabato. 
Sa-raya , too, was in a fragmented state. The Buayan Sultanate ' s  control was con­
fined to the kotas of Buayan, Pinyaman and Kabalungan. Montero y Gay, however, stresses 
the fact that Buayan was the most important and prestigious sultanate in the upper 
Pulangi. Its ruler was called "Grand Sultan" in order to distinguish him from the more 
recent upstarts. Gone was his vassal relationship with the Cotabato Sultan. Even the 
latter's assertion that a confederation still existed between them was seriously doubted 
by Montero. The one thing that, at this time, clearly stood in the way of conflict be­
tween them wa, the tie of kinship between the two ruling families.2 0  
The general internal situation can be summarized as follows: The Cotabato Sultan 
had undoubtedly lost the respect of the Magindanaos in the interior. Whether this was 
true as early as the eighteenth century cannot be ascertained owing to lack of informa­
tion at the author's disposal. But we can be sure that this was the outcome of the 
process described in the last chapter. Setbacks in trade had deprived the Sultan of the 
greater part of his wealth; his increasingly close relationship with the Spaniards in an 
effort to maintain his precarious situation had only resulted in heightened resentment 
from the interior. But the sentiment was not necessarily anti-Spanish. In 1854 the 
Sultan of Buayan appeared to be friendly toward Spain; his irritation was rather directed 
at the Cotabato Sultan ' s  practice of blocking the mouth of the river in order to prevent
the sa-raya Magindanaos from communicating with the Spaniards at Pollok. The Buayan 
Sultan believed that his rival wished to be the sole beneficiary of whatever might accrue 
from friendship with Spain.2 1  That this was a correct appraisal of the situation can be 
seen from other details. Why was the Cotabato Sultan, unlike his counterpart at Sulu,
willing to cede his domains to a colonial power? There is no doubt that the domestic 
motive was paramount. The Sultan wanted to use his alliance with Spain as a counterforce 
to threats emanating from Buayan.o2 2  In 1855 he requested the establishment of a Spanish
garrison in Cotabato.o2 3  Furthermore, it was reported on February 186 1 ,  the eve of the 
Spanish occupation, that fortifications were being built in Cotabato not as a defense 
17. "Exploracion , "  p. 117. 18. Ibid . ,  p. 119. 
19. These seem to be the sites where the Lumaguans and Tampacans, with whom the Span­
iards at Zamboanga maintained contact s.ince the seventeenth century , had their 
settlements (see Chapter I, p. 8). 
20. Montero y gayo, "Exploracion , "  pp. 119-120. 
21. Juan Cordoba, "Gran Rio de Mindanao,o" MS , Newberry Library, entry of Aug. 19 , 1854, 
p. 3 2 .  
22. In the series of treaties made between Spain and Cotabato from 1827 to 1872, it is 
clear that the Magindanaos from Libungan and Taviran down (i.e.o, sa-raya) would be 
granted certain benefits such as the use of the Spanish flag ( ! )  and the provision 
of arms. Enemies of the Sultan (i.e.o, generally the sa-iZud people) would be con­
sidered enemies of Spain; Ladislao Nieto, "Mindanao: paginas sueltas, 1885-18 87 , "  
MS , Newberry Library , pp. 64-66. 
23. Ramon Mascaro to the Gov. and Captain- general , Manila, June 21 , 1855, MS , Newberry
Library , p . 8 S . 
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against the Spaniards but as a protection against the Buayan Sultan ' s  threat to place by 
force one of his sons (possibly the young Datu Uto) on the Cotabato throne.e2 � 
If, on one hande, the sa-raya chiefs were resentful of some of the Cotabato Sultan ' s  
practices, on the other hand their attitude toward the Spanish visitors was ambivalente. 
The threat of a Spanish invasion of the Pulangi not being imminent at the time, how else 
could the foreign explorers be regarded by the petty sultans, each vying to gain the 
upper hand over the other, except as representatives of a powerful kingdom with whom 
alliance would be profitable? To the delight of the Spaniards some chiefs sought to 
outdo each other in honoring them and seeking their friendship.e2 5  Not all acted this 
way, however. There were those who remembered the bloody conquest of Davao seven years
earlier. The Sultanate of Cabakan, where the principal datus of Davao had found refuge, 
was particularly hostile and twice attempted, unsuccessfully, to engineer ambuscades 
against the Spanish flotilla .  The majority of the chiefs were simply apathetic. But it 
is significant that on one occasion where a datu was slighted by the Spaniards who pre­
2 tferred to deal with his rival, the former was quick to join the hostile camp.e This is 
a sign that beneath all the apathy and divisiveness was a potential for unity and action. 
What impressed the Spanish explorers was the fragmentation of authority in Maginda­
nao, from which it was concluded that the situation was ripe for a Spanish occupation.
Montero y Gay suggested that, by occupying Cotabato and adopting a policy of attraction, 
most of the little sultanates could be won over to their side; these in turn could be set 
off against the few recalcitrant ones. Infantry Commander Crespo felt confident that 
control could be established simply by taking over Cotabato and Matincauan, at both ends 
of the Magindanao settlement in the Pulangi river, and having a steamship shuttle back 
and forth petween the two points .  Oyanguren and Mascaro stressed economic develeopment 
and the opening up of trade. This would bring wealth to the inhabitants as well as to 
Spain. How, then, could a conflict develop? Such confidence on the part of the Span­
iards was not an outcome of ignorance . Crespo ' s  advice that the Muslim sherifs and 
panditas ought to be  carefully watched or even expelled, and Mascaro's recommendation 
that the hill tribes, the source of manpower, be  neutralized by missionaries, show an 
awareness of the roots of political power.2 7  But the Spanish observers were so impressed 
by the conditions of relative peace and equilibrium they witnessed that they could not 
imagine that the Magindanaos could be unified under a leader other than the Cotabato 
Sultan, their ally; they underestimated the reaction to their projected establishment of 
control. What actually happened was beyond their expectations. The Spanish advance 
served as the catalyst for the impending restructuring of the Magindanao internal polity. 
On April 30, 1861, a flotilla led by the commanding general of Pollok naval base 
advanced toward the mouth of the Pulangi river. With the corvette Narvaez stateioned at 
the headwaters, the contingent moved into Paiguan, residence of Datu Amirol, father of 
the Sultan. There the Spanish flag was raised in the datu's kota without the slightest
resistance . At Cotabato, the Sultan of Mindanao likewise raised the Spanish flag to the 
roar of a twenty-one gun salute. Aboard the flagship a grand biohara was held, whereupon
"with the presence and approval of the Sultan and a large number of datus" the Spanish 
camp was designated, and the government promised to respect the Muslim religion and the 
customs of the Magindanaos.e2 8  
But before the coleonial government was able to consolidate its gains, hostilities 
flared up as a group of Cotabato Magindanaos, about half of the population, signified
their opposition to their Sultan, whom they thought to have submitted t o  Spain all too 
willinglye. The flag of revolt was raised at Pagalungan near the apex of the delta, the 
middle zone between sa-ilud and sa-raya where Malinog had had his base more than a 
24. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 319. 
2 5 .  Cordoba MS , pp. 28- 29; Montero y Gay, "Exploracion,e" pp. 1 20-121. 
26. Montero, ibid. 
2 7 .  A good summary of the 1854 - 1855  documents can be found in Paul Lietz, Calendar of 
Philippine Doouments in the Ayer collection of the Newberry Library (Chicago, 1956)e, 
items no. 294-298. For a preliminary synthesis see his article "Mindanao in the 
nineteenth century . "  
28. Montero y Vidal, Historia de la Piraterta Malayo-Mahometana en Mindanao. Jolo y 
Borneo (Madrid, 1888)e, p. 487; Francia and Parrado, I, p. 324. In view of the 
latters' criticism of Montero's mistakes in the rendering of dates, places, names, 
etc., their version is accepted whenever discrepancies arise. See Francia and 
Parrado, II, p. 190 for their comments on Montero. 
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hundred years earlier. In November 1861, a Spanish land-sea expedition was sent out to 
punish the Pagalungan rebels. 
The Magindanao forces were led by Datu Maghuda, the eldest son of the Sultan of 
Tumbao. But the influence of the Sultan of Buayan could be felt in spite of his absence 
from the scene of battle itself. For, on the fifteenth of November, Maghuda sent a com­
mission to notify the Spanish commander that a peace treaty could be concluded only if 
the Buayan Sultan were consulted first.o2 9  The invaders ignored this veiled peace over­
ture. They had come "to casti�ate the insolence of the Sultan of Tumbao," and they were 
not to be set off their track. 0 They repeatedly assaulted the kota by land, but it was 
a futile task owing to the natural barriers of marsh and tall grass. Finally , on the 
seventeenth the kota was rammed by the galley commanded by Frigate Captain Mendez Nufiez. 
The Spanish-Filipino forces stormed into the walls, overwhelming the defenders who were 
forced to make a hasty retreat.o3 1  
The Pagalungan massacre seems to have been a great shock to the Magindanaos. Long
accustomed to live in continual dissensions among themselves, their petty wars were 
nevertheless quite bloodless. For example, Vidal y Soler notes that there were only four 
casualties in half a year among the armies of two sultanates at war with each other. At 
Pagalungan no less than two hundred Magindanaos were killed. The encounter came to be 
deeply imbedded in their memories, and the story was transformed into an epic poem which 
was recited during their councils of war.o3 2  
Another uprising at Taviran was suppressed. But the resistance, far from being 
eradicated, continued farther upriver. A group of survivors from Pagalungan headed south 
to Talayan, where they were welcomed. The rest marched to Buayan, which was to become 
the focus of the anti-Spanish movement. In accordance with Manilao' s  orders to secure the 
whole of the Pulangi, the colonial forces advanced through Buayan unopposed and pushed on 
to Matincauan, at the upper limit of Magindanao settlement, which was occupied in Febru­
ary 1863. This was the turning point in their fortunes. In an attempt to establish 
communications with Davao to the east, the Spanish forces overstretched themselves,
failing to maintain vital communications with the delta. Supplies were running low, and 
the morale of the troops was flagging, when the decision to strike out for Davao was 
made. For such a daring and foolhardy attempt they paid a high price. According to 
Perinat fever, heat, hunger and other calamities left the dead scattered all along the 1
route.o3 3  
All this was being watched closely by the Magindanaos, who were in complete control 
of riverine communications above Tumbao. Montero y Vidal comments that the Spanish 
disaster at Matincauan made the Magindanaos realize that their best weapon was the topog­
raphy of their homeland.o3 4  Encouraged by the retreat from Matincauan, "fugitives" from 
the delta swelled the ranks of the Talayan Sultanate in what came to be a massive move­
ment of population from sa-iZud to sa-raya. 
In 1864, the governor of Cotabato , Lieutenant Colonel La Hoz, thought it imperative 
to punish Talayan , the center of operations against Spanish positions in the delta ' s  
south. The Sultan of Buayan, who had come to terms with the Spanish establishment pre­
sumably after the Pagalungan massacre, provided La Hoz with four guides and some warriors 
captained by his young son Datu Uto. As the column crossed a reed-grass field (cogonal)
in single file , small groups of Talayan Magindanaos, kris in hand, suddenly fell upon the 
center of the column. At this critical moment the Buayan guides and auxiliaries switched 
sides and joined their Talayan brothers in the attack. In spite of his force of five 
hundred soldiers, two pieces of artillery, and a great number of Cotabato Magindanao 
29. Antonio Vazquez de Aldafia and Valentin G. Serrano, Espana en Za Oaeania (Paginas de 
la guerra de Jolo) (Manila, 1876) ,  p. 88. This account is taken from a letter by a 
famous participant, Mendez Nunez. Other correspondences reproduced in the above 
volume. 
30. Pablo Pastells, Mision de Za Companta de Jesus de FiZipinas en SigZo XIX (Barcelona,
1916-1917), vol. I, p. 28. 
31. Cf. accounts in Aldana, op. ait . r; Pastells, ibid . ;  Alfonso Perinat, Operaaiones
MiZitares en eZ Rio Grande de Mindanao (Manilao, 1888), part I (historical summary), 
p. 22; Francia and Parrado, I, pp. 327-328. 
32. Sebastian Vidal y Soler, Memoria sobre eZ Ramo de Montes en las Islas Filipinas
(Madrid, 1874), p. 193. 
33. I, p. 22; also Montero y Vidal, Piratertar, pp. 653-654. 34. Ibid . ,  p. 654. 
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auxil iaries , La Hoz was overwhelmed and chased up to the Spanish fort at Taviran. For 
the first time , the Magindanaos in the interior were victorious in battle. Their hero 
was Datu Ute , who from this time on is  the leading figure of  independent Magindanao .r3 5  
In  the above incident , we s aw how Datu Ute disobeyed his father, the Sultan of 
Buayan, by turning against La Hoz and his contingent. Up to 1 8 7 2  we are not informed 
about the datu ' s  pos ition in the hierarchy of  Buayan. The old Sultan s eems to have main­
tained friendly relations with Spanish Cotabato,  and the latter pressed this t o  their 
advantag e . 3 6  But the young Ute was already a figure to be reckoned withr. In 1 8 6 5 ,  the 
Commandant General of Mindanao negotiated a treaty with him.  I t  appears that he s igned 
in the name of  the Sultan of Buayan .r3 7  Was Datu Ute merely negotiating on behalf of  his 
father, or is this a s ign that power was beginning to shift into his  hands? Surely Ute 
must have been a powerful chief by the late 1860r' s .  He probably could boast of a large
following and wealth, even though in terms of rank he was subordinate to the Sultan. 
The period from 1865  to 1 8 7 2  was one of relative s tability ,  punctuated by s kirmishes 
and reprisal s , threats and counterthreats between the Spanish forces and those of Datu 
Utor. This was a period of entrenchment, particularly for the Spanish s ide. Forts had 
been constructed in s trategic points in sa-ilud during the early 1860 ' s ,  and now efforts 
were made to win over the chiefs of the delta in order to offset the isolation of these 
forts.r3 8  The Jesuits , who had es tablished themselves in Tamontaka following the occupa­
tion , went to work spreading the Gospel among the hill  people and, more important , 
attempting to subvert their  relations with the Magindanaos .r3 9  Such pacification programs 
were to bear fruit much l ater. 
One thing the Spaniards could boast o f :  Cotabato was theirs.  This commanding pos i ­
tion at the mouth of  the Pulangi was now an extension of  Zamboanga. This was the culmina­
tion of a long process which began when Zamboanga was established in the seventeenth 
century to maintain a coercive influence upon the Magindanao s tater. This was also the 
culmination o f  another proces s - - the decline of  the Cotabato Sultan ' s  pres tige . He no 
longer s tood as the symbol of  the integrity of  the Magindanao world. 
The Magindanaos consider Sultan Kudrat I I , who was respons ible for the incorporation
of Magindanao territory into the Spanish empire,  as the last one of any worth who ruled 
in Cotabato. The reason they give i s  that he was the last Sultan to perform the ances ­
tral rite of  "stepping on the white  earth , "  which is  · a  guarantee of  the Sultan ' s  power
and the prosperity o f  the land.r4 0  The Sultan was , in effec t ,  relegated to the position 
of a paid official in the colonial adminis tration. During his visits to the Pollok naval 
s tation, for exampl e ,  he was given the honors of  Teniente General in actual service, and 
was saluted with a vol ley of  seven cannonades . r4 1  The Cotabato Sultans were awarded vari­
ous titles by Spain, among which was the Caballero Gran Cruz (Knight .rof  the Great Cross ) r. 
They were "Hispanized" l ike the early chiefs of  the now-Christian territories ; s oon they 
would act l ike cultivated hidaZgos. 42 Ironically , the Sultans and a few important Magin­
danao datus were shown more respect by Spanish officials than were the most i l lustrious 
35.  Ibid.r; Perinat, I ,  pp . 2 2 - 2 3 .  3 6 .  Cf. Gayangos MS , p .  2 6 .  
3 7 .  Pio A. de Pazos , JoZo; ReZato Historiao-MiZitar (Burgosr, 1879 )r, p. 197 ; Montero y
Vida l ,  Pirater£a, p .  S O S .  
3 8 .  For the general s i tuation in 1866  (described as a s talemate)r, see Ferdinand 
d ' Alen�on [dua]r, "Lucon et Mindanao , recits et s ouvenirs d ' un voyage dans ! ' extreme 
Orient , "  Revue des Deux Mondesr, 191 (May 1 5, 1 8 7 0 ) ,  pp. 3 4 1 - 3 74.  Some datus , al ­
though enemies of  the Cotabato Sul tan, were willing to  cooperate with the Spaniards ; 
Pastells,  Mision, I ,  pp . 3 0 - 3 1 ,  68.  
39r. Grace L .  Wood , "The Tiruray , "  PSR, V ,  2 (April 1957)r, p.  13.  The material on mis­
sion work is  abundantr. Cf.  Madigan and Cushner ;  Pas tells, Mision ; CMSJ. The topic
will  be dealt with later in Chapter V I .  
40r. Saleeby , Studies, pp. 29, 60 . 
4 1 r. Jose Cuevas , "Relaci6n de un viaj e de exploraci6n a Mindanao , 1860 , "  in CMSJ, VI I I ,  
p. 36 . 
4 2 .  Vidal y Soler,  p. 192.  The Sultan was an accompl ished chess p layed and showed "a 
cultivated intel l igence . "  Mixing freely with the Spanish elite ,  he and other datus 
of Cotabato were fascinated by things European and were willing to accept aspects of  
Spanish culture (ibid . r) .  
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Christian natives in other parts of the colony.4 3  
But, in the eyes of the majority of Magindanaos, the Cotabato Sultans were no l onger 
worthy of respect. In May 1863 , the Sultan and his son were granted yearly pensions of 
1 , 000 pesos and 800 pesos respectively, for theye'' . • e• had come to such a state of 
penury that . • .  they had not eaten substantially for several days, being abandoned by
the majeority of their subj ects."4 4  
. . . Ever since he ceded these lands to the Spaniards, his influence has 
greatly diminished, and although most of the sultans obey him "morally," in 
material terms it is not much, and he sees himself reduced greatly in the 
tribute they ought to pay him,  and in resources . . . .  The pension is most 
just,  since it  is due to the Spaniards that he has been deprived of his 
former prestige.e4 5  
In return for the pension, Cotabato was ceded t o  Spain, although the Sul tan retained the 
right to use the title  "Sultan of Cotabato , "  which was in itself a far cry from the 
illustrious title of "Sultan of Mindanao" by which he used to be called.4 6 Meanwhile, he _ 
"ruled" on the opposiete side of the river in a "sordid-looking" house described in un­
4 7flattering terms by the Frenchman Montano 1n 1880e■-
Some attention has been given to the fortunes of the Cotabato Sultanate because of 
the place it  occupies in the memory of the Magindanao people. Cotabato was the door to 
the Pulangi valley, l inking the Magindanaos to the greater world beyond. The Sul tanate 
stood as a symbol of the integrity of the Magindanao world as a Islamic community in 
spite of political rivalries within its segments. The incorporat ion of Cotabato and i ts 
environsr- - a a-iZud, in short--into the Spanish empire must have come as a shock to many.
If in 1855 most of the sultans and datus in the interior were already "anti-Cotabato , "  as 
we have seen, in the 1860's the "anti-Spanish" element came into the forefront. The 
issue now.was one of opposing not only an internal rival but also a foreign and Christian 
power which had ridden on the back of that rival. The merging of Spain and Cotabato 
meant that Islamic sentiments could be invoked from among the fragmented principalities
of sa-raya in order to unite them against the common threat , under the leadership of the 
new symbol of integrity--Buayan. 
In 187 2 ,  Datu Uto ' s  father died. One suspects,  from the relativ� inattention paid
Uto by Spanish writers prior to 1872,  that the old Sultan had the power to restrain his 
son. Increased mention of Uto after this date indicates a new phase in his career. He 
had a strong claim to the title "Su ltan of Buayan,e" but apparently he alleowed his uncle 
to assume the title. Perinat ' s  opinion is that this was a calculated move by Uto in 
order that he might carry out his plans "without presenting his face."4 8  As we shall see 
later, he was the real ruler of Buayan because he controlled its wealth, including that 
of his uncle. By using his uncle, the Sultan, as a fron t ,  Datu Uto was able to consoli­
date his power and carry on "illicit" trade and communications with other independent 
regions, without provoking immediate reprisals by the Spaniards.e4 9  
In the beginning of 1874 Datu Uto, according t o  Perinat , "accelerated his rebel­
l ion , "  establishing close relations with Sulu, which at this time was being threatened 
with occupation by Spain. He embarked upon a program of intimidating the remaining datus 
who refused t o  support him. His principal kota at Marandag (Bakat) was strongly forti­
fied ,  becoming a veritable nest of heavy cannon and Zantakas enceircled by a network of 
trenches.e5 0  Apparently he had gained such a large following and a network of family
alliances that he sent in 1874 a taunting l etter to the governor of Cotabato, hinting
that with the power he had come to possess he would dare come down t o  Cotabato to defy
the Spaniards and to prove that he was the most powerful in the Pulangi.e5 1  
43. Blumentrit t ,  "Los maguindanaos, "  p. 279. 44. Franci a  and Parrado, I, p. 329. 
45. Juan Burriel , "Ytinerario de la escursion hecha a Mindanao y Jolo ,"  1862e- 1863, MS, 
Newberry L ibrary, p. 138. 
46. Alen�on, p. 363. 
47. Voyage aux PhiZippines et MaZaises (May 1879 -June 1881) (Paris, 1886), p. 2 05. 
48. I, p. 23. 49. This is dealt with fully in Chapter III. S O .  Loe. cit. 
51. Francia and Parrado,  I, pp. 344-345. For the complete text of the letter and an 
analysis of Uto ' s  alliance system see Chapter IV of this Data Paper. 
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Shortly after Uto's letter was received, the governor of Mindanao himself, Colonel 
Ramon de Careaga, led an expedition in order to capture the "renegade" datu.o5 2  Bakat was 
occupied, but the wily datu was nowhere to be found. Meanwhile, his forces were in com­
plete control of the countryside. Owing to difficulty in maintaining communications with 
Cotabato (a problem, it seems, of every Spanish force that ventured beyond the delta), 
and harassed by the guerrilla tactics of the Magindanaos, the Spanish foothold had to be 
given up within the same month. Ships and men retreated to Cotabato; the advance-fort at 
Bonga, a few miles above Tumbao, was abandoned. Somewhat as a compensation devised by 
Uto, Careaga brought back with him a handful of vague declarations of obedience from some 
Magindanaos who declared themselves representatives of Uto. This was the only compensa­
tion he could get for Uto's alleged "crimes and acts of violence.o"o5 3  Worthless though
these declarations were, the governor of Mindanao was saved from the specter of utter 
humiliation. 
Shortly thereafter , the Spanish government decided that the best course of action 
to follow was to abandon attempts to capture Bakat and to enter into friendly relations 
with Datu Uto. I n  May 1875, the acting governor of Mindanao, Anastasio Marques , boarded 
a gunboat for Buayan, docking right in front of Uto's old house. Somewhat taken aback, 
the Datu refused to come aboard as Marques suggested. Instead he dispatched two sultans 
and his chief pandita, who, on seeing that the Spaniards sincerely wanted peace, took 
great pains to welcome their enemies of yesterday. As the delegation stepped ashore 
unarmed, someone, possibly Uto, cried out "pagari, pagari, amigos, amigos ! "  ("friends, 
friends . . o. ! ") ,  whereupon the five hundred or so warriors who had threateningly
gathered laid down their arms to echo the cry of friendship. Then took place a most suc­
cessful biahara, attended by all the sultans, datus and religious dignitaries of the area. 
Datu Uto was in a particularly happy mood, for a daughter had recently been born to him. 
As the party , returning from the conference site, was passing by a gaily decorated raft 
on which Uto's daughter lay surrounded by her retinue, the Datu , obviously in a highly 
elated state, threw his arm around the collar of the Jesuit Fr. Juanmarti, and then of 
governor Marques, repeating the words "pagari, sagune pagari; amigos, ahora amigos" 
("friendso, today we are friends . . .  "). Both Spaniards and Magindanaos were very satis­
fied with the established peace.o5 4  
But could there be real peace so long as the Spanish threat reamined? In 1876, Jolo 
was occupied by Spanish troops, and the sense of bitterness and humiliation suffered by
the Muslims of Sulu could not fail to reach the Magindanao interior.o5 5  Moreover, the 
Spaniards at Cotabato, together with their Jesuit allies at Tamontaka, still held to 
their policy of attraction, which meant fomenting dissensions among the sultans and datus 
upriver. By 1877,  after several visits by officials and missionaries, the Sultan of 
Tumbao (Talakuku) could be counted on to side with Cotabato against his rival Uto.o5 6  
Only direct orders from the governor-general prevented the use of military solutions.o5 7  
In spite of the treaty, then, basic differences and tensions remained unresolved. Uto 
himself carried on with his program of uniting the sa-raya Magindanaos under his banner. 
In 1878, he appeared at Cotabato at the head of an armada of eighty to a hundred vintas 
loaded with armed warriors. The Spaniards "could only endure in silence.o" His visit was 
a dashing show of strength, representing the height of his career. He had gained the 
alliance of all the sultans and datus of the Pulangi, except Datu Ayunan and others on 
the south branch of the delta. As the Spaniard Perinat puts it, Uto had truly become 
"Sultan of the River.o11 5 8  
52. Ibidr. ,  p. 345. An apparent misprint in Montero y Vidal's account gives the date of 
the Careaga expedition as October 1864. 
53. Perinat, I, p. 24; Montero y Vidal, Piraterta, p. 655. 
54. Letter of Fr. H. Ignacio Larranaga, May 2 1 ,  1875, quoted in Pastells, Misi6n , I, pp. 
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55. Vidal y Soler, p. 194. This 1s examined 1n Chapter V of this study. 
56. Pastells, Mision, I, p. 261. 
57. On June 3, 1878, a decree was sent out by Moriones prohibiting wartime operations
and all kinds of hostilities against the Moros, except in case Spanish forts were 
attacked. According to Montero y Vidal, this decree bolstered Datu Uto's prestige;
Piraterta, p. 655. 
58. Perinat, I ,  p. 24; see also Montero y Vidal, Piraterta, p. 656. 
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From what has been said so far, should we continue to maintain the Spanish view that 
Uto was a mere rebel? Or is the notion of "revolt" only relevant in the sense that the 
Datu was a source of resistance to every attempt of Spain to extend her rule upriver? 
Datu Uto, descendant of the ancient ruling family of Buayan, can be better viewed as a 
legitimate Muslim prince, aware of sa-rayar' s  tradit ion of independence, who responded 
positively to the Spanish threat. There was no constant warfare during the period from 
1861- 1878 but only petty raids conducted by government forces against independent kotas. 
The only significant encounters were the Talayan massacre of 1861, the defeat of La Hoz 
in 1864, and the short-lived occupation of Uto's capital in 1875. In all these inci­
dents, it was the Spanish side which took the initiative. Complementing these military 
adventures were various diplomatic initiatives such as we have seen in 1865 and 1875. 
Insofar as these initiatives always came from the Spanish establishment , this is  a drama­
tic comment on the scale of the problems which Datu Uto, in fourteen years of influence 
in the Pulangi valley, had created for the Spaniards. 
CHAPTER III 
THE WORLD OF DATU UTO (ca. 1864-1885) 
Datu Uto belonged to the old ruling family of Buayan, the most prestigious in 
sa-rayra .  According to Saleeby, at some unspecified time in the recent past there had 
been a split in the Buayan Sultanate after the death of Sultan Maytum. Bayaw, the 
younger son of Maytum, succeeded to Kudarangan and all the northern half of Buayan, and 
he was known as the Sultan of Kudarangan. Marajanum, Ute's father, succeeded to the 
capital itself and all the country lying on the left bank of the Pulangi and Sapakan 
(Dansalan) rivers, including the vital areas extending to lakes Liguasan and Buluan.o1 
The split in the Sultanate accounts for the fact that Ute's power base is usually named 
Bakat, rather than Buayan , to distinguish it from the original Sultanate's northern half,
Kudarangan. 
The territory directly controlled by Datu Uto was Bakat. This was his district, 
where his ancestors had resided. But his renown rests mainly on his success in subordi­
nating to himself all the sultans and datus in the upper valley up to Matincauan in the 
northeast, which was the upper limit of Magindanao settloement, and down to Sarangani bay 
at the southern tip of Mindanao. Moreover, Uto had ties with several Muslim principali­
ties in the vicinity: there were the Illanuns to the northeast and the Sulus (Taosugs)
farther beyond. Each of the areas in and out of Magindanao where Uto's influence was 
felt had a part to play in the waxing and waning of his power. The relationships between 
these areas will be examined in this chapter. 
Bakat, Uto's district, was an asset to him in terms of agricultural productivity and 
its strategic location in the Pulangi valley. According to Nieto, "the exuberant vegeta­
tion of the domains of Utto [had] no equal in the banks of the Rio Grande.o"2 The greater 
part of it was planted with sugar cane, rice paddy, coffee, cacao, corn, cotton, coconut 
and various fruits.o3 In 1878, an anonymous commentator refuted the common but unfounded 
belief that the Magindanaos were degenerate and in worse condition than the rest of the 
Philippine Muslims, in particular the Taosugs of Sulu, by emphasizing how well cultivated 
the fields were in the delta, in Buayan, and in the Liguasan-Buluan areas. He pointed 
out how commerce was stimulating agricultural productivity.o4 The person who most readily
responded to such commercial incentives was Datu Uto himself. 
What the succession of Spanish treaties with Uto in the 1860's and 1870's did was to 
open up trade between Spanish-controlled sa-ilud and independent sa-rayra.  The Spaniards 
and their Magindanao wards needed food, for the supply of which they were willing to 
postpone bitter ·enmities. 5 Rice, fowl, fish, vegetables, fruits, cacao and tobacco were 
the "necessary goods" which all the Spanish garrisons stood to forego in the event of 
their complete isolation from the enemy. For such items, says Burriel, the Spaniards 
were "completely dependent upon • . .  [the Magindanaos] ,  and exposed to a desperate 
situation.o" For the Spanish advance had caused a great part of the delta's population to 
migrate upriver, leaving the lands surrounding the garrisons uncultivated.o6 Datu Uto 
used the food-supply issue to increase his bargaining power during the negotiations with 
Spain. 
1. Saleeby, Studies, p. 23. 2 • Nieto MS , p . 12  4 • 
3. "Algunas reflexiones sobre el 5o° Distrito de Mindanao llamado del Centro, publicada 
el aiio pas ado en la ' Oceania,o"' CMSJ, I I, 1879, p. 232; Adolfo Horguin, "Comunica­
cion,o" March 30, 1888, in Juan Salcedo (ed.), Proyeatos de Dominaaion y Colonizaaion 
de Mindanao y Jolo (Gerena, 1891) , p. 97; Nieto MS, p. 124. 
4. "Algunas ref lexiones,o" p. 236. 
5. ? Espanola, Num. 89, 1886 (newsclipping attached to Nieto MS). 
6. Burriel MS, p. 125. Burriel was writing during the early years of the Spanish occu­
pation. Presumably as the situation stabilized in sa-ilud in the late 1860's some 
of the population moved back to the delta. 
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The relative peace that existed for some twenty years (ca. 1864 - 1884)  between Uto 
and the Spaniards was, to a great extent, due to the commercial rapport between them. 
Perinat says that the great quantity of gold, silver and copper-cash in Ute's vaults was 
the revenue he got from the sale of foodstuffs and forest products to Cotabato.o7 Many
of the products from Buayan were re-exported from Cotabato to Sulu and Manila. The rice 
yield was more than enough for subsistence, and so rice was "one of the more im�ortant 
articles of trade of the Moros with the Chinese, who export it to other parts.o" The 
cacao of Buayan was said to be of "superior quality" and was "very much sought after.o"9 
There were other productive areas in sa-raya beyond Uteo' s  own domains. In Perinat's 
opinion, in fact, the most cultivated and fertile strength of land was that from Santa 
Isabel to Cabacan, along the edge of Liguasan marsh.o1 0  The borders of Liguasan marsh and 
lake Buluan were well populated and cultivated. Since the sultans and datus of these 
areas were all subordinate to Uto, he must have obtained a measure of the produce as tax­
payments.o1 1  Even if this were not so, however, Uto was certainly able to derive revenue 
from the traffic in foodstuffs between sa-ilud and sa-raya by exploiting the superior 
position of Bakat. 
A very common practice in the Malay world was the collection of tolls from vessels 
passing through control points set up along riverine highways. Those who controlled 
rivermouths were specially favored since they also sat athwart trade routes. The Sultan 
of Cotabato, for example, collected tolls from vintas leaving the interior laden with 
produce. Spanish policy, however, sought to eliminate such exactions and to create a 
situation of "free trade" along the river.o1 2  When the Spanish occupation forces landed 
in Cotabato in 1861 , panic swept many of the datus who saw the end of their profitable
exactions.o1 3  The string of forts erected in strategic points along the deltaic r1verways
deprived the sa-ilud chiefs of income from tolls. 
But Datu Uto stood beyond the pale of Spanish control. His capital, Bakat, was 
located in such a way that all vessels coming down from the upper Pulangi and the twin 
lakes had to pass through it. In 1872 , according to Vidal y Soler, all the sa-ilud 
Magindanaos were saying that Uto imposed a stiff toll in Bakat. He denied this charge 
when questioned, for he was treaty-bound not to interfere with the riverine trade. 1o4 But 
by 1875 the Spanish authorities were certain that a toll station at Bakat exacted a large 
fee from each vinta bringing foodstuffs to Cotabato. The short-lived occupation of Bakat 
by governor Careaga in 1875 is a possible reaction to the toll problem, although the 
matter is not made explicit in the sources.o1 5  The amount collected by Uto is not known,
though we are given a hint by Nieto, who says that it was "neither more nor less than 
that which we consent to in the ports of Melilla in Africa.o"1 6  
A great ·odeal of Uto's economic activities was directed toward Cotabato; communica­
tions between sa-ilud and sa-raya were not at all frozen during the greater part of the 
Datu Uto period. But Ute's activities must be seen not only in relation to Cotabato and 
the Spaniards. In economic terms Cotabato could provide the interior with salt, cloth, 
metals, porcelain and other important staples, but firearms and other armaments, which 
Uto needed to sustain his prestige and prepare for the inevitable confrontation with 
Spain, were items that could not enter Buayan via the deltaic riverways. Parallel to the 
sa-ilud sa-raya trade pattern was another one which , in Spanish eyes, fell under the 
category of "smuggling.o" 
7. Perinat, II, p. 125. 
8 .  "Algunas reflexiones,o" p. 232. One might speculate on Buayan's role in the often 
mentioned export of Magindanao rice to Sulu. See Forrest, p. 299  ; Hunt, p. 4 3 ;
Reber, p. 198 . 
9. "Algunas ref lexiones,o" p. 23 2 .  
10. Introductory note to Perinat, Operaoiones Militares. 
11. Cf. Cordoba MS, p. 16. 
12  . This was unanimously propounded by the members of the 1855  expedition. 
13 . Francis and Parrado, I, p. 3 2 2 .  i4. Vidal y Soler, p. 200. 
15 .  ? Espanola, Num. 8 9 ,  18 8 6 ,  newsclipping attached to Nieto MS. 
16. Nieto MS, p. 1 2 2 .  
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The Magindanaos of sa-raya had something else to export besides riceo, bees-wax and 
the like. They possessed slaves, captives taken fro� the hills surrounding the Pulangi 
valley. The slave-trade was a continuation of centuries of raids on Christian settle­
ments. The Spaniards had, by Uto ' s  time, put an end to such threats on their territories,
but the Mindanao interior provided fair game. The commerce in salves undertaken by the 
sa-raya Magindanaos forms an important basis for the "illicit" system of trade and com­
munications linking them to the outside world. 
One of the advantages of Bakat was its strategic location vis-a-vis the mountain 
ranges of Mindanao! inhabited by pagan tribes. The Tirurays, in particular, were domi­7nated by Datu Uto. Many of the rancherias allied to him were also strategically 
located�o_ The Ta�ayan Sultanate, whose sultan was highly trusted by Uto, was situated 
west of Bakat and straddled the Tiruray mountains. Matincauan, at the upper limit of 
sa-rayar, periodically raided Manobos and other hill tribes to its north and east. We 
know that in the 1880 ' s  Matincauan and the surrounding areas were controlled by Datu Enga 
or Watamama, also called Uto, who was a brother or close relative of Datu Uto.o1 8  Finally, 
there was Buluan, commanding the outlet of lake Buluan on the east bank of which stood 
the important slave-raiding center of Tukanabagu.o1 9  Buluan was one of the allied 
rancherias mentioned by Uto in his letter of 1874.o2 0  
One hill groupo, the Tirurays, merits special attention because of its proximity to 
Uto's power base at one end, and to the Jesuit mission at Tamontaka at the other end,
resulting in its becoming a bone of contention between the two poles. An examination of 
the Tirurays also enables us to understand the relationship between the Magindanaos and 
their hill neighbors and, in particular, the reason for the exploitation of the latter. 
According to an anthropologist, Grace L. Wood,o2 1  the history of the Tirurays begins 
with a legend, shared by the Magindanaos, that the two peoples had "the same father and 
the same mother"; in other words, there were originally two brothers. When Sarip 
Kabungsuwan came and introduced Islam, the elder brother Mamalu, who refused to be con­
verted, made an agreement with his younger brother Tabunawai whereby the former would go 
to the mountains and they would carry on trade. From the elder brother came forth the 
Tirurays; from the younger came the Magindanaos. 
A special system of trade existed between the Magindanaos and the Tirurays. On the 
basis of the legend mentioned by Wood .othe trade pacts, couched in terms of "sharing
mother 's  milk," may have originated from the ties of the first hill refugees with their 
lowland kin. Eventually, the relationship seems to have become purely exploitative. A 
Magindanao chief selected the leaders of the Tirurays within an area he could control and 
gave them titles, making them responsible for their followers who were to bring to him a 
share of their agricultural and forest products. I n  return, the Magindanao chief pro­
vided manufactured goods, coastal products and, perhaps most important, protection from 
raids of other chiefs. Seeds and goods were also loaned, captives being seized if the 
debt were not paid.o2 2  
Before the Spanish forward-movement in the nineteenth century, some sort of stabil­
ized relationship must have existed between the Tirurays and the Magindanaos, a situation 
which would have owed not a little to their acknowledgement of a common pre-Islamic 
ancestry. The notion of a trade pact between the two peoples is corroborated by Forrest, 
who talks about the forced sale of paddy by hill peoples. The latter, says Forrest, 
" . . .  possess great estates. They may be sold with the lands, but not off the lands. 
They pay yearly taxes not expected from Mohammedan vassals--a bois or land tax.o"o2 3  
What Forrest took to be salves were not captured hill people but Bisayan Christians, the 
prize of Illanun or Magindanao raids in the north. The association of slaves with such 
captives is reflected in the fact that in Sulu and Lanao the word bisaya is synonymous
with "slave.o" 
17. Gayangos MS, p. 27. 
18. Juanmarti to Provincial, June 1, 1890, CMSJ , IX, p. 101. 
19. Montero y Gay, "Exploracion,o" p. 123. 
20. See Chapter IV, pp. 34-35 for text of the letter. 
21. pp. 12- 13. For ethnographic material on the Tiruray in the nineteenth century, see 
Pastells, Mision, I, pp. 30-41. This 1s a compilation of data found in the Jesuit 
letters. 
22. Wood, pp. 12-13. 23. p. 278. 
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The extensive raiding of Mindanao hill tribes, particularly the Tirurays , for the 
purpose of ens laving them s eems to have been a comparatively recent phenomenon, occa­
sioned by greater Spanish vigilance and naval s trength in the nineteenth century which 
effectively cut off the Christian (i.e.o, Visayas and Luzon) s ource of s laves. One result 
of this concerted action against piracy, in which the British and the Dutch took part in 
their respective spheres , was the final downfall of the Sultan of Cotabato; he was de­
scribed in 1855 as "a king without soldiers nor s laves , "2 4  a far cry, indeed, from 
Forrest's description of him flanked by his Basayan bodyguards. The Magindanaos of 
sa-raya, however, were able to respond to the s ituation b y  undertaking to fill the demand 
for s laves that had arisoen. Cordova noted in 1854 that Matincauan had become powerful
because it had easy access to s laves who were sold downriver.o2 5  In 1860, the Spaniards 
first became acquainted with Batu Uto as the captain of two boatloads of s laves bound for 
Sulu. 2 6 Finally, Sarangani bay, which became Buayan' s "outlet, " as we s hal 1 s ee ,  was 
used by ships from all over the archipelago which unloaded firearms in exchange for 
slaves. , 
Starting from the notion expressed in legend that the Magindanaos and Tirurays were 
brothers , and that their relations hip was principally one of trade, we have s uggested an 
explanation for the trend towards outright exploitation of the Tirurays in the nineteenth 
century, culminating in the Datu Uto period, by relating s uch a trend to the closure of 
the main slave sources due to the vigilance of the colonial forces in the s ubject terri­
tories. Soon, however, Spanis h vigilance extended to Illana bay itself. The mouth of 
the Pulangi river, Buayan's usual exit to the outside world, became Spanish territory in 
1861; Cotabato could no longer be a channel for the slave trade. The only explanation 
for the continued s uccess of the slave trade up to the 1880's is that the sa-raya Magin­
danaos 'had another outlet, which was Sarangani bay, at the s outhern tip of Mindanao. 
The importance of Sarangani bay, also called Sugud Boyan (Harbor of Buayan), was 
noted in 1775 by Forrest ,  who s aw it as the Rajah of Buayan's only other access to the 
s ea besides the Pulangi rivermouth controlled by the Cotabato Sultan.o2 7  Geographic con­
s iderations made this possible. From sa-raya one can navigate s outh past Liguasan marsh 
to just beyond lake Buluan, from which there is a flat stretch of land--a veritable 
highway-- to the towns of Makar and Buayan on the s hores of Sarangani bay.o2 8  The members 
of the Spanish expedition of 1855 do not seem to have been aware of this fact. They be­
lieved that, if Cotabato were occupied, the Magindanaos in the interior would be truly 
locked in. Only in 1862 was Burriel able to point out the facility of communications 
betw�en the Magindanao interior and Sarangani bay. Burriel, in fact, met many Maginda­
naos who talked of having been to the bay and who added that many of their tribe lived 
there.o29 
Because of its situation at the s outhern tip of the island, Sarangani bay played an 
important role as a haven for s hips plying the route to Ternate and Menado. The anti­
quity of this role is shown by the report of a sixteenth-century shipwrecked expedition, 
which s tates that in a fortified s ettlement of Sarangani island (off the bay) were 
"porcelain, musk ,  amber and oils, in which the Mindanaos and the other islands carry on 
internal commerce: some s igns of gold were found . . . .  1 1 3 0  Recent archeological findings 
confirm the observation that Sarangani was visited by Chines e junks which unloaded, among
other thingso, porcelain ware.o3 1  According to the journal of a Magindanao piratical
(mangaio) prau mentioned b� Forres t ,  Sarangani was the first s top-over on the island­
hopping route to Celebes.o3 For the most part of the s eventeenth century the Sarangani 
24 � Montero y Gay, "Exploracion, "  p. 119 25. Cordoba MS , p. 30. 
26. Cuevas , "Relacion , "  p. 44. 27. p. 189. 
28. A British explorer, A. Henry Savage Landor, confirmed this in 1903. See Gems of the 
East (New York, 1904) , II. According to Pastells , the journey from Sarangani to 
Buluan took only fourteen hours on horseback, "passing through good roads"; "Informe 
s abre la Isla de Mindanao , "  August 15, 1888, reprinted in Misionr, III. p. 487. 
29. Burriel MS , p. 160. 
30. Santayana , p. 12; the original source is Juan de la Concepcion. 
31. Leandro Locsin and Cecilia Locs in , Oriental Ceramics Discovered in the Philippines
(Rutland , Vt.o, 1967), map facing p. 3 (distribution of T'ang , Sung, Ming, Annamese 
and Sawankhalok wares with principal sites . . o. ) . 
32. Forrest ,  p. 303. 
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region was tributary to the Sultanate of Mindanao at Cotabato.e3 3  In the e ighteenth cen­
tury, however, the decline of Cotabato is evidenced by the s eries of treaties made by a 
"king of  Saringani" with the Dutch.3 4  The latter apparently realized the importance of 
the Saranganis. By the 1740's they had s taked their claim on Sarangani isle by  i mplant­
ing there a s tone tablet bearing the initials V.O.C. and claiming the is land as part of 
Ternate. The Spanish government viewed this with much alarm.3 5  
As long as the outlets of  the Pulangi were open, Sarangani bar remained of s econdary 
importance to the sa-raya Magindanaos because of the long duration of the j o urney and the 
difficulty of transporting goods by land. This must have been the s tate of affairs up to 
the early nineteenth century. Despite sporadic enmities between Cotabato and Buayan, 
the former could not close off the river for any length of time because it had come to 
depend on the collection of tolls from vessels descending from Buayan. 
Increasing Spanish press ure towards the middle of the nineteenth century altered the 
s i tuation somewhat. Strong efforts to control navigation at the mouth of the Pulangi 
through the treaty with the Cotabato Sultan in 1837, the establishment of  a naval base at 
Pollok in 1851, and ultimately the occupation of Cotabato and other key points in the 
delta made it virtually impossible for the sa-raya Magindanaos to us e the Pulangi outlets 
for their traffic in s laves and firearms. Consequently, Sarangani b ay's i mportance was 
enhanced. Moreover, the Spanish conquest of Davao in 1848 had made the principal datus 
of that area transfer their res i dence and base of operations to the bay. 
Owen Rutter ,  writing about nineteenth- century Malay p iracy, notes that "the is land 
of Sarangani , off the coast of Mindanao, was a recognised center of the s lave traffic, 
traders coming from all parts to barter with them. " 3 6  In 186 2,  Burriel observed that 
Sarangani bay was "the principal market for s laves."3 7  This observation fits in with the 
pattern of events described earlier :  owing to the closure of  the s lave sources in the 
Vis ayas and Luzon, the exploitation of the pagan tribes increas ed greatly in the interior 
of Mindanao itself. Cotabato and Davao having fallen into Spanish hands, Sarangani bay 
was the natural outlet left. Burriel goes on to s ay that the s lave center was attracting
ships from Illana Bay, Sulu and other places.3 8  As late as 1888, Pastells branded the 
bay an "immoral focus of commerce in s laves . "3 9  
Various reports concerning the persistence of piracy and smuggling in the southern 
Phileippines make references to Sarangani bay and its adjeoining islands. In 1869 the 
governor of Mindanao , having been aroused by "crimes" committed in Sarangani waters, 
called for a vigorous program of espionage to identify piratical centers and destroy
them. Suspected areas were Tawi-tawi, haunt of the Balanini pirates and apparent center 
of operations, Jolo, Calamianes, Balabac, Sias s i ,  and the Sarangani is lands . The range
of piratical operations was from the Visayas south to the Sangirs , indicating that the 
Spanish assertion that piracy was com�letely stamped out with the use of steam vessels in 
the 1850's mus t be  somewhat modified. 0 In May 1871, the Spanish Navy revealed key in­
formation on the timetab le of Balanini expeditions. The Sarangani is lands , according to 
Balanini informantse, were a rendezvous for the pirate fleet operating off the north and 
northeast coast of Mindanao.4 1  
Among the inhabietants of  Sarangani bay, the people who came in ships from all over 
the archipelago were obvious ly regarded as traders or, as Raja! y Larre puts it, "commer­
cial friends." Ships came not onlf from !Ilana bay and Sulu, but also from Borneo, 
Sangir ,  Celebes, and the Moluccas . 2 Pastells specifiecally mentions the Borneans who 
33. "Relacion de la Gran Isla de Mindanao . . .  , "  p. 112. 
34. M. P.eH. Roessingh, "Dutch relations with the Philippines : a s urvey of sources 1n 
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36. The Pirate Wind (London, 1930), p. 45. 37. Burriel MS, p. 160. 
38. Ibid. 39. "Informe , "  p. 487. 
40. "Unas comunicaciones del Coronel D. Ramon Blanco . .  y una propuesta sobre reprension
de piratas del gobernador de Z amboanga, ' '  Z amboanga, Jan� 15, 1869 , document in 
Francia and Parrado , II, pp. 283-287. 
41. Aldana and Serrano, p. 107. 
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came in panaoa to exchange firearms for slaves.o4 3  Sometime in 1870 or 1871, a Dutch 
brig, the Joasevin, was apprehended in Sarangani bay while engaged in "illegal trade , "  
meaning that gunrunning was involved. The Joasevin had come from the Moluccas and was 
heading for Jolo and Java. Two or three months earlier it had been seen unloading cacao 
and firearms in Jolo.o4 4  Writing in 1882, Fr. Mateo Gisbert expressed his conviction that 
the British and Dutch were selling firearms at Sarangani bay and the Culaman coast (south­
west of Davaoi , for even the Manobo hill people in the area appeared to be well-equipped
with rifles.o4 Rajal y Larre , as governor of Davao , reported the frequency of appearance 
of panaoa in the bay. Most of them carried foreign traders; Dutchmen, in particular, 
were mentioned.o4 6  As further evidence of the Sarangani bay trade, one can mention the 
response of various other merchant communities nearby. An Indian trader representing 
some commercial firms in Davao was reported, in 1885, to have settled together with some 
one hundred Sangir Moro families opposite the Sarangani islands.o4 7  Many Chinese and 
Christians moved from Davao and Cotabato to the towns of Glan and Buayan in Sarangani bay 
in order to take advantage of the commerce there.o4 8  
To Rajal y Larre , the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876 seemed to  accentuate the 
importance of Sarangani bay. Perhaps the dislocations resulting from the conquest, 
aggravated by Spanish attempts to regulate trade, caused traders to call directly at the 
bay for Mindanao products. Saleeby says that the fall of Jolo completely terminated 
slave-raids in the Christian communities.o4 9  This being so, the importance of the Saran­
gani bay slave center must have been enhanced. 
The flourishing of the bay was made possible by the absence of Spanish control over 
the area up to around 1885. Burriel, in 1862, was only concerned with the commerce in 
slaves taking place in the bay. He looked forward to the day when a naval station would 
be set up there, but he did not express any sense of urgency about it.o5 0  The governor 
of Mindanao calledo_ofor the establishment of a naval unit there in 1869, but there is no 
evidence of a response from the central government.o5 1  From 1870 to 1876 Spanish control 
over the area was represented by a mestizo and an indior, named Saavedra and Panay respec­
tively, who lived in Balut , one of the Sarangani islands , and engaged in agriculture and 
a little commerce. In 1873 the two were assigned by the Davao government to collect 
tribute from the islanders. Shortly thereafter, with the help of some pagan inhabitants 
they fought and defeated two panaos of Moro pirates who raided their island. Saavedra 
killed, in hand-to-hand combato, one of the more famous datus of Sarangani bay, a feat 
which earned him great respect and prestige from the inhabitants of the islands and the 
bay. However, at the end of 1876 (the year of the conquest of Jolo) Saavedra and Panay 
were forced by misfortunes and mysterious causes to abandon their land and leave the 
area. A Spaniard , agent of one of the Davao commercial houses, was installed in 
Saavedra's place but during the two years of his tenure he not only absented himself from 
the Sarangani area , but also from the district itself. And so for many years after 1876 
only a few Christians remained in the islands , living in virtual poverty, depending 
solely upon the prestige of the military forces of Davao.o5 2  Jesuit missionaries occa­
sionally visited the area in search of prospective missions. Generally they were treated 
with di�trust and suspicion by the datus and panditas of Sarangani bay.o5 3  
It was �atu Uto, not the Spaniards , who was in control. When Fr. Juanmarti visited 
the bay in 1879, he found the inhabitants fearful of the Magindanaos of Buluan and 
farther north. They admitted that it was Datu Uto who dominated them • :from yonder above, "  
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and that his will was always obeyed.o5 4  Saiangani's link with sa-raya helps explain its 
attractiveness to traders. The diversity of those who called at the bay indicates that 
they wanted not only slaves but also products such as rice, coffee, cacao, beeswax and 
other exports of sa-raya. In  return, Datu Uto received the supplies needed to arm an 
ever-growing number of followers and bolster the defenses of his capital. Rajal, who 
explored southern Mindanao in 1882, saw clearly the connection between Sarangani and Uto: 
. . .  The bay of Sarangani [is] the only one much visited, where with im­
punity they commit their outrages, bringing in those contrabands of firearms 
which are provided to the Moros of Mindanao who cannot pass through Cotabato 
because of our establishment, such contraband being transported through com-
munications with the lake of Buluan.o5 5  
During all those years when Datu Uto wielded almost supreme power in the Pulangi, 
Sarangani bay was free from Spanish interference. While the Cotabato Sultan was deprived
of his prerogatives as patron of trade, Datu Uto was free to profit from trade with all 
parties--Sulus, Illanuns, Boreans, Chinese, Europeans--in the tradition of Cotabato 
during its flourishing years. While Buayan maintained trade relations with Spanish Cota­
bato and ultimately with Spanish Philippines, it was also able, thanks to its Sarangani
outlet, to look to the Malay and Indonesian world of commerce of which Singapore, not 
Manila, was the center. 
The situation in Magindanao was such that Cotabato and Buayan, sa-iZud and sa-raya,
stood in opposition to each other. The former was now a part of the Spanish colonial 
world looking to Manila as the center, the latter clung to its independence and looked to 
the Muslim Malay world for support. This situation was reflected in the neighboring 
Muslim territories of Lanao and Sulu. The active Spanish presence in the Philippine 
south during the second half of the nineteenth century tended to polarize the leader­
ships of these territories into pro-Spanish and anti-Spanish segments. The success of 
Datu Uta's resistance owed not a little to the support which the Datu found among his 
independent Muslim neighbors. Working in cooperation, they constituted a system of trade 
and communications which operated parallel to that dominated by Spain. 
Datu Uto's relations with the I llanuns inhabiting the coast of Illana bay and their 
Maranao brothers of lake Lanao cannot be clearly established because the Spaniards them­
selves were ignorant of what was happening in these areas. The lake Lanao area was for 
the most part independent until the American conquest at the turn of the century. There 
is no doubt, however, of Uto's links with the Illanuns. On November 1886, the gunboat 
Gardoqui undertook to inspect the ranaherias of the I llanun coast which were suspected of 
being in communication with Uto's forces and providing the latter with war supplies. The 
first datu interviewed, Kailadan of Balabagan, informed the Spaniards that a henchman of 
Uto was residing at Lalabuan, one of the larger Illanun principalities. When the gunboat 
arrived at Lalabuan, the inhabitants, fearing Spanish reprisals, had all fled to the 
interior.o5 6  
In  order to understand the significance of the above-mentioned incident, it is use­
ful to examine the developments that led up to it. In the first place, precedents ex­
isted for Magindanao-Illanun alliances and commercial ties. The earliest Spanish posi­
tions around lake Lanao had to be abandoned in 1640 owing to repeated attacks from 
contingents sent by Sultan Kudrat of Cotabato.o5 7  It  is interesting to note that the 
Maranaos and the Illanuns actively aided Malinog in his revolt against the Cotabato 
Sultan in the eighteenth century. Some sources even state intriguingly that Malinog was 
called "king of Malanao.o"5 8  If Malinog was a protege of Buayan, the I llanun involvement 
54. Ibid . ,  pp. 13-14. Juanmarti was of the op1n1on that the "reduction" of the inhabi­
tants, particularly the pagan tribes, around the bay could only be effected if 
Buayan itself were first conquered. 
55. ExpZoraai6n, pp. 179-180. 
56. Manuel Maria Rincon, Cinao Meses en Mindanao; Operaaiones en 1 88 6 - 1 8 8 ? ;  Cartas al 
"Diario de Manila" (Manila, 1894), entry of Nov. 27, 1886, pp. 52-53. The volume 1s 
a collection of dispatches to the newspaper Diario de Manila. 
57. Montero y Gay, "Los Moros Malayo-Mahometanos," p. 332; for Kudrat's involvement in 
northern Mindanao see Francis Madigan, "The early history of Cagayan de Oro," PS , 
II, 1 (Jan. 1963), pp. 76- 130. 
58. "Capitulos de carta escrita, " in Barrantes, p. 329; Francia and Parrado, II, p. 207. 
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in the Magindanao civil war may be early evidence of Illanun-Buayan relations. 
The evidence, however, points to the fact that the Illanuns were more closely linked 
to Cotabato than to Buayan before the Datu Uto period. The name "Illanun" is a contrac­
tion of "I-lanaw-en" which means "people of the lake.o" This was the name given by the 
Magindanaos to those Maranaos who, owing to various causes in the past, had come to 
settle around Illana bay and in the Pulangi basin. Illanuns follow Maranao speech but,
according to Kudero, have adopted the sober Magindanao dress and quiet manner and are 
recognized as a pengampong or genealogical clan.o5 9  Mednick has pointed out that the 
overlap between the Maranao and Magindanao genealogies occurs· particularly with those 
genealogies derived from the sa-iZud, or downriver, branch of Magindanao; there 1s very 
little overlap with the sa-raya branch . 
. . . The implication is therefore that the Maranao are sociologically
derived from the down-river branch, and further that the system first took 
root in the Butig area which _lies between the lake and the down-river 
Magindanao.o6 0  
The Illanuns have always acknowledged a certain superiority of the Magindanaos over them,
rooted in the fact that Islam was brought to them by Sarip Kabungsuwan, the founder of 
the Cotabato Sultanate.o6 1  
Such close ties of origin are entirely consistent with the historical relationship 
between the famed Illanun pirates and Cotabato. According to Kuder, Illanun piratical
praus of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were actually captained by Magin­
danao datus or, in some cases, Sulus.o6 2  Although Sulu was the principal market for the 
products of Lanao and the booty of pirates, the city of Cotabato remained a safe haven 
for pirates until the middle of the nineteenth century. Belcher's description of 1845 
is strikingly reminiscent of the earlier days of Cotabato when Lutaos congregated at the 
flourishing port-city and gave their support to the Sultan: 
The Illanons . . .  are a distinct race, inhabiting the great Bay of Illanon, 
on the southern part of Mageendanao, or Mindanao, having for its capital 
the city of Mindanao (Cotabato), where the Sultan resides, and where, even 
in the pirates' nest, Europeans and other traders meet with h-ospitable 
reception and protection. 
It is this Lagoon which is the stronghold of the Lanoon pirates, . . .  
where, it is highly probable, they submit to their own pirate Chief, and 
who, acknowledging the supremacy of the Sultan of Mindanao, shields the 
latter from blame by this semblance of independence; it is well known, how­
ever, that any matters referred to the Sultan of Mindanao, respecting the 
acts of the Lanoons, especially upon questions of ransom, are speedily and 
effectively arranged by the Sultan.o6 3  
The survival of the Cotabato Sultanate's prestige into the nineteenth century may 
have been due to the Illanuns' acknowledgment of the Sultan ' s  supremacy. Their relation­
ship was concealed, as Belcher tells us, and this may explain why Spanish sources say
nothing about an alliance between their ally-- the Sultan--and the dreaded Illanuns. But 
all the treaties between the Sultan and Spain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries contain a clause making the Sultan responsible for acts of piracy committed by 
Mindanaoans, including the Illanuns. Is this a hint that the Spaniards acknowledged that 
the Sultan had some influence over the Illanuns? The material benefits which the Sultan 
derived from this relationship can be inferred from the first clause in a treaty of 1805: 
sacred vessels and jewels of the Church, allegedly bought by the Sultan's mother from the 
Illanuns, were to be turned over to the Spaniards in exchange for 15,000 pesos.o6 � · 
The increasing Spanish domination over the Cotabato Sultan, culminating in the occu­
pation of Cotabato in 1861, was bound to have its effect on Magindanao-Illanun/Maranao 
59. Edward M. Kuder, "The Moros in the Philippines,o" Far Eastern Quarterly, IV, 2 (1945) , 
p. 123. 
60. "Encampment, " 102. 61. Kuder, p. 123. 
62. Kuder, 123 · , Reber, p. 190. 
during the years 1843-46 (London, 1848),63. Voyage of H.M.Se. Samarang,Narrative of a 
263-264. 
64. Barrantes, 281o. 
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relations. When the naval station of Pollok was being constructed in 185 1 ,  the inhabi­
tants of Sugut, a majeor ranaheria near the Magindanao-Illanun border, rose in revolt. 
Bernaldez gives two causes of this uprising: first, the instigation of the Maranaos; 
second, Sugu t ' s  enmity with the Cotabato Sultan who was ostensibly under the protection 
of the Spanish garrison at Pollok.e6 5  Obviously the Illanuns and Maranaos were not wit­
nessing the events at Magindanao with disinterest. The adverse reaction to the Sultane' s  
submission to Spain was not unique to the Davao and sa-raya datus. On the other hand, 
there were Illanun and Maranao datus who remained friendly with the Cotabato Sultan. 
In  1879, the Maranao datu Ilian, who belonged to the ruling family of Ganas!, on the 
shores of lake Lanao, and Malabang on the Illanun coast, was elected by the rumah biahara 
of Cotabato to the post of Datu Amirol. This was a prestigious title, equivalent to 
Rajah Laut, and it evoked memories of Cotabato ' s  past glories as a maritime empire. The 
Cotabato Sultan was anxious to publicize the new appointment. Letters were sent to the 
lesser sultans and datus of L anao. The Sultan also sent his decorated vinta, towed by a 
Spanish gunboat, with a contingent of Magindanao datus to fetch Ilian, who was residing
temporarily near Malabang. Ilian brought with him to Cotabato one of his wives,  some 
waiting maids, and thirty principals of Ganas!.e6 6  
The significance of Datu Ilian's election to a Magindanao post is twofold. First, 
it was a gesture made by the Sultan on behalf of Spain. The Spaniards had been wanting 
to gain a foothold in Lanao, for they had heard of the tremendous wealth it held. In 
1879 Martel de Gayangos reported a brisk traffic in rice and coffee from lake Lanao to 
the Illanun coast. The Maranao heartland, he said, produced more than 15 ,000  picas
6 1( 1  picoe= 137½ lbs.) of rice and 1 1 , 000  of coffee annually for export.r The Cotabato 
Sultan was willing to exert every effort to divert Illanun exports to Z amboanga and 
Manila. He declared to Jose Urbano, governor of the District, that he had influenced the 
election of Ilian on behalf of Spain. Now, he said, his friends would be able to partake
of the benefits of the Lanao trade. Gayangos' account ends with a strong recommendation 
that a commission be assembled to explore the hidden trade routes between I llana bay and 
lake Lanao, which he considered to be "the richest of all in the Filipino archipelago.e1 1 6 8  
Ilian ' s  election can also be seen in the context of internal power struggles. < It 
will be remembered that a year before this Datu Uto and his allies had appeared in Cota­
bato in a show of strength; the Cotabato Sultan must have looked petty beside his upriver
rival. Most significant of all, Uto was one of the aspirants to the rank of Datu Amirol. 
Gayangos states that Uto could have easily won owing to his massive following were it not 
for the intervention of the Sultan and the Spaniards.e6 9  That the Sultan had to appoint 
a wealthy and powerful Maranao datu to an important Magindanao post must be seen as an 
indication of the Sultan's almost total loss of prestige in Magindanao itself. This, 
perhaps, is a reflection of the nature of the conceealed Cotabato-Illanun relationship
mentioned earlier. As the Magindanao heartland came under the domination of Buayan, the 
Cotabato Sultan was forced to look outward for support. This he found from the Spaniards 
at Zamboanga and from some of the Illanun and Maranao chiefs. 
The Cotabato Sultan's alliance with the principal Maranao datu did not meet Spanish
expectations. The Maranaos and the Illanuns have never been unified politically. Ac­
cording to Gainza, some geographers had talked about the existence of an Illanun Con­
federacy, but in actual fact this was not a body-politic but a vague mutual- defense 
agreement in case of external attack.e7 0  I n  Forrest's time there were, on the shores of 
65.  Bernaldez, p.  2 19. 
6 6 .  Antonio Martel de Gayangos, "Laguna de L anae en  la isla de Mindanao,e" BSGM , XIV, 
1883, pp. 377 - 379. 
6 7 .  Ibid.r, p. 3 79; Montero y Gay, "Los Moros,e" p. 333. 
68. Gayangos, "Laguna de Lanae," pp. 377,  379.  I t  is possible that at this time there 
was an alternative route for Maranao agricultural exports. A 1902 Gazetteer states 
that the products of the areas east of lake Lanao found an outlet to the sea via < the 
Pulangi river and its tributaries, which extend upwards to the Maranao region (U . S. 
Bureau of Insular Affairse, A Pronouncing Gazetteer and GeographiaaZ Diationary of 
the Philippinesr; 190 2 ,  p. 579)e. The significance of this is that Datu Uto may have 
benefited from tolls collected from this apparent traffic. 
69. Gayangos MS, p. 9. 
70.  Juiaio Cr{tiao, quoted in Bernaldez, pp. 46-47. Gainza says that there were a great
number of I llanun datus, all equal, and that they undertook slave raids in order to 
increase their power vis-a-vis their rivals. 
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lake Lanao, no fewer than seventeen self-styled rajahs and sixteen with the title of 
sultan.o7 1  The Spanish scheme of diverting Illanun trade to their ports was thus only
minimally realioz�d. For example, Illanun coffee was exported in great quantity to Dutch 
and British as well as Spanish ports.o7 2  The commercial entrepot was Sulu. When the 
Spaniards occupied Jolo in 1876, the greater part of Lanao ' s  products found their way to 
Maibun, the alternate, independent capital of Sulu and the center of the "smuggling"
activities. Parallel, then, to any special trading relationship between Illanuns and 
Spaniards which may have resulted from the election of Ilian, was a pattern of Illanun 
and Maranao trade that was oriented to the Malay and Indonesian world. The evidence for 
this in Spanish eyes was the flow of firearms and armaments to Lanao and the Illanun 
coast, a phenomenon which was to make the subjugation of these peoples a difficult task 
even for the American forces later. The dual system of trade in these areas somewhat 
resembles the situation in the Pulangi valley. Because of their wealth, says Blumentritt, 
the Illanuns and Maranaos were able to obtain more and better weapons than their Magin­
danao counterparts.o7 3  
Gayangos notes that the Maranaos had a good number of Tiruray slaves who were set to 
work in plantations or in cloth printing industries. These Tiruray slaves were bought
regularly from the Magindanaos.o7 � It will be remembered that Buayan was the foremost 
supplier of slaves, and thus we are given a strong hint of the economic relationship be­
tween Lanao and Buayan. The principal market on the Illanun coast for such illicit mer­
chandise as slaves and firearms was the town of Lalabuan. There a great market was held 
every Saturday which attracted Chinese and Muslim traders from all over the area, includ­
ing Buayan. Coffee, rice, beeswax, Tiruray and Subanun slaves, were brought there to be 
bartered.o7 5  The striking thing about this description of the Lalabuan market by Gayangos
is the fact that the main commodities brought there are all known exports of Buayan. 
The Spanish government soon discovered that firearms were entering the interior of 
Magindanao through Lalabuan. That is  why, in 1884, governor-general Jovellar strongly 
recommended that Lalabuan be occupied, for the latter, together with Sarangani bay, was 
linked to the maintenance of Uto's military strength.o7 6  We can picture the datu of 
Lalabuan as the converse of Datu Ilian of Ganasi and Malabang who opted for Cotabato and 
Spain. The datu of Lalabuan was one of Uto ' s  hidden allies, a link to the non-Spanish 
world of trade and communications. It is not surprising that a henchman of Uto should, 
as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, be resident at Alalbuan and that the inhabi­
tants of this place should prefer to flee inland rather than be questioned about their 
links with the Magindanao datu. 
Datu Uto must have communicated with the Illanuns via a northwest land route.o7 � 
This seems to have been a more difficult route than the one to Sarangani bay described 
earlier, and i ts use must be seen in relation to the Spanish interruption of Sarangani 
trade in the mid- 1880's. The role of both Lalabuan and Sarangani bay was to provide 
channels through which firearms and war supplies from Sulu could enter the Magindanao in­
terior. Sulu was the focal point of trade and communications in the southern Philippines. 
Nieto Aguilar states that, at least prior to the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876, 
the latter city was the point from where the inhabitants of Mindanao were receiving arms,
munitions and other things necessary to sustain their resistance to Spanish designs 
against their independence.o7 8  That this was the case is not surprising in view of Jolo's 
historical role as trade entrepot of the region. Since the decline of Cotabato in the 
71. p. 301. Forrest says that this multiplicity of independent chiefs was the reason 
that the Cotabato Sultan found it  impossible to restrain the Illanuns from piracy. 
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secondary smuggling base. This was after a Sultan friendly to the Spaniards was 
killed, resulting in complications which prompted the governor of Zamboanga to call 
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July 26, 1871, in Lietz, Calendar , p. 165. 
77. Pastells implies that the establishment of a fort at Parang-Parang, which is  present­
day maps lies midway along the road from the Pulangi valley to Lalabuan, was one of 
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Mision, III, p. 276. 
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late seventeenth century, Sulu , especially its capital Jolo, was "the great commercial 
mart of all the surrounding ports in Magindanao and the Celebes . . . .  "7 9  Because of the 
Spanish interruption of the junk trade with Cotabato, Chinese goods had to filter in by 
way of Sulu , thus making Magindanao dependent on the latter for such vital items as 
metals and cloth. Sulu, on the other hand, never grew enough rice for consumption and 
so relied on Magindanao for this commodity. B o  Forrest also mentions that the Sulus 
bought whole cargoes of captives seized by Illanun and Magindanao raiders; this was still 
the case in the 1830's, according to Hunt.oB l  Long before the Datu Uto period the pattern 
of trade had already been established: it was to Sulu that Chinese, Arab, Malay and 
European traders generally went in order to obtain the products of Mindanao; it was from 
Sulu that the inhabitants of Mindanao obtained imports of iron, cloth and firearms. 
The Spanish forward-movement in the nineteenth century had, as one of its goals, the 
control of the Muslim Mindanao and Sulu trade. After the Spanish destruction of Jolo in 
1851, attempts were made to license native shipping, as in Cotabato, and to impose a 
tariff on foreign shipping. The idea was to divert trade to Spanish ports. Since Jolo 
was not actually occupied until 1876, however , the former pattern of trade persisted. Bo2 
The significant changes took place in Magindanao. As early as 1836, a plan was put forth 
to diminish or cut off Sulu trade with Mindanao "in order to confine the commerce to our 
[Spanish] channels. "Bo3 By 1837, says Hunt� large quantities of paddy 
were transported
from Magindanao to Sulu in Spanish ships. B After the Spanish occupation of Cotabato, 
the latter's trade was directed to Zamboanga and Manila, thus ending a centuries-old 
pattern. 
One of the reasons for Buayan's success in maintaining its integrity was its ability 
to maintain extensive contacts with Sulu while its rival, Cotabato , was drawn into the 
Spanish net. In 1860 , Datu Uto was seen passing through Cotabato at the head of two Sulu 
ships, bearing a passport signed by the Sulu Sultan, exporting slaves to Sulu in exchange
for firearms and cloth. Says Fr. Cuevas� a Jesuit missionary: "This is the principalcommerce of Jolo with the river . . . .  "o8 I ndeed, Sulu's role as buyer of captives 
seized by Mindanao p-irates was not undermined by the series of punitive expeditions and 
treaties undertaken by the Spaniards. The difference was that by the second half of the 
nineteenth century the interior of Mindanaoo, dominated by Buayan, had become almost the 
sole source of slaves. 
Unfortunately we lack data concerning Sulu ' s  trading relationship with sa-raya
Magindanao. We know, however, that Sulu ships were said to frequent Sarangani bay and 
Lalabuan, bringing in firearms which ultimately found their way to Buayan. Wickberg
notes that Sulu was the prime outlet for a number of important Mindanao goods whose ulti­
mate destination was Singapore. This leads him to conclude that "in a larger context 
. . .  the Spanish-Moro struggle in Mindanao was part of a contest between Manila (assisted
by Cebu and Iloilo) and Sulu to include Mindanao in their respective spheres of economic 
influence. " B o6 In the context of Wickbergo' s  hypothesis, Buayan was Sulu's partner in an 
economic tug - o-war with Cotabato and Manila. A good part of the "important Mindanao 
goods" of which Sulu was the outlet must have come from the Mindanao interior. 
Some Spanish writers feel that the death knell of the Magindanao resistance was 
sounded by the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876. The supply of war materials being cut 
off, the whole basis of the resistance would be undermined.oB 7 The reasoning is sound, 
but it rests on the mistaken assumption that Sulu trade was controlled by Spain after 
79. Hunt, p. 51. The Cotabato Sultanate may have overshadowed Sulu in the seventeenth 
century or earlier. The Sultan and nobles of Cotabato boasted to both Forrest and 
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1876. Jolo itself was made subject to a multiplicity of regulations against the importa­
tion of firearms, especially by the Chinese, but apparently the breach of such regulations 
was not uncommon.o8 8  More significantly, the impact of the fall of Jolo was neutralized 
by the rise of an alternative center on the south side of the island. Called Maibun, it 
became the de faato capital of Sulu and the site of the Sultan ' s  residence after 1876. 
Just as in Magindanao Buayan came to stand for resistance against the Spanish presence at 
Cotabato, in Sulu it was Maibun that stood against occupied Joloo. The lines of trade 
tended to reflect such oppositions. Following careful observations made in 1880, the 
Spanish investigator ·Garin reported in a memorial that warehouses could be found both in 
Jolo and Maibun. The merchants of Jolo tended to trade with Zamboanga and Manila, while 
those of Maibun traded with Labuan and Singapore� In Maibun Garin discovered a huge 
stockpile of firearms, ammunition and cannons which had arrived from Singapore via Labuan. 
These were smuggled to Mindanao and retailed there "at a somewhat swollen price."o8 9  
In another of his general observations resulting from a study of the Chinese in the 
Philippine south, Wickberg states that "the line between Spanish and non-Spanish territory 
in Mindanao also marked the line between an area that felt the pull in the direction of 
Hongkong and one that was oriented toward Singapore.o1 1 9 0  The preceding sections have 
shown this to be essentially the case, though we must add that Wickberg ' s  "line" should 
be extended to Sulu itself after 1876. In Magindanao, the line between Spanish and non­
Spanish territory was roughly that which determined the territories of sa-ilud and 
sa-raya. Cotabato, the center of sa-ilud, came to be a part of the Spanish lines of 
trade and communications that linked together Malabang, Davao, Zamboanga, Jolo, Cebu, 
Manila and Hongkong. Buayan, the center of sa-rayar, while trading with Cotabato really
belonged to another pattern which linked together Lalabuan, Sarangani bay, Maibun, 
Labuan, Singapore and other areas of the Malay and Indonesian world. It was Datu Uto ' s  
skillful participation in both systems of trade and communications that enabled him to 
reap much wealth, the uses of which, as we shall see, were instrumental in elevating him 
to a position of leadership in the Magindanao world. 
88. Majul, "Chinese relationship," p. 156; Vicente Barrantes, "Peligro de Mindanao," La 
Potttiaa de Espana en Filipinas , IV, 1894, p. 102. Barrantes blames this on the 
free-port status of Jolo as of November 1876,  a situation which encouraged the smug­
gling of firearms. This contrabanding, he says, is clearly reflected in the "almost 
permanent state of the insurrection in Mindanao.o" 
89. "Memoria sobre el Archipielago de Jolo," BSGM, X, 1881, p. 206o. The price range of 
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CHAPTER IV 
UNITY AND THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM (ca. 1872-1888) 
The Spanish expedition that explored the Pulangi Valley in 1855 found a fragmented 
political situation. There were almost a dozen little sultanates that had sprouted in 
the river valley, claiming equal status with Cotabato, Tumbao and Buayan and vying for 
prestige among their neighbors. The Spaniards were confident that their control over the 
valley would be  accomplished with ease, since the potentfal for unity among the various 
political groupings did not seem to exi st. But when the colonial forces tried to extend 
their domination beyond sa-ilud barely six years later in 1861, they were met with con­
certed resiestance by the Magindanaos, and their advance was checked. Less than a decade 
later, the sa-Paya Magindanaos were political l y  unified under Datu Uto, and the 1855 
image of fragmentation was shattered. How was this unification accomplished, and what 
were its foundations? 
One way this was done was through the build-up of a system of dyadic or person-to­
person alliances with Uto at the apex. Pastells says that Uta ' s  ab i lity to capture the 
friendship of most of the datus was extraordinary, such friendships usually being sealed 
through his marriage with their daughters.e1 Alliances were also made by arranging mar­
riages between his daughters (by royal wives or concubines, depending on the recipien t ' s  
status) and other datus. In this way, Uto extended to the political realm the cohesion 
characteristic of a closely-knit kin group. 
An illustration of the importance of marriage ties is Uta ' s  uni on with Rajah Putri 
("Royal Princess") ,  the only legitimate daughter left behind by the last noteworthy
Sultan of Cotabato, Kudrat II. Unfortunately, the date is unknown to us. According to a 
Manila newspaper, the marriage increased Uta ' s  importance because Kudrat's famil y  was 
stil l  considered the most i mportant in the valley.e2 It was as if Kudrat, the last inde­
pendent Sultan, had, through his daughter , transferred the symbol of Magindanao ' s  in­
tegrity to rival Buayan. Rajah Putri and her mother, Paya Sabi,  were respected by 
everyone in the valley, Spaniards included.e3 The Princess' banner and insignia were 
venerated by all the Magindanaos. Thi s  banner, which used to be  displayed in the Sultan 
of Cotabato's palace, was seen in 1887 to fly proudly above the kota of Datu Uta ' s  
Minister of War.� The Uto-Rajah Putri marriage also brought the former into relationship
with the Princess' brother, Datu (later Raj ah Mudah) Mamaku, who lived in the vicinity of 
Cotabato and was Uto's protege in several succession disputes for the Cotabato throne. 
Perhaps the period of Datu Uto's greatest power coincided with the time when his 
network of dyadic alliances, sealed by marriages, was at its ful l est development. He 
himself boasted of this fact in a letter to the governor of Cotabato sent in 1874: 
Praised i s  he who can manage everything . . . .  I consider it substantial, 
indeed, that to which one can aspire from marriage. I am making i t  known 
to the commanding general that I will come down [ to Cotabato] during the 
coming Lent. I dare to give this information because we will  come in a 
large group, very large indeed : including my uncle the sultan, my uncle 
the sultan of Limontangan , the sultan of Punul, Talayan, Ladehilayan, 
Luna- igned, the rajah mudah of Baluguis,  of Baguigued, Cadiguilan, Cayuque, 
Martincahuanan, Buluan , Badeha-Buayan of that same place, the sultan of 
Dupilas, of Salugay, and my brother Tambi lauan ; we brothers and relatives 
will all come down this Lent . . e. .  Also with us will be the sultan of 
Buayan, of Malasila, of Mamlag , Malada and Ladasihina. It will  be good for 
1. "Memoria del R. P. Pablo Pastell s,e" March 15, 1892 ,  CMSJ , IX, p. 615. 
2 .  News article from the Diario de Manila quoted in Montero y Vidal, Pirater!a, p. 654 
(note)e. 
3 .  Ibid. 
4. Perinat, "Diario" (part II of Operaciones Militares) , Feb. 2 0, 1887, p .  117. 
34  
35 
us to come down in order to join with you 1n friendship. Give warning to 
Tumbao; we will not be intimiedated. 5 
How does one explain this extraordinary ability to form personal alliances? Why 
were the datus attracted to Datu Uto i n  the first place? In answering this question
Pastells put forth this view i n  a memorial of 1892 : 
In effect his natural talent, his prestige, his riches, his supporters and 
above all his fiery despotisme, had created around him a certain air of 
glory which made him like a feared idol or the compelled leader of whatever 
action took place in the basin of the Rio- grande.6 
The above description can be  roughly b roken down into three components: wealth, a 
strong �ersonal following, and personal qualities. By examining each of these aspects
in detail, perhaps a fuller understanding may be had of the basis of the dyadic ties 
created by Uto. 
Much of Datu Uto's prestige and power was derived from his wealth. This explains
how he, a datu, could have gained the respect of all the sultans in Magindanao. 7 In the 
first place, the hierarchies of Magindanao, i n  comparison with Sulu, are not very well 
delineated. The title datur, for example, is  much more significant and dignified in Sulu 
than in Magindanao. In the former the title is hereditary, while in the latter a weal­
thy freeman might easily acquire the title through i nfluence.e8 In other words, there is 
no automatic correspondence between one ' s  actual power and one's title or position in a 
formal hierarchy, although it is usually desirable to legitimize one ' s  position of power
through the acquisition of some formal status. In Datu Uto ' s  case, wealth bridged the 
fine distinctions of rank. Everywhere in the Pulangi people knew him as The Datu,r9 but 
none doubted his superiority over the sultans. 
The most important index of p restige and power in traditional Magindanao was the 
number of slaves a sultan or datu owned.e.· Santayana goes to the extent of saying that 
the aspirant to the throne who possessed the largest number of slaves and sakops (free
subjeects) automatically became Sultan.e1 0  The Spaniards realized how important slaves 
were to the Cotabato Sultan when, after the city ' s  occupation, they tried to make the 
Sultan free his slaves. The Sultan replied to an insistent Spanish official that he 
would rather give up his wife and children than his slaves, for lacking the latter he 
simply would cease to be Sultan.e1 1  But eventually he had to bow to the laws of Spain,
and surely enough the Sultanate ceased to exist except in name. 
Things were different further upriver. In the Pulangi, according to Nieto, prac­
tically anybody who had slaves, or had the means to buy them, made himself a datu and 
established his own rancheria. But the number of slaves owned by any af these petty
datus rarely exceeded a hundred. At the time of Nieto ' s  writing, there were two poten­
tates who towered above the rest because they had three to four thousand slaves apiece.
These were Datu Uto and the Sultan of Tumbao, who.was himself a vassal of Uto.1 2  Gayan­
gos, writing during the height of Uta ' s  power in the 1870 ' s, ·eattributes to him four to 
5. Quoted i n  Franci a  and Parrado, I, pp. 344-345. Some parts of the Spanish are vague, 
and the place names are not easily identifieable. See Map 3 · efor the locations of 
identified places. 
6. "Memoria,e" p. 6 15. "Action" i n  line 4 1s a loose translation of the Spanish 
"algarada.e" 
7. Saleeby (Studiesr, p. 23) is the only writer who gives the title "Sultan" to Uto. 
In his description of the man, however, he uses the conventional title "datu" 
ascribed to Uto. 
8. Charles Livingston, "Constabulary monographs of the Province of Sulu,e" 1915 ( ex­
tracts), i n  Customary Law Papersr, 160 , vol. V ,  p. 1; Melvin Mednick, "Some prob­
lems," p. 47. 
9. ". . .  when a moro of whatever rancheria talks about Uto, he says The Datto, and 
everyone knows to whom the reference is''; . Rinc6n, p. 160. 
10. p. 106. 
11. "Memoria de la Portilla,e" Manila, Oct. 7, 186 7 ,  publieshed in Francia and Parrado, 
II, p. 129. 
12. Nieto MS, p. 6 2. 
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five thousand slaves.o1 3  Clearly, the superior number of his slaves is a manifestation 
of his power; it also explains his superiority over all the sultans. 
The Spanish sources available are not too clear about the composition and the role 
of Uto's slaves. Having determined to stamp out slavery not only in accordance with the 
demands of the Catholic laws of Spain but also as a means of undermining the political 
power of the datus, the Spaniards, especially the Jesuit missionaries, tended to condemn 
the institution without really understanding it in terms of Magindanao society. In the 
first place, Spanish sources usually fail to distinguish between debt bondsmen and cap­
tives of war or slave-raids. Secondly, they often equate Magindanao slavery with its 
counterparts in America and Africa, thus failing to note the debt relationships and the 
opportunities for social advancement which, in the case of Magindanao as well as other 
Malay-type societies, counterbalance the evil aspects of the institution. 
According to Mednick, among the Magindanaos as well as most other Philippine low­
land groups the generic term for slave is olipon. As a group olipon were bond rather 
than chattel slaves and they possessed recognized rights and property. But there was 
another category of dependents called baniaga. These were persons seized from Spanish
territories or from the hill tribes to whom the Magindanaos were hostile.o1 � Among the 
thousands of slaves attached to Datu Uto, there must have been both olipon and baniaga. 
It is understandable that when the Spanish sources talk about slaves they actually 
refer to the baniagar. For the Spaniards never forget that they had been their subjoects 
or that they had belonged to the hill tribes whose care had been entrusted to the mis­
sionaries. Since slave-raiding in the Visayas had practically ceased by Datu Utoo' s  time, 
the baniaga he owned were taken from the Mindanao hill tribes. Uto must have obtained 
them as tribute, or pagdato, from his sakops and other datus who acknowledged his over­
lordship. As Cordoba points out, a powerful personage had very little authority over 
other datus apart from his right to exact tribute. The latter could be in the form of 
slaves, military service or agricultural produce. The datus, including Uto in his own 
district, obtained slaves from the freemen attached to them. The latter were the ones 
who raided the hills periodically, generally capturing women and children too weak to 
flee.o1 5  
As Cordoba points out, the baniaga had a very good chance of bettering their lot in 
succeeding generations: 
The captives are first put to hard labor. They hunt when they come of com­
petent age. Their children, although slaves, are in better condition, and 
from them are taken the concubines of the free classes who often come to be 
mothers of datus or freemen; and there have even been cited principal datus 
and a certain sultan born of slave mothers. . . .  Because of the relations 
between slaves and masters, the Moros ·have become a mixed race.o1 6  
Compared to the situations in other cultures, the distance between master and baniaga 
was not total or unbridgeable. Santayana states that, although slaves could not abandon 
their owner or change their affiliations, a mutual relationship existed between them and 
their masters. "Their master is their 'sole deity,o' but there seem to be favors they 
also receive.o"o1 7  Vidal y Soler and Blumentritt, who were among the most reliable observ­
ers of the Magindanao scene, state that slaves were not maltreated "except in most rare 
conditions,o" and that they frequently passed on to become free subjects of their datu.o1 8  
There were even captives from the Spanish territories who found more freedom as slaves 
of a datu rather than exploited subjects of the Spanish Crown. For example, a report 
from Sulu states: " • • o. by becoming used to a life of freedom and license those people 
(slaves) also become inured to captivity, from which they could sometimes escape but do 
not, many preferring to turn to piracy.o"1 9  In Magindanao, it was only after the Jesuits 
were able to offer generous material incentives that slaves were induced to escape from 
their masters. 
Bearing in mind that the lot of the baniaga was not abysmal, that in fact they were 
not much less fortunate than the olipin who had rights and property of their own, we can 
now turn to the role they played in Datu Uto's career. I n  the first place, slaves, 
13. Gayangos MS, p. 27. 14. "Encampment,o" p. 61. 
15. Cordoba MS, pp. 16-17. 16. Ibid. 
18. Vidal, p. 191; Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," p. 281. 
10 7 -10 8 . 
19. "Royal directions relative to a general policy • • . , " June 23, 183 7, 1n Saleeby, 
History of Sulu, appendix III, pp. 217-218. 
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especially those recently acquired, were made to cultivate Uto ' s  extensive landsa. This 
enabled Uto to generate wealth through the export of surplus crops , and , perhaps more 
important, made it  possible for Uto and the other datus to be  a leisure clas s .  As Med­
nick puts i t ,  the datus were "free to devote themselves completely to military and polit­
ical affairs as well as to engage in symbolic behaviour for which their position 
called . ' 1 2 0  Slave labor gave Uto a s trong economic foundation for the ·acultivation of 
dyadic alliances which, as we shall see ,  cons isted of a redistribution of his material 
wealtha. 
In the second place , s laves were important to Datu Uto as personal bodyguards and 
emissaries .  A dis tinction has to be  made between freemen and , perhaps , olipon who formed 
a datu ' s  standing army , and baniaga who were entrusted with the more delicate missions 
requiring unswerving loyalty .a2 1  Whenever he traveled, Uto was always accompanied by 
what appeared, to the news correspondent Rincon, to be an infinity of armed warriors , 
front and back of him, their kampitana unsheathed, ready to act on a s ignal from their 
masatera.a2 2  These were his s lavesa, some of them his own sons by slave mothersa. Not only 
were they , under the Magindanao code of  laws , totally bound to him as well as dependent
upon him for their livelihood ; they had come to give their complete loyalty to Uto and 
were thus placed in a position of trust .  "Paid assassins , "  Montery y Vidal sarcastically
calls them. Uto ' s  chief bodyguard , who shared with Pandita Ali the honor of ever being 
by the datu ' s  s ide , was himself an ex-s lave named Yamut,  nicknamed "The Executioner . "a2 3  
There were other indications of Uto ' s  wealth, besides his s lave s .  His house was 
quite substantial , as Nieto puts i t ,  "an indication of the height of success of a 
lord . " 2 � On each s ide , strongly lashed to the main pos ts , were five tantakasr; at the 
entrance was an array of these bronze cannons , too numerous to be  counted. They were 
there not only for defensive purposes , but also to symbo1ize the status and power of the 
owner of the house .  
The interior was divided into rooms , the walls of which were made of choice and 
finely carved wooden screensa. Within these halls lived his concubines and female slaves , 
more than thirty of them, his only companionsa. In the main chamber there was a huge 
cache of precious obj ects and weaponsa. According to accounts of slave defectors and to 
rumor , there were large earthen j ars , classified according to color , and huge chests 
made of wood and copper , filled with gold and silver coins of all mints and denomina­
tions , a great quantity of Chinese copper cash,  j ewelry of all ages , and a thousand 
objects of ivory and tortoise-shella. Along one s ide of the room were three heaps : one 
of krisea, another of bolos, another of spearsa. Leaning against the walls were a great
number of kampitans, shields and shotguns .a2 5  Here were j ewelry for his women, gold and 
weapons for his allies and followers . By giving to others , Uto made himself possessor
of a debt of gratitudea. By lending to the aakopa in his districta, he could turn them 
into otipin, debt-bondsmen, in case they failed to repay him . 
Mention of the weapons and armaments Uto owned brings us to a function of his 
wealth : the monopoly over military power .  According to Mednick, the Moro datus as a 
class had more or less a monopoly over military force and action. Moro weapons of the 
nineteenth century were fairly complex , and were certainly beyond the means of the ordi­
nary person . The latter had to subordinate themself to those who had access to arms and 
could provide protection.a2 6  I f  Uto was to mobilize  the Magindanaos against the Spanish 
threat , he had to have the resources for i t .  To hold off the colonial army he had to 
respond with comparable forc e .  
We have seen how armaments were imported from Sulu, directly or through the I llanun 
coas t ,  although some lantakas were manufactured in Magindanao itself , albeit crudely . 
The high cost of  these armaments precluded their purchase by sultans and datus of mean 
resourcesa. But Datu Ute ' s  control of  trade gave him both the purchasing power and the 
2 0 .  "Some problems , "  p .  4 8 .  2 1 .  Cf .  Nieto MS , p .  1 2 3 .  
2 2 .  Feb .  1 0 ,  1887 , p .  160a. 
2 3 .  Rincon, ibid.r; Montero y Vidal , Piraterla, p .  654 (note)a. 
24 . Nieto MS , p .  1 24a. Uto originally employed a Manila architect to design his house ,  
but , being dissatisfied with the plans , he dismissed him and proceeded to have the 
house built in the traditional manner ;  Perinat , I I ,  p .  1 2 4 .  
2 5 .  Nieto MS , p .  1 2 4 ;  Perinat , I I ,  p .  1 2 5 .  Perinat ' s  information comes from a former 
s lave of Uto named Atek . 
2 6 .  "Some problems , "  p .  4 9 .  
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access to these itemsr. This is another explanation of his paramouncyr. When the brother 
of Datu Amirol was asked to comment on why Uto seemed to be more respected and powerful
than any of the sultans, he said that this was because more warriors could be  armed by
Datu Uto alone than five sultans put together.r2 7  Gayangos attributes the respect given
Uto by a l l  the sultans and datus of the Pulangi to his abi lity to arm his people with 
rifles of modern design.r2 8  Perinat, a mil i tary man who participated in the 1 8 8 7  cam­
paign against the datu, did not fail to emphas ize, in the scattered descriptions in his 
diary, that there was no lack of lantakas and carbines among the Magindanao forces.r2 9  
Datu Uto ' s  wealth--his  slaves, gold, and stockp i l e  o f  arms- -undoubtedly brought him 
much prestige, served to attract followers, and bound them to him through some form of 
deb t .  But wealth alone does not explain why, as Pastells puts it, Uto had a certain air 
of glory about him which made him "a feared idol."  The attractiveness o f  the datu to 
others must also have been due to his personal qualities, his possession of powers recog­
nized by othersr. 
One quali ty of Uto which serves to explain his rise  in pres tige and power was his 
personal valor, combined with a certain amount of physical prowess . There is evidence 
that he was known for his fighting abi l i ty at least in the early days of his career. 
Several Spanish historians have compared him to the seventeenth century Sultan o f  Cota­
bato, Kudrat, who became a l egendary hero to the Magindanaos owing to his exploits 
against Spain.r3 0  According to Francia and Parrado, Datu Uto represented "resistance . "  
He stood at the head o f  a group of datus hostile to Spain, who gave battle against the 
advancing Spanish- F i l ip ino forces in Pagalungan, Talayan, Bakat, Buayan and Kudarangan,
where the datus had concentrated for more effectiveness .r3 1  It  was in the defense of 
Pagalungan in 1861  that Uto lost his r ight eye, thus gaining the nickname "one- eyed 
man . " r3 2  He was in the grand tradition of the great datus of Magindanao who captaiRed
piratical praus and displayed their valor at every opportunity in order not to fall into 
disrespect from the vassals and s l aves who obeyed them. 3 3  
However, Spanish accounts of the 1880 ' s, when Uto was already "Sultan of the River" 
and the Spaniards were devising all sorts of ways to break his power, contradict the 
dynamic and forceful picture abover. Nieto says that Uto was timid ; Rincon, that he was 
cowardly ;  Montero y Vidal, that he lacked personal valor.r3 � There s eem to be  two ways
of explaining this apparent change in Uto. First, the unflattering descriptions of him 
can be placed in his torical context : they actually refer to the time when his dyadic
alliance system was breaking down as a result of external pressuresr. Second, personal 
prowess and valor may be meaningless in the context of Is lam and the Sultanate which he, 
though s t i l l  known as datu, had, as we shall see, come to represrent. 
Nieto describes Uto as "a  king with many tyrannical rivals . " r3 5  Not every datu 
will ingly acknowledged his supremacyr. His reign as "Sultan of the River" was marked by
instances of terrorism and assassination undertaken by his s lave army against recalci­
trant datus who either refused to pay tribute or  were seeking the alliance of Spain in 
order to further thei r  own interestsr. Thus, beneath the semb l ance of unity in sa-raya 
were ever-present centrifugal forces , the control of which depended largely upon Datu 
Uto ' s  personal interventions. The situation was aggravated by the lack of effective 
mechanisms to insure peaceful success ion along, say, family lines and primogeniture, as 
was the case in Sulu, which was more subj ect to orthodox Is lamic influences.r3 6  Thusr, 
anyone with a s i zable  amount of wealth, a strong following, and firearms was a potential
rival who might even assass inate in order to create a power vacuum which would facilitate 
his own rise.  
Uta ' s  fears were very real and inescapable, and it is in this context that Spanish
descriptions of him must be seen. His fears explain the numerous precautions he took, 
some verging on absurdity, in order to insure his safety and wellr-being. His palatial 
27.  Vidal y Soler, p. 191.  2 8 .  Gayangos MS, p .  27.  
29.  I I ,  passim. 
30. Francia and Parrado, I, p .  34 7 ;  Wences lao Retana, "Prologue" to Combes, 1897  edi­
tion. 
31. Francia and Parrado, I,  p. 346r. 3 2. Ibid.r; Vidal y Soler, p. 191.  
33 .  C f .  Santayana, p.  108r. 
34.  Nieto MS, p .  1 2 3 ;  Rincon, p .  160 ; Montero y Vidal, Pirateria , pp . 6 5 4 - 6 5 5  (note)r. 
35. Nieto MS, p .  1 2 2 .  36. Majul, "Sulu Sulta!late," pp . 26- 27. 
39 
home was inhabited solely by women who kept a watchful eye on the datu during his relaxed 
3 8moments.o3 7  Only women were allowed to ride with him in his vintar.r The person in 
charge of all his gunpowder and munitions was a woman.o3 9  His food had to be prepared 
before his own eyes by his wives and served first to the other people dining with him, 
so that what he ate were practically the left-overs.o4 0  Such was his fear of being poi­
soned that whenever he was away from home he drank the milk of coconuts which he himself 
had split open. During his travels the datus were forewarned to make• security prepara­
tions. When on land he was perpetually surrounded by his bodyguards. When he used the 
riverways, warriors would line the banks.o4 1  
Because of his delicate position at the apex of a political system based upon shift­
ing dyadic alliances, what was more important to Datu Uto than personal valor was shrewd­
ness and tact in dealing with men. Montero y Vidal is, at least, willing to acknowledge 
this fact: 
Uto does not have physical prowess or personal valor; but his character 
traits, on the other hand, make him truly superior to all the Moros of the 
river, over whom he rules through his intelligence and audacity.o4 2  
Pastells talks about Uto ' s  "natural talent. "1to3 Nieto describes the man as "cunning,
extremely bad in morals and personally considerate (or prudent). "o1t 1t  Francia and Parrado 
mention his "sanguinary and cruel instincts . . .  augmented by his lively ingenuity.o"1t s 
Rincon says that Uta was "suspicious and astute," and that he had a supine pride which 
he knew how to conceal with great ease.o1to6 In other words, Uto ' s  personality was hardly
rigid ; in spite of the cruelty and decadence which Spanish writers invariably ascribe to 
their enemy, there is also an acknowledgment of his ingenuity and prudence, qualities
which are necessary ingredients in any successful Magindanao leader. As Santayana points 
out: "each datu, to prevent absorption by other datus, had to aurttivate his clientele 
and have many slaves.o1 1  1t 7 A datu always feared that his free subjects might refrain from 
sustaining him, such as through the payment of taxes, and that they might abandon him 
and transfer their allegiance to another datu. What the Spaniards noticed about Uto was 
his ingenuity in manipulating friendships and debt relationships to suit his ends. 
Datu Uta's flexibility, prudence, and wisdom influenced to a great extent his rela­
tions with the Spanish officials at Cotabato. If we ignore for the moment the role of 
Muslim Hajis and panditas, we can say with some confidence that Uto ' s  hostility toward 
Spain was determined by questions of survival in nature; Spain was not hated in itself 
and Spaniards were not regarded as the archetypal enemy. The series of biaharas between 
Uta and the Spaniards, where the datu would greet the enemy of yesterday with open arms 
and profuse declarations of friendship (to the utter amazement and even disbelief of the 
"enemy"), is only one instance of his flexibility in dealing with others. If the Span­
iards had not been conquerors who were hoping eventually to occupy Uta's lands, genuinely
friendly relations could have existed between Spaniards and Magindanaos. Datu Uta, like 
many of his contemporaries in other parts of Southeast Asia, was no bigot who rejected 
foreign ways and things simply because they were foreign. How does one, for example, 
account for his wish to have his son Magindara go and study in Spain?o1t 8 
Datu Utoo' s  wealth brought him prestige. It enabled him to build up a following 
bound to him through some form of debt. He had the natural talent, ingenuity, and pru­
dence to maintain a system of dyadic alliances. This is essentially what the Spanish 
sources say. But is it the complete picture? Was Uto merely a rich datu who knew how 
to "play the game,o" to manipulate people and objects in order to further his self­
interest? When Pastells talks about Uto ' s  compelling attractiveness, does it not imply
that something more than factional politics was involved? Vidal y Soler says that the 
Magindanao political system had a "patriarchal" character, that the datu considered his 
3 7 .  Perinat, II, p. 125 ; Nieto MS, p. 123. 
38. Nieto MS, p. 123. 39. Perinat, II, p. 125; 
40. Rincon, Feb. 10, 1887, p. 160; Nieto MS, p. 123. 
41. Nieto MS, p. 123. 42. Piraterta, p. 654 (note). 
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45. I, p. 347. 46. Loa. ait. 
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vassals to be members of his own family.4 9  This statement s uggests that something more 
than self-interest  was involved in Uto's relationships with others. Perhaps there was 
love as a quality permeating such relationships, but we lack the indigenous sources to 
show it. The most that can be said is that Uta ' s  real name was Nua , which means "good,"
"affable,e" "kind.e1 1 5 0  
Perhaps it was not so  much that Uto could bribe and manipulate people and thus 
unify them than that there was power in him which the Magindanaos recognized, power of 
which wealth and perseonal qualities were but reflectionse, power which made perseonal valor 
and prowess irrelevant. The Sultan of Cotabato was said to be the only one who could 
perform the ri tual of "stepping on the white earth" which symboliezed his union with the 
powers of the earth, thus ass uring the prosperity and fertil ity of the land.e5 1  Energy, 
power, flowed from the Sultan who sat in his throne at the top of Tantayan hill in Cota­
bato. With the disappearance of the Sultanate, Datu Uta came to represent this power,
and this explains, in one sense, his overpowering attractiveness. 
The nature of source materials does not permit us to elaborate upon Magindanao per­
ceptions of leadership. But by looking at the subj ect of religion, we can go beyond a 
description of the alliance s ys tem and broach questi ons of brotherhood and s piritual 
fulfillment which inspire human behavior. 
49. p. 191.  
s o .  Rincon, p. 160e. Rincon calls this "a true sarcasm of the Moro world [ morisma] . "  
5 1. Saleeby, Studies  , pp. 29, 60. This ritual was pre-Islamic in origin. 
CHAPTER V 
MUSLIM ASPECTS OF DATU UTO'S SOCIETY 
When in 1855 Romaldo Crespo strongly recommended the expulsion or, at least, the 
suppression of the activities of Muslim religious officials in Magindanao, he correctly 
spotted the ideological roots of resistance to the forthcoming Spanish inroads. Watch 
the sarips and panditas clos ely, he said, and be prepared to deal with them as the Dutch 
had done to the Muslim hierarchy at Batavia.o1 Actually, however, we do not hear of any 
serious attempts on the part of the Spanish authorities to suppress Muslim missionary 
activity in the Pulangi� in spite of warnings voiced by some Spanish Jesuits � I n  the 
first place, the treaties made with the Cotabato and Sulu Sultans all contained provi­
sions against Spanish interference in matters of religion and culture.o2 In the second 
place, the assumption seems to have been that, by controlling communications 1n the 
delta, links with the greater Muslim world would be progressively severed. 
The Spaniards were certainly aware of what was happening to the remaining Muslim 
communities in Davao in the wake of heavy Sfanish colonization since 1848. They were 
isolated from Muslim communities elsewhere, with the result that the panditas lost the 
prestige they enjoyed among the people. They had difficulty in reading and writing, 
s kills which they traditionally monopolized. Ancient religious practices were displacing
orthodox I s lam.o4 Some Jesuit missoionaries concluded that the isolation and decadence of 
Islam made the rate of Muslim conversions to Christianity unusually high in Davao. There 
is the celebrated case of a sherif who, having come from . Singapore only three years ear­
lier, was converted to Christianity, his "congregation" following suit.o5 
The situation in the Pulangi valley was entirely different. When the Due d'Alen�on 
visited Cotabato in 1866, he was clearly impressed by the great number of haj is he en­
countered there. One of them, the adviser to the Sultan, is described by the Frenchman 
as having been to Mecca and adopted the large turban and long robe of the Western Mus­
lims. According to Alen�on, "One is surprised to see these barbaric tribes conserve 
their relations with their religious metropolis three thousand leagues away. "o6 Thus, 
even in Cotabato, the center of Spanish activity in Magindanao, Islam retained much of 
its vitality through links with the greater Muslim world. 
We can be sure that the resistance of the Magindanaos to the colonial advance in 
the 1860's had a religious dimension. Alen�on, who accompanied a Spanish contingent in 
a raid on a rebel kota in Supangan, noticed several books in Arabic lying in the aban­
doned kota. Furthermore several Arabic characters were inscribed above the door to the 
command post in the center of the fort, and Alen�on believed that they were a Koranic 
text.o7 Although these details are inconclusive, they hint at the involvement of the 
panditas in the actual fighting. This becomes very evident in the 1880 ' s ,  when the pan­
ditas were reported to be fighting side by side with the warriors, rousing them to give 
their lives for the cause of Allah and the Prophet.o8 Datu Uto ' s  rise to power in the 
1. Mascaro MS, pp. 95, 98. 
2 .  Referring to the Spanish drive against the Muslims in the second half of the nine­
teenth century, Phelan says: "The Spanish were beginning to distinguish between the 
adoption of Catholicism and the acceptance of political control. Manila was • willing 
to tolerate non-Christian beliefs in order to win the political allegiance of the 
newly conquered" (p. 144). 
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' 
8. One of the kotas used in defense against the Spaniards was made by the panditas;
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1860's may have been facilitated by his appeal to the Islamic consciousoness of the Magin­
danaos in the face of the Christian threat of conquest. 
In 1872, the Spanish Navy initiated hostilities against Sulu by attacking the cap1-
tal and setting up a blockade. Vidal y Soler, who was in the Magindanao interior in 
late 1872, observes that: 
During the war with Jolo the sultans and datos [of the Magindanao interior] 
were very much informed about what was happening, and they s ympathized 
clearly with the Joloanos. There should be no illusions about it; they 
are , without exception, enemies of Spain.o9 
One can picture the independent Muslim sultans and datus of sa-raya nervously awaiting
news from Sulu, knowing well enough that their own fortunes depended to a great extent 
on the outcome of the Sulu-Spanish war. What a far cry this is from the Cotabato 
Sultan's reaction to the destruction of Jolo in 1851: he actually applauded his Spanish
friends for having trounced his rival.o1 0  Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that in 
1874 Datu Uto "accelerated his rebellion,o" to cite Perinat, by establishing close rela­
tions with Sulu when the latter was in deep trouble.o1 1  The s ynchronism of events sug­
gests that Uto could see his actions in Magindanao in a wider context which included 
Islam. 
Jolo fell to Spanish hands in 1876 after a bloody struggle. This was the signal 
for a distinct Islamic revival which spread out from Sulu and reached the Magindanao 
interior. The majority of the Sulu datus refused to obey the Sultan, who was controlled 
and given a pension by the Spanish government. In this posture of dissent the datus 
were supported by the Muslim religious officials who s aw themselves menaced by the prox­
imity of Spain and her Catholic missionaries.o1 2  As we have seen, the reaction was ex­
pressed in one form through the build-up of Maibun as an alternative to the port of Jolo. 
In the religious sphere one finds a marked increase in the haji traffic after 1876 ,o1 3  
and the impact of this phenomenon upon the religious life of Sulu. 
Although Spanish sources attest to the fact that the hajis came by way of Singapore , 
nothing is said about their activities there or in the Holy City, or about the contacts 
they made and the ideas that influenced them. But recent studies about the Indonesians 
and Malays in Singapore and Mecca cast some light on our topic, since the situation in 
which Achehnese ,  Malay or Javanese Muslims found themselves was not entirely different 
from that in Sulu or Magindanao.o1 4  In Mecca, certainly the Sulu pilgrims would have 
come in touch with foreign ideas and, like the Indonesian community there , "share the 
international and distinctly anti-colonial outlook of the holy city.o" 1 5  Singaporeo, 
which was a base for anti-Dutch activities ,  had commercial ties with Maibun and Buayan,
and it would be s trange indeed if the mood of the city had not made an imprint on the 
hajis returning to their Spanish-threatened homelands. 
In spite of our ignorance abou� the precise happenings in Singapore and Mecca, we 
know that a qualitative change in the religious life of Sulu as a result of the haji 
work, making them believe that the Koran would be consoumed by fire . . .  if the 
Spaniards caree to plant themselves in Talayan"; Horguin ,  "Comunicacion , "  1888, in 
Salcedo, p. 99. 
9. p. 194. 10. Bernaldez, pp. 211-212. 
11. I, p. 23. Interestingly enough, the long, drawn-out Dutch-Achehnese War, 1n which 
Muslim priests , or imams , played a leading role , began in 1873. 
12. Montano, pp. 140-141. The Sultan himself could not be reconciled to the new situa­
tion until 1878. Early in 1877, he encouraged hostilities of all sorts against the 
Spaniards; s ee Saleeby, History of Sulu, Ch. V. 
13. Barrantes ("Peligro de Mindanao , "  p. 103) says that this was a consequence of Jolo 
being made a free port in 1876. -The facility of communications and the increase in 
monetary circulation permitted the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao to finance the trip 
to Mecca via Singapore. Barrantes ,  however, seems to place undue importance on 
Jolo and ignores the fact of Maibun's flourishing at this time. 
Cf. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth century pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," Journal 
of Asian Studies ,  XXVI, 2 (1967), pp. 267-283; William Rof f ,  The Origins of Malay 
Nationalism (New Haven, 1967)o, Ch. II. 
15. Reid, p. 269. 
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influx was perceived by the Spanish Jesuits at Jolo. Fr. Juan Quintana reported that 
"the difficulty and the repugnance of the Joloanos in embracing our civilization are due 
to the strong and powerful influence which the Hajis or moros come from Mecca have always
exercised in order to spread the message of the Koran.o" 1 6  Fr. March was more precise;
he sought to bring to the attention of the Manila government the great number of pan­
ditas, imams and sherifs who in a short time had come to Sulu from Singapore and were 
obstructing Spanish attempts at conversion and political control. They were responsible 
for the great increase in the number of juramentados, as the Spaniards called those indi­
viduals who had made the Muslim oath to give one's own life in the process of slaying 
Christians.o1 7  They had even built an imposing mosque conspicuously adjacent to the gates 
of the Spanish garrison. 
Islam, or more accurately its clergy . . .  used to be pretty nearly extinct. 
Whenever there were [Muslim priests] hereabouts, they were guided by ancient 
customs, and their number had greatly diminished. But today they are exper­
iencing great progress and an increase in numbers.o1 8  
Such a height of Islamic fervor in Sulu had direct repercussions in Magindanao. Ac­
cording to Pastells in a letter of July 1887, the Jolo panditas saw Magindanao as another 
segment of Dar-ul-Islam threatened by Spanish political and religious expansionism: 
. . .  Many of [ the Jolo panditas] travel to Mindanao with the sinister goal
of uniting among themselves the Moros, whose disunity had been up to then 
the greatest advantage the Spaniards had perceived . . . .  1 9  
Similarly, Blumentritt in 1893 mentions the great number of panditas 1n the Pulangi 
valley who had come from Sulu and 
. . .  who distinguish themselves by their great fanaticism and superior re­
ligious knowledge. These j oloano panditas are those who preach war against-
Spain and keep up the relations of the Magindanaos with the foreign centers 
of the Islamic world.o2 0  
The hajis and religious dignitaries who showed up in Mindanao were not necessarily 
natives of the area. Many of those who came to Sulu from Singapore were Malays.o2 1  Theo, 
chief pandita and adviser of Datu Piang (an ex-follower of Uto who rose to prominence in 
the 1890's) was a certain Sherif Abdul from Bokhara who conversed with the British 
explorer Landon in the Pahari (Hindustani) tongue.o2 ! Landon, who visited the Pulangi 
valley in 1903, was impressed by the sizable contingent of hajis which he found scattered 
all over the country--"mostly men who have drifted here from Arabia, Bokhara and Afghan­
istan . . .  a cross between missionary and a trader, at best unscrupulous scoundrels.o"o2 3  
Unscrupulous or not, one cannot doubt the value of their services to th_e local sultans 
and datus. Landon describes the role they played in the Maranao areas then under attack 
by American occupation forces: 
The Lanao region is overrun with Panditas, wise men, and medicine men, offi­
cials, and sayids or priests, who are the ·ochief instigators of trouble. A 
pandapatan is a military genius who lays out forts and places for defense; 
a sangupan is the head or chief adviser of a tribe.o2 � 
What Landon saw at the Pulangi valley and Lanao in 1903 could not have appeared over­
night. Even prior to 1876, hajis and panditas must have trickled into the Pulangi with 
the aim of strengthening Islamic orthodoxy in the scattered ranoherias and above all 
unifying the Magindanaos, who were faced with the Spanish threat. No evidence has been 
found of the existence of Muslim religious schools or monasteries in Mindanao; the in­
flux of religious figures from abroad to ensure the continuity of Islam must have had a 
long historical precedent. 
There is sufficient evidence to indicate the part played byo.oIslam in the Pulangi
valley itself. Writing in 1874, Vidal y Soler states that in each ranoheria in the 
16. Juan Quintana to Juan Ricart, Jan. 12, 1887, CMSJr, VIII, p. 63. 
See pp. 44-45 for a fuller explanation of juramentado. 
18. Estanislao Marth to Father Superior, June 16, 1887, CMSJ, VI1I, p. 82. 
19. Mision, II, p. 109. 20. "Los Maguindanaos, " p. 283. 
21. March to Superior� CMSJ, VIII, p. 82. 22. Landon, II, p. 136. 
23. Ibidr.,  p .  56. 24. Ibid . r, p. 103. 
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val ley lived a pandita, who generally had made the pilgrimage to Meccar. One of  .his 
tasks was to recite from the Koran, copies of  which were guarded with great care s ince 
they dated from the s ixteenth and seventeenth centuries and were heavily written in with 
commentaries .  Panditas had a monopoly of reading and writing skills.  Blumentritt com­
pl iments the panditas of  the Pulang i ,  in particular, for being "consummate calligraphers . "  
Because of  their wisdom, panditas were called upon to give advice on all s erious matters . 
The highest  ranking among them, called Pandita Kali, had the sole  authority to interpret
and revise the Zuwaranr, or Magindanao code of laws.r2 5  
We can draw out two important roles of the pandita during the Datu Uto period.
First, he sought to uphold a political order s tructure along I s lamic lines . Second, his 
preachings gave an added dimens ion of meaning to the acts of those individuals who com­
mitted themselves to warfare against the Spaniards and their alliesr. 
A pandita was attached to a rancheriar, and yet in a way he transcended i t .  He be­
longed to the complex sys tem of dyadic relationships, and yet he also s aw himself  as 
part of a larger community of  men under the Muslim religionr. In  call ing for I s lamic 
unity, he also  meant pol it ical unity under a Sultan who was both the guardian of the 
sharir'a and, nominally ' at least, the head of  stater. Nieto , the most penetrating of  the 
Spanish observers, was able to trace such I s lamic roots of  Datu Uto ' s  powe r .  Simply by 
entering Uto ' s  domains, one s aw the contrast (with the rest of  Magindanao) in the way 
the religion was practicedr. The clergy was organized and, most important, unified in 
spiri t - - from the Arab pandita who had arrived from Mecca, to the more recently initiated . 
They show their eagerness to maintain their  religion in its purity and to 
demonstrate that it  is the only good one, and that Uto is  the head of  that 
reunion of  men . They show that the best prince is he who obs erves the pre­
cepts of  the Koran . . . . 2 6 
Although Uto was known to all as The Datto,  for all  purposes he was the sultan of Buayan
and the symbol  of  unity for the Magindanaos of sa-ray a .  But to be Sultan, and not merely 
a powerful chief, may have entailed a very different role for him, more pass ive than 
active, for he was also the mediator between the people and supernatural powers. This 1s 
one possrible explanation of the disparity in Spanish descriptions of  Datu Uto, from a 
valorous, active man in the 1860 ' s  to a timid and pass ive one in the 1880 ' s .  
According to Nieto, a corollary of  I s l amic unity in Datu Uto ' s  domains was the 
creation of  a relatively sophisticated organizational apparatus in the capitalr. He 
claims that this was one contribution of the foreign or foreign-trained panditas and 
hajris, who would have been exposed to the advanced pol itical s tructures of  the Middle 
Eas tern sultanates, not to mention Sulu . Nieto, unfortunately, does not go into details.  
At most he s ays that Uto had some sort of  a "Council of  Minis ters," of  which the most 
prominent was the Minister of  War, Datu Kabalo .  There was also a Collector of  Customs 
who manned the toll s tation at Baka t ,  and a Grand Judge who also  exercised the role of 
executioner .r2 7  Datu Piang, a Chinese-Magindanao, was Minister of  Lands, or administrator 
of Uto ' s  extensive holdingsr.r2 8  I n  sum, s ays Nieto, I s l am provided the framework for 
mil itary, administrative and other kinds of organirzationr. One can be sure that the hajris  
and panditas were respons ible for fostering some sort of  organizational unity in Uto ' s  
capital.  
Mention is  often made of  the panditasr' role  in "fanaticizing" individuals, turning
them into juramentados. In the accounts of  skirmishes between Datu Uto ' s  forces and the 
Spaniards, mention o f  the juramentados is almost  invariably mader. For example, a band 
of  forty of them fell  upon the Spanish expediti0nary force that invaded Bakat in 1874r. 
Another juramentado had defended the mausoleums of  the Buayan ruling family when the 
Spaniards threatened to raze them in 1886r. Again, contingents of  juramentados swooped
down on Cotabato and Tamontaka in 1886, burning barracks and Jesuit establishmentsr. In  
fact, wherever fighting occurred, the juramentados were sure to appear, inflicting the 
greatest damage upon the enemy, each one of  them being s lain in the processr. They were 
probably Datu Ute ' s  greatest asset militarily. But what inspired them to give up their 
l ives in such a way? 
The usual descriptions of  juramentados by Europeans gives one the impression that 
they were a maladj usted and desperate l o t ,  given to fanaticism in order to relieve their 
anxiety. Generally they are s aid to be ins olvent debtors, as in the following typical 
description by Wingfield : 
2 5 .  Vidal y Soler, p. 1 9 2 ;  Blumentritt, "Los Maguindanaos,"  pp. 2 8 2 - 283 ; Saleeby, 
Studies. 
26 . Nieto MS, p .  1 2 1. 2 7 .  Ibid. ,  p. 1 2 2 .  28 .  Mision, I I I, p .  2 1 5 .  
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An insolvent debtor and his family become the slaves of his creditor, and 
carelessness as to the future is an item in the character of the Malay. It 
is easy to lure him into debt, for he is a born gambler--cockfighting his 
supremest j oy. Threatened with the sale and dispersion of his family, he 
is offered an alternative. Wife and children may be ransomed at the price 
of his own life. He must swear to slay as many Christians as possible ere 
he falls himself, his after-fate being, of course, Mohammedan beatitude. 
He swears, and is henceforth known as juramentado .r2 9  
While not disputing the validity of the above description, one nevertheless finds diffi­
culty in believing that the hundreds of juramentados who were killed during the later 
Datu Uto period were merely insolvent debtors, subtly coerced by society to commit 
ritual suicide. If whole contingents of Magindanaos could be "fanaticized" by the pan­
ditas into becoming juramentados, then we must go beyond the question of psychological
motivation and look into the vision that fired them . 
. . . they are brought together and summoned by the expert panditas to 
undergo a well- regulated training period. Then they begin the fastings, 
the wandering courses in deserted forests, the prayers over the tombs of 
deceased juramentadosr, and, beneath the glimmering light of the moon, the 
lengthy sermons which expatiate in vibrant terms the joys of the paradise 
of Mahomet; when the subjects have arrived at a sufficient degree of exci­
tation, but only then, they are set loose upon the Spanish city.o3 0  
To those juramentados who sallied forth from Uta's kota throwing themselves against
phalanx after phalanx of well-armed Spaniards, or those who slashed their way into groups 
of Christians at the Cotabato market, their acts were an extension of religious experi­
ence. Their movements toward their sure death were movements in the direction of Para­
dise; the more Christians they killed, the closer they came to fulfillment. After their 
death they believed that they would mount a flying horse that would bring them to Heaven, 
where forty houris were waiting to be their wives. There, too, were the most delectable 
dishes one could imagine , all for the asking. There one need not do any work; the sur­
roundings were of the greatest possible beauty.o3 1  
"In the name of God"--this was the cry of the juramentado when his first victim 
fell,o3 2  and one should not miss its implications for the movement which Datu Uto led. 
The Magindanaos who fought on the side of Uto found their actions meaningful because 
they were brought closer to the ultimate happiness , the ultimate form of existence. Per­
haps this view of the juramentado can supplement that of Majul, who explains the system 
in terms of the failure of the Sultan to prevent a non-Muslim power from controlling a 
land asserted to have been part of Dar-ul-Islam. In such a case,  says Majul, the respon­
sibility for the defense of such a territory shifts to the individual, �he juramentado.r3 3  
The unification of most of the Magindanao world demanded an ideology that could 
transcend the notion of personal alliances. Such an ideology was provided by Islam. The 
impetus for its revival in Magindanao came from Sulu and the Muslim world beyond. Its 
effect was to impress upon the Magindanaos the existence of a brotherhood of men tran­
scending the ranaheria. The image of Datu Uto became transformed from merely that of a 
powerful chief .to the symbol of Magindanaoo' s  integrity as a segment of Dar-ul-Islam. The 
organization of the Sultanate of Buayan was strengthened. To those who joined and fought 
in battle, religion brought a vision of Heaven, the attainment of which was linked to the 
struggle against foreign, Christian domination. 
But in spite of the importance we have assigned to religion as a unifying force, the 
fundamental, deeply ingrained notion of the dyadic or personal tie as the basis for uni­
fication cannot be underestimated. Datu Ute's height of power probably came at that point 
where Islamic unity and the alliance system merged in the consciousness of his followers. 
If the Spaniards at Cotabato and Tamontaka could make no headway against Islam, there was 
something they could and, as we shall see, did do, which was to subvert the alliance sys­
tem. 
29. Lewis Wingfield, Wanderings of a Gtobe-trotter in the Far East (London, 1889)o, vol. 
I ,  p. 300; also Montano, p. 141. 
30. Montano, p. 142. 
31. J. Franklin Ewing, S.J. , "Juramentado: institutionalized suicide among the Moros of 
the Philippines," AnthropotogiaaZ Quarterly , III ( N. S. ) (Oct.o, 1955)o, pp. 149-150. 
32. Ibid.r, p. 51. 
33. "The role of Islam,o" pp. 313-314. 
CHAPTER VI 
"ATTRACTION" AND CONQUEST (ca. 1878- 1887 )  
The period from 1878  to 1884  is notable for the absence of  armed conflicts between 
Uto ' s  forces and the Spaniardsr. Perhaps this was due to the weakness of the colonial 
mil itary es tablishment ; thoughts of conques t  were set aside for the moment. As one com­
mentator put it  in 1 8 7 8 ,  the extent of  Spanish control was limited to isolated detach­
ments guarding various s trategic points in the deltar. Not a s ingle home or cultivated 
field would generally be found in the vicinity of these stockades. The latter were 
manned mostly by deportees from the Christian areas in the northern islands , who spent
the day idly longing for their families elsewhere .r1 
Presumably ,  too, the s tipulations of the 1 8 7 5  treaty were in effect, whereby the 
independence of  Uta ' s  qomains were recognized by Spain in return for non-harassment of  
established Spanish pos itions and trade between sa-iZud and s a-raya. In 1880 , friendly 
visits were exchanged between Cotabato governor Carbonnel and Datu Utar. Writing in Janu­
ary 1881 , Fr.  Juanmarti gives the prevailing Spanish feeling then : the Moros were "paci­
fied" and quiet in the whole of  the Pulangi basin;  no "misbehavior" took place in any of 
the occupied points. Credit for this , of course ,  is given to the governor , a tactful 
and affable man. And Uto? Unfortunately he i s  not credited with a genuine desire for 
peace . A few days before Juanmarti ' s  writing , several high- ranking Spanish officers had 
j ourneyed to Buayan in the gunboat ManiZeno, penetrating farther upriver than Carbonnel 
had done the previous yearr. Although Datu Uto received the Spaniards with much hospi­
tality and demonsrtrations of friendship, he could not hide his concern that the ManiZeno 
had penetrated to the very heart of his domains. Fr. Juanmarti writes with deep suspi­
cion that things unseen by Spanish eyes were going on in sa-raya. His experience and 
contacts among the Magindanao population had probably given him hints of  the firearms 
and slave trade being carried on by Uto. His views most likely represented thos e of  the 
Spanish officials at that time , s ince he was a frequent adviser to the governor. There 
was peace , indeed,  but distrus t pervaded the atmosphere .r2 
The fact is that neither s ide was willing to accept a s tate of permanent coexisrtence. 
The panditasr, sherifs and hajris who came in increasing numbers to Magindanao could not 
but have brought with them the spirit of  jihadr, the Holy War. As long as a viable re­
sistance movement could be  maintained, the goal was the reconquest of  those parts of 
Magindanao that had fallen into Spanish handsr. On the Spanish s ide, the ultimate goal 
was still  the destruction of the power of the sultans and datus, and the extension of  
colonial rule upriver. The British , Dutch and French were fast consolidating their in­
fluence in other areas , and sa-raya Magindanao was bound to become a s ource of irritation 
to officials in Manila with an expansrionist bent. Such lulls in military activity as 
the period under discuss ion were due to power struggles between l iberals and conserva­
tives in the colonial administration. 
But the period from 1 8 7 8  to 1884  appears to be one of inactivity only in a superfi­
cial sense. Through non-military means, the Spanish estab l ishment was busy attempting 
to subvert the datu-slave and alliance relationshipsr. This is sometimes called a policy 
of "attraction" to distinguish i t  from the policy of  armed conques t .  I f  Fr. Juanmarti 
was suspicious of Datu Uto ' s  motives , the latter in turn would have had grounds for dis­
trusting the Jesu i t .  For the missrionaries were at the forefront of  the drive to win the 
population over to the Spanish side, paving the way for more direct intervention in the 
futur e .  
A pol icy of attraction had been outlined i n  1855  by several members of the exped i ­
tion that toured the Pulangi valley. Ramon Mascaro, the mos t perceptive and articulate 
proponent of this type of policy , emphas i zed that Spaniards should always act in good
faith, with j us tice and patience. There should be no demonstrations of superiority , no 
unj ustified snobbery, no bad treatment or obstructionism toward the Muslims. The latter 
should be left in the belief of their  own sovereignty ; it must not be insisted upon that 
1 .  "Algunas reflexiones , "  p .  231r. 
2 .  Juanmarti to Father Superior , Jan. 2 5 ,  1 8 8 1 ,  CMSJ, IV, pp . 1 4 1 - 1 4 2 .  
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they are subjects of Spain. Rather, the "necessary conditions" should be imposed almost 
without the inhabitants being conscious of the process. 
The ''necessary conditions'' for peaceful conquest,  as Mascaro saw it , involved the 
destruction of the traditional power basis--ownership of slaves- -and substituting for it 
wealth gained through cooperating with the Spanish establishment (i. e. ,  work and trade).
The hill people, source of slaves, were to be mobilized and converted to Christianity by 
the Jesuits; they would be grouped together in towns, their chiefs given Spanish titles, 
and provided with protection against the Magindanaos.- As for the latter, individuals 
who wished to submit would be gathered into towns sheltered by Spanish garrisons. Sul­
tans and datus, submitting, would retain their titles and authority over their subjects. 
The important thing was that they be made to realize the benefits of cooperating with 
the colonial authorities. The Cotabato Sultan should be set up as a model for all to 
follow. The model, however , contained an unpalatable feature: pacified areas would be 
made subject to Spanish laws regarding slavery. � 
Mascaro ' s  advice seems to have been followed after the Spanish conquest of sa-ilud 
1n the 1860's. For example, in 1863 the Tamontaka officials appointed Datu Bandara, a 
Tiruray chief , as Presidente of the Municipality of Awang, as the district was then 
known, and tried to fan resentment against subordination to the Magindanaos. They sup­
plied the Tirurays with goods, and were successful in breaking down trade pacts between 
these hill people and the lowlanders. � The Jesuit letters make scattered references to 
attempts to gather hill people into towns within hearing distance of churchbells, a tech­
nique reminiscent of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Luzon and the Visayas. In the 
delta itself various Magindanao datus, such as Vansil and Ayunan, came to terms with 
Spain and were confirmed in their positions.o5 
Such attempts ,  however , were largely unsuccessful. Wood says that the Spaniards
were simply not strong enough to protect the Tirurays from the Magindanaos.o6 The tug­
o ' war between Uto and the Jesuits seems to have been won by the former. As for the · 
chiefs in the delta ,  excepting Cotabato and its environs, very little headway was made 
in gaining their genuine support. Spanish garrisons had to bear with their precarious
isolation. The most that was achieved was persuading a couple of datus to supply the 
forts with foodstuffs. As for Mascaro ' s  belief that the datus would naturally aspire to 
the benefits accruing to the Cotabato Sultan for his submission, this prospect was belied 
by the Sultan ' s  own lapse into obscurity, his utter dependence on _a Spanish pension for 
his subsistence. The Sultan would not do as a model; something more was needed to con­
vince the datus to submit at heart. 
The answer was provided by the Jesuit fathers at Tamontaka who, in the 1870 's,  em­
barked upon a program called the resoate (ransom)7 which paved the way for the success 
of the policy of attraction in the 1880's. The resoate involved the purchase of Magin­
danao slaves and children, and their resettlement in a new environment where, it was 
hoped, a community would arise along Hispanic-Christian lines, spreading out to confront 
the existing Muslim society. The movement originated during a serious epidemic of small­
pox in July 1872 which temporarily halted agricultural enterprise in the Pulangi valley. 
The result was a great scarcity of rice, a disaster which forced the Magindanaos to sell 
slave children at a very low price. Mindanao governor Luis Golfin, while in conversation 
with Fr. Venancio Legarra , picked up the idea which had been suggested in 1861 by Fr. 
Cuevas of forming a small model agricultural community with pagan children and ransomed 
slaves. Upon reaching a reasonable age the latter would be granted t heir own parcels of 
land; as Christian families they would be the nucleus of a town. Golfin thought that the 
effects of the famine offered an opportunity to start such a project. 
Golfin rushed his plans to the Father Superior at Tamontaka , suggesting that , after 
the ransomed slaves were educated by the Jesuits, they could serve as powerful agents for 
the development (presumably economic and religious) of the area. The Padre was enthusi­
astic. The next step was to present the plans to the Captain-general and the Archbishop , 
primarily in order to devise means to raise funds. A Junta Superior, headed by the Arch­
bishop himself, was formed in Manila, while a subordinate commission was set up in Cota­
bato to implement decisions made by the higher council. By the end of the first year,
the first donations totaling 4 , 500 Pesos enabled the Jesuits to start work immediately. 
On February 2 ,  1873 ,  a great fiesta was held in Tamontaka to celebrate the baptism of 
3. Mascaro MS , passim. 4. Wqod, P�  13. 
S. Pastells, Misi6n, I ,  pp. 30-31, 68 and passim. 6. Wood, p. 13. 
7. See articles by Madigan/Cushner , O ' Shaughnessy for a more detailed account of the 
mission effort. 
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the first thirty tibertos (freed-men) of  the Mission .e8 
What started out as a cautious experiment became , within a decade , a key but subtle 
tool to spread Spanish influence deeper in the Pulangi valleye. The Tamontaka community
presented to hill people ,  slaves and Muslims alike a model of life in another systeme. 
Mascara ' s  1855  suggestion that the benefits of cooperating with the Spanish estabelishment 
be made known to all was realized not by setting up the Sultan and datus of Cotabato as 
models but by creating from scratch a community that appeared to provide multiple bene­
fits to its members , who happened to be ex-slavese. The first outsiders to be affected 
were other slaves , who saw in the Tamontaka idea a means of much swifter transition to 
free status and livelihood than they could expect otherwise .  Gradually , members of the 
higher classes came to recognize Tamontaka for its educational aspecte. As we have seen , 
in Magindanao the art of reading and writing had always been reserved to the politico­
religious hierarchy , particularly the panditase. The attainment of such faculties brought
great prestige to the individuale. But to come under the wing of the Jesuits was pre­
cisely to be made subj ect to educational techniques which had been tested in other mis­
sion frontiers of the archipelagoe. A typical day in the Tamontaka community allowed for 
more than three hours of instruction in reading and writing , plus equal time learning
basic agriculture or some tradee.e9 The first batch of tibertos in 1873  were given a sys­
tematic education . By the early 188O ' s ,  the respect of the neighboring datus and pan-
·di tas for the Jesuits and their wards was considerably enhanced. 
In an essay written in 1876  or 1877  by an anonymous Jesuite, it was reported that 
there had been a significant increase in the number of slaves defecting to Spanish-occu­
pied arease. It was suggested that the sultans and datus be made to understand that the 
Spanish government would protect slaves taking refuge under the Spanish flage. As a com­
promise ,  the loss on their former masterse' part would be idemnified in cashe. It was, in 
effect, suggested that the concept of the resaate be broadened to accommodate defecting 
slaves .e1 0 About two years later , the institution at Tamontaka was expanded to accommo­
date the ever-increasing number of such defectors .e1 1  It is clear that by the late 187O ' s  
the Tamontaka experiment was bearing fruit among the lower levels of societye. 
The greatest feeling of j ubilation came when the datus and panditas themselves began 
to respond to the Jesuit efforts . Writing in May , 1882 , Fr .  Juanmarti applauded the · 
change in attitude of the native hierarchy in the vicinity of the Missions in Cotabato , 
Pollok and especially Tamontakae. Datus and panditas were even calling on the Mission 
houses ; they now allowed Jesuit padres to enter their homese. Confidence was built up as 
the Spanish Jesuits gladly gave their advice on all sorts of problems and provided medi­
cal help gratis. Many who belonged to the marayao (free) class even asked to be bap­
tized.e1 2e . In addition to the respect which the Magindanaos had had for the Jesuits as 
religious personages, as Christian counterparts to their panditas ,e1 3  there was a recogni­
tion of the practical knowledge (i . e . e, in medicine ,  agriculture ,  reading and writing) 
they could offere. This recognition , which belongs to a general Southeast Asian ethos of 
respect for civility and education even in a foreigner , came from viewing the results of 
the Jesuit efforts at Tamontakae. 
As Fr . Ignacio Duran reported to his Superior in 1883 ,  the former slave children , 
many of whom were reaching the adult stage , had acquired a certain "discipline" in work 
habits , had assimilated some Spanish customs , could speak haltingly in Castilian , and 
could even play the reed organ and sing a whole Mass in three or four voices. More im­
portant , perhaps , was their ability to read and write well .e1 � The Jesuits report that 
such a display of talent and learning could not fail to attract the attention of the 
other inhabitants , who compared the Zibertos with their own children raised in the tradi­
tional mannere. As Fre. Pastells puts it , ''they were left amazed by the change wrought in 
8 .  Pastellse, Mision, I ,  pp . 132- 133 and passim. 9 .  Ibi d . ,  p .  1 33 .  
10e. "Mejoras , que a nuestro j uicio convendrian en el 5 ° Distrito de Mindanao , "  CMSJ, II 
(1876 , 187 7 ? ) , pp . 238 - 240 . 
1 1 .  O ' eShaughnessy , p .  2 33 .  
1 2 .  Juanmarti to Antonio Zarandona in Madrid , May 1 2 ,  1 882 ,  CMSJ, V ,  p .  187e. See also 
Pastells , Mision, I, p.  4 5 1 .  
1 3 .  They believed , for example ,  that the Padres accompanied the soldiers to rally them 
on and toughen them in battle. Datu Uto had high regard for the "panditas Cristi­
anos , "  especially Fr . Juanmarti ;  Pastells , Misi6n, I ,  p .  137 . 
1 4 .  Ignacio Duran to Father Superior , May 1 1 ,  1883 ,  CMSJ, V, p .  2 0 5 .  
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the intelligence, in the heart and in the mode of conduct of the libertos.r"r1 5  They came 
to respect the Jesuits and their wards, and this was, to Fr. Juanmarti, the reason why
the Tamontaka establishment, practically defenseless, was not harassed at all by the 
neighboring ranaheriae.r1 6  
A peak in the number of defections seems to have been reached in 1884. On the 
tenth of June, Fr. Bennasar wrote that whole families were being attracted· either by the 
well-being of their relatives among the libertos or by practical necessities to settle 
in Tamontaka.1 7  Famine broke out again in 1884, contributing to the increase in the num­
ber of hill people in the Mission who sought refuge from Magindanaos raiding them for 
food supplies. Out of extreme poverty and hunger, many Muslims as well as �laves sold 
their own children to the Jesuits.o1 8  As of December of 1884, more ransoms had been made 
during the past six months than during the previous two years.o1 9  
By the mid-1880's the Jesuits had contributed two elements to the situation in the 
Pulangi. First, by encouraging the settlement of hill people near Tamontaka and by pro­
viding material aid and protection to defecting slaves and freemen, the Jesuits were 
exerting pressure on the source and actual manpower complement of the datus. The owner­
ship of slaves, symbol of a datu's power, was being undermined through subtle and non­
coercive means. Second, the Jesuits had established a rapport with the neighboring datus 
and panditas, creating in the south branch of sa-ilud a set of potential allies which 
the Spanish government could, and later did, tap in the event of renewed conflict with 
Buayan. The techniques which were used during this period to "attract" the population 
of sa-ilud to the Spanish side were to be used shortly thereafter in dealing with 
sa-raya. 
In 1882, an epidemic of cholera struck the valley of the Pulangi, taking a heavy 
toll of lives in the ranaherias of the south branch of the delta, in Lasedan, Lara,
Taviran, and in the sa-raya districts of Buayan and Talayan. It devastated the whole 
southeastern coast of Mindanao up to Sarangani bay and then crept upward to the lake 
Buluan area. Among the casualties were the Datu Amirol and the Rajah Mudah of Cotabato,
Maminteng.o2 0  The Spanish government failed to name a new Rajah Mudah because the strong­
est claimant to the title, Datu Mamaku, was the brother of Rajah Putri, Ute's wife. 
Thus, when the Cotabato Sultan died in April 1884, there was some confusion over the 
succession. Hesitation on the part of the government led to rivalry and feuding among 
various datus of royal blood, none of whom was powerful enough to rise above the rest. 
Other datus found in this chaotic situation an opportunity to increase their independence 
from the Sultanate. 
Nieto gives us a glimpse of the internal situation following the death of the Sul­
tan. The Magindanaos of the south branch of the delta, says Nieto, felt slighted and 
suspicious of the Spaniards because their protege Datu Mamon was not na�ed Rajah Mudah 
after Maminteng's death. Those of the north branch of the delta below Libungan main­
tained that the new Datu Amirol, a staunch ally of Spain, was "an old dotard.o" They
were restless and cynical about the fortunes of the Sultanate. The rest of the ranahe­
rias of sa-ilud, those of Datus Galan, Kamama and Buisan, were taking advantage of the 
confusion to raid and rob other ranaherias. But the most significant element of the 
situation, concludes Nieto, was Datu Uto himself, who was ''exercising pressure over 
everybody.o" 2 1  
The whole issue, in fact, revolved around Datu Uto. The Spanish government, which 
could have avoided all the trouble by immediately naming a new Sultan, wavered because 
it was attracted to the possibility of having Datu Uto himself as Sultan of Mindanao, 
15. Misi6n, I, · p. 451. 
16. Juanmart1 to Zarandona, May 12, 1882, CMSJr, V, p. 186. 
17. Guillermo Bennasar to Father Superior, June 10, 1884, CMSJ, VI, p. 62. 
18. This type of transaction surprised the Spaniards at first sight and made them be­
lieve that there was lack of love and paternal affection among the native inhabi� 
tants. But parents who sold their children to others were confident that they would 
not be maltreated except in the rarest exceptions, and that they would pass later to 
the category of free subjects of their datu; Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos,o" p. 281. 
19. Bennasar to Father Superior ,  Dec. 31, 1884, CMSJr, VI, p. 71. 
20. Juanmart1 to Father Superior, Jan. 13, 1883, CMSJ, V, p. 196. 
21. Nietoo·oMS, p. 63. 
so 
perhaps in order to bring the Datu into the Spanish sphere of influence. Eventually
Pablu , son of the deceased, was elected, but Nieto implies that the Spaniards had no 
choice but to comply with certain provisions of their treaties with the C otabato Sultan­
ate which laid it down that the Magindanaos of sa-raya were to be considered enemies and 
thus precluded from holding office at Cotabato. "Thus the Spaniards were foraed to name 
a Raja Muda and a Sultan from among those who were their allies. These were virtual 
puppets."e2 2  It was clearly stated,  in a memorial to Madrid drafted in the spring of 18 85 
by the Government of Mindanao, that Datu Uto was the only person who deserved to be named 
Sultan by Spain, If Spain had her way , Uto might have become Sultan and the course of 
Cotabato history significantly altered, but the government had to bow to internal con­
siderations, such as the conflict between sa-iZud and sa-raya. The most that could be 
done , concludes the 1885 memorial, was to adopt a policy of attracting Uto over to the 
Spanish side and treating him kindly.2 3  
It must be pointed out that the above memorial originated from Z amboanga where a 
liberal governor of Mindanao, Julio Serina, held office. There were others of a more 
conservative bent who felt that a policy of armed conquest rather than attraction ought 
to be implemented in the Pulangi. Even the Jesuits were not immune from this kind of 
thinking. Among the criticisms of Spanish policy by Fr. Ricart in 1883 was the inaction 
which he felt had come to characterize the Sword and the Cross: the Spaniards had become 
content with the posseession of isolated points manned by soldiers administered to by the 
missionaries; the policy of attraction was badly understood and had degenerated into 
condescension.2 � In 188 4 ,  governor-general Joaquin Jovellar visited southern Mindanao, 
and "his impression at the sight of the deplorable state of the island could not be more 
sad." In the following communication to the Minister of Ultramar in Spain, Jovellar 
summarized the situation as he saw it: 
The program of occupation is completely paralyzed; due to lack of resources 
or a misapplication of the "system," we have been set back twenty years. 
Nothing is farthest from signifying permanency and progress than the mate­
rial state of all our establishments; the ruins of former edifices hardly
exist; in Pollok the old fort and barracks have completely disappeared; 
the fort of Cotabato has also disappeared, not a stone over stone has re­
mained; and the smaller [forts] of Libungan , Tumbao, Taviran and Tamontaka 
. . .  cannot be more than provisional: the detachments are, in all places,  
badly lodged, in buildings sometimes eaten up by termites or threatened 
with ruin ; in Cotabato the munitions are rendered useless by the lack of 
· 2 Spowder magazines . . . .  
For years, the military installations 1n Magindanao had been in this sorry state. 
Jovellar ' s  sudden interest in them means that Manila ' s  outlook was changing; the pendulum 
was shifting towards a military solution to the Magindanao problem. As Nieto Aguilar 
puts it, the governor-general came to the conclusion "that a period of activity without 
compromising in great and costly operations should be initiated."e2 6  Jovellar immeediately 
called for an allotment of 100,e000 Pesos for the use of the military. Among his sugges­
tions were : to improve defensive positions; to build better barracks, hospitals, store­
houses, powder magazines;  to occupy Lalabuan , a source of smuggled firearms; to transfer 
the Davao naval station to Sarangani bay; and to extend Spanish control to the "middle 
course" of the Pulangi river, meaning Buayan.2 7  
Jovellar's plans took some time to be implemented,  for the Manila government had to 
consider the alternative policy suggeestion originating from the governor of Mindanao 
which was one of accommodation toward Uto. However, the militaristic governor of Cota­
bato, Federico Roldan , anticipated Manila' s  decision by engaging in a series of actions 
designed to provoke an armed conflict with Datu Uto.2 8  What these imprudent acts were 
is not clear from the sources, but Pastells states that these were truly unjust to Uto.2 9  
2 2 .  Ibid., pp. 64- 66. 23. Ibidr. ,  p. 244. 
24. Juan Ricart, S.J., " Informe sabre la reduccion de Mindanao • • • , "  Manila, Jan. 17, 
18 83,  reprinted with added notes in CMSJ, X, p. 600. 
25.  Montero y Vidale, Pirateria, p. 642. 26. p. 43. 
27. Montero y Vidal, Pirateria,  pp. 642- 643; Nieto Aguilar, p. 43. 
28. The Cotabato governor seems to have had a lot of freedom of action since his aggres­
sive designs were contradictory to the "peaceful attraction" policy of his immeediate 
superior, the Governor of Mindanao. This may be a reflection of new centralizeation 
policies after 1860  (see Robles, part II). 
29. Misionr, II,  p. 54. 
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Moreover, governor Roldan had designs, as yet unauthorized by Manila, to establish a 
garrison at Uto's stronghold of Bakat. 
The Datu ' s  reaction, upon hearing of such threats against him, must have been one 
of surprise or disbelief, because prior to Foldan's governorship in 1885 Cotabato had 
followed a policy of accommodation rather than confrontation. In a letter to the gover­
nor dated April 23, 1885, Datu Uto expressed his reaction to the Spanish move: 
Greetings to the Governor of Cotabato- -I  understand that you are about to 
advance to Buayan, as they have told me. Just the same, you presently know 
that I am loyal to Spain, so that, even if today they required me to wear 
a sombrero, I would wear one. I am letting you know that I am transferring 
all my belongings to another location. With regard to all my followers who 
have marched, I ask you to order the men to wear sombreros and the women to 
wear sayas, and if they do �ot comply, then it is true that they have not 
gone [hayan ido] with the Spaniards, and so also with the other datus.o3 0  . 
In this rather puzzling letter, Uto seems to be saying that the Spaniards ought to give 
him a chance to prove his friendship with them. Wearing the sombrero (Spanish wide­
brimmed hat) and the saya (skirt used by Christian Filipinas) is a way of expressing sub­
mission to Spain. Of course, the wily Datu does not expect much from such an appeal.
Resigned to another invasion of his district, he is transferring his wealth farther in­
land. Montero y Vidal says that, from this time on, Uto took a more militant stance. 
. . . His withdrawn and apprehensive posture was transformed into manifest 
rebellion. He failed to reply to the letters of the governor of Cotabato,
and established with his banaas a veritable blockade of the numerous pas­
sages of the river. He brought terror to all parts by his robberies and··
assassinations.o3 1  
It was not only the threat on Bakat which brought about this change in Uto's pos­
ture. There was something more immediate: the subversion of his following's loyalty to 
him. Cotabato Governor Roldan believed that the best way of breaking Uto's. power was to 
foment desertions among his subjects. His method is not stated explicitly in the 
sources, but most likely it anticipated the decree sent later during the year (1885) by 
the central government, stating that slaves seeking refuge under the Spanish flag were 
to be automatically free
J 
without any ransom or other form of idemnification being paid 
2to their former masters. Whatever Roldan's method exactly was, we can be sure that it 
was in the spirit of the Jesuit efforts at Tamontaka. The result was a spate of defec­
tions from among Uto's slaves and even relatives; this made the Datu "disturbed and 
uneasy.o"3 3  His complaints to the governor having been repeatedly ignored, Datu Uto theri 
embarked upon a series of assassinations and terrorist acts directed against his former 
subjoects. 
A recorded incident at Tamontaka is the beheading of a Muslim who was preparing to 
renounce his faith ahd become Christian. Four months previously, he and his brother had 
escaped from Uto's ranaheria and had come to live in the Mission.o3 4  In Cotabato, the 
bloody killing of a former slave by one of Uto's assassins precipitated an investigation
for the district j udge. Uto was declared guilty of indirect participation in the crime. 
The j udge, a rather conscientious magistrate, posted signs in the most conspicuous places 
calling for the Datu to present himself at court. There was even a demand that the 
governor throw him in jail. Roldan was sane enough to see the absurdity of the . j udge's 
demands; nevertheless, he considered the situation serious because of the rising spate 
of assassinations. The case was brought to the central government which, at tha� time 
(mid-1885), was about to adopt formally the policy of "peaceful attraction" as advocated 
by Serina. The Audiencia did not consider itself competent and authoritative enough to 
sanction the judgment of the Cotabato court of law; besides, there was the question of 
whether or not Uto was subjoect to Spanish law. To prevent further embarrassment, the 
district j udge was recalled to Manila.o3 5  
The above incident finally caused the central government to abandon the policy of 
"peaceful attraction" toward Uto, calling it an "untimely" move. A state of war was 
30. Published in Franci and Parrado, I, p. 347. 
31. Piraterta, pp. 657-658. 32. Pastells, Misi6n i  II, p. 56. 
33. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 348. 34. Pastells, Zoa. cit. 
35. Felipe Canga Arguelles, "La Isla de Mindanao," BSGMr, XXII (1887), pp. 225-226;
Montero y Vidal, Piraterta, p. 656. 
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declared in Cotabato.e3 6  Soon afterwards, governor Roldan received Manila ' s  authorization 
to set up a garrieson at Bakat.e3 7  Just as the notice arrived, however, the projeect was 
postponed because of the timely arrival of Roldan ' s  immediate superior, the Mindanao 
governor Serina in May or June of 1885. Serina' s  intervention must be seen as another 
reflection of the liberal-conservative rivalry mentioned earlier. He had b acked the 
policy of accommodation and attracti on toward Uto which Manila rejeected, and now he was 
in Cotabato to take over the situation and hopefully to find a peaceful solution to the 
brewing conflict. Another purpose of his coming was to consult his friend Fr. Juanmarti ,  
the acknowledged authority on Magindanao internal affairs. But what the Jesuit recom­
mended was no different from Roldan's policy : for effective Spanish domination in the 
river, the installation of a garrison at Bakat was imperative.e3 8  
Governor Serina must be  credited with a genuine desire to work things out with Uto 
in spite of the aggressive designs of his aides Juanmart i  and Roldan. Since communica­
tions between Cotabato and Buayan had been cut , he enlisted the help of Datu Mamaku in 
forwarding a letter to the Datu requesting that a biahara be held in order to hear the 
latter's complaints and to attend to whatever just claims he would make. Upon receipt 
of Uto's affirmative reply Serina, Juanmarti and Mamaku set out for Buayan. In spite of 
the tension pervading Bakat because of the presence of hundreds of armed warriors, the 
party was received well. In a lively bichara that lasted a full two hours, Datu Uto 
voiced out his grievances against certain governors and lesser officials of Cotabato and 
also against certain datus in the delta who were stirring up trouble for him. Serina 
promised j ustice and reparati ons for the damages inflicted upon Uto.3 9  It is doubtful 
whether the governor wanted anything more than that tensions between Uto and the Span­
iards be eased. Fr. Juanmarti , however, seems to have interpreted the outcome of the 
biahara differently. In a letter to the Father Superior dated July 2 5 ,  1885 , he states: 
Our fears and lack of confiedence were melted away. The way was open to 
mutual understanding in the future and to require from them (the Moros) 
what is believed to be  j ust and necessary . . e. .  Now the government can 
establish itself wherever i t  is  found suitable.4 0  
It is strange how Juanmarti could have arrived at the conclusion that the occupation of 
Bakat was ever closer to realization after the conference. This impression would have 
been farthest from the minds of Uto and even Serina. In fact , governor Roldan apparently
believed that his plans for the Bakat garrison would never materialize as a result of the 
biahara, for in disgust he sent in his resignation.e4 1  
Serina was true to his word. In the months that followed, various runaway slaves 
of Uto were handed b ack. The Datu was idemnified in cash for the damages he claimed to 
have incurred. Presents were even sent to him. The benevolence of Serina is amply 
pointed out by Montero y Vidal. Uto, on the other hand, is  pictured as an ungrateful
wretch, who did not change his conduct , who refused further conferences as long as he 
was unsatisfied with the deal he was gett ing, and who refused to answer letters sent 
him.4 2  
The weakness in Montero y Vidal ' s  account is that he ignores certain decrees of the 
central government in the light of which Datu Uto's recalciterance is understand�ble, if  
not j ustifiable. It is  qui te clear from Pastells that , not long after the Serina-Uto 
conference, the Civil Government of the Archipelago passed a resolution to the effect 
that slaves seeking refuge under the Spanish flag would be "by that mere fact" free, 
except in cases where the ransom would be more sui table. Moreover, Serina himself in 
late-1885 received direct orders from the governor-general to install a fort at Bakat.e4 3  
Serina had no choice but to comply. In J anuary 1886, Serina, Juanmarti and Naval Com­
mander Vicente Roca led a flotilla of four gunboats and a transport ship that proceeded 
to occupy Bakat. Datu Uta ' s  immediate response was to retreat farther inland. As Fr. 
Bennasar puts i t :  
I have never believed that he [Uto] would resign himself to live beside the 
Spaniards, because then we would know everythini he does , and to him that 
is not convenient. Que male agit, odit Zuaem.r4 
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It was after the Spanish takeover of his Bakat stronghold that Uto refused to show up at 
conferences arranged by Serina and to answer letters sent him. 
According to Pastells, three factors brought about the dissolution of the Serina-Uto 
treaty. First, the controversy between Uto and Roldan over the matter of defecting
slaves had not been resolved. Second, the increase in the number of Spanish ships and 
troops in the Pulangi due to the establishment of - the Bakat fort made Datu Uto apprehen­
sive to the extent that he refused to discuss matters with the Spaniards any longer. 
Third, Uto believed that he had the strength to expel the Spaniards from Magindanao once 
and for all. The presence of a new fort in the very heart of sa-raya gave him an oppor­
tunity to rally together the Magindanaos of the middle Pulangi "who up to then had been 
very much divided.o" Then Pastells goes on to say that the establishment of the Bakat 
fort was very much justified because it prevented Uto from aggressively expanding into 
the delta .o4 5  It is rather difficult to accept this rationale for Spain ' s  own aggressive 
designs. The evidence leads us to believe that the. occ�pation of Bakat was the fruit of 
the expansionist aspirations of men like Governor-general Jovellar, Fr. Juanmarti and 
governor Roldan. The whole trouble started when the Spanish establishment succeeded in 
seducing Uto ' s  slaves and followers to defe.ct. In a society where a leader's position 
depends upon the possession of slaves and the ability to attract a following, the pre­
dicament of Uto is understandable. His predicament, together with the knowledge of his 
enemy's designs to occupy Bakat, caused him to undertake his only measure which may be 
termed "aggressive": he directed the sa-raya Magindanaos to hold back food supplies
destined for Cotabato. One news report, in fact, states that the occupation of Bakat 
was necessary in order to restore the food supply to Spanish points in the delta.o4 6  
Hostilities were initiated by Datu Uto ' s  men under a special set of circumstances. 
The projected site of the Bakat fort happened to be adjac�nt to a grove of trees which 
sheltered the ancestral tombs of Uto ' s  family. A detachment of Magindanao warriors had 
been left to guard it. On the thirteenth of February, 1886, Serina ordered the grove to 
be demolished, while respecting the tombs, since it was feared that s·ome of the trees 
might be felled to block the rivei passage. The Magindanao sentries would not allow 
this, nor would they withdraw without express orders from Uto. A shot was fired, and a 
skirmish took place which left thirteen dead on both sides.o4 7  The burial grove was 
razed to the ground. 
According to Blumentritt, it was the defilement of the sacred tombs of the Buayan 
ruling family by the Spaniards which started the war.o4 8  The next day, bands of Uto ' s  
followers set fire to the naval coal depot and the barracks at Cotabato. Resentment 
against Christians found violent expression in killings and burnirtgs in homes and market­
places. On the fifteenth, three juramentados set fire to the dormitory of the Zibertos 
at Tamontaka. The whole building was destroyed, the blaze spreading to the house of the 
missionaries, the church then under construction, and on to the rice fields. Damage was 
placed at 20, 000 Pesos; eighty children were left homeless.o4 9  
The primary .target of Datu Uto's forces was the garrison at Bakat, a dagger in the 
heart of Buayan. Heavy bombardment by cannon proved inerfective. Then attempts were 
made to storm the fort; again these were futile, and the casualties on the Magindanao 
side were heavy. As the colonial army led by Serina advanced to conduct retaliatory 
measures Datu Uto, seeing that no ground was being gained in the costly struggle, sued 
45. Misi6n, II, p .  58. Special attention has been given here to the views of Montero y 
Vidal and Pastells because their books (Piraterta and Misi6n)r, being standard works 
on Mindanao history, have probably determined what is known about Datu Uto to the 
public outside Magindanao itself. Being staunch supporters of Spanish rule has 
naturally influenced their histories� 
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for peace. On the 28th o f  March, the white flag o f  surrender was carried to the Spanish
camp by Datu Kabalo (Ute ' s  Minister of War),  the pandita Ali,  and other prominent datus. 
They begged (Rogar) that hos t i li ties be s topped and that the Spanish forces should ad­
vance no farther than Bakat, "s ince they were very poor and des ired peace.r1 1 5 0  Emi s ­
saries, they said, had already been s ent t o  a l l  parts o f  the Pulangi t o  round up the 
roving bands who were molesting those who refused to support Datu Uto. 
Serina was prepared to acquiesce provided that a petition s igned by Uto and Raj ah 
Putri was presented to himr. The next day there arrived such a document from Uto pleading 
that the Spaniards occupy other points in the river except Bakat, because the area, the 
site  of the ancestral tombs, was sacred to the Magindanaosr. Perinat makes the curious 
assertion that Uto promised personally to surrender Bakat eight to ten days after a 
Spanish withdrawal ; "without doubt his des ire was not to lose  his prestige or his moral 
force over the Moros by making them believe that he was ceding i t  [Bakat] voluntarily
and not by force.r"r5 1  Although Perinat comes close to understanding Uto by linking his 
prestige to the loss of Bakat, it does not follow that the Datu would have gained by 
ceding Bakat voluntar i ly .  The fact is that Bakat ' s  loss was a disas ter to the Uto camp . 
The mos t  prominent of his officials promised to submit to Spain if  only Bakat were evacu­
ated by the Christian intrudersr. Serina, however, preferred to maintain the Spanish
foothold.r5 2  
Bakat was, in all .  respects , los t .  Not only Uto ' s  ances tral tombs but also the most 
strategic point in sa-raya were in Spanish handsr. Uto s tood to lose not only prestige 
but also the revenue he used to collect from every vessel that made its way from sa-raya 
to sa-iZud. What was worse, however, was that the loss of Bakat was only one part of the 
s tory . When Datu Kabalo and the pandita Ali pleaded for peace on the grounds of poverty, 
they may have had in mind the fall of another key point- -Sarangani bay. 
When the Spanish steamship Pasig was pass ing by the Sarangani straits on the way to 
Davao in 1880, it  paused to es tablish contact with some naval tenders which for s everal 
days had been keeping a watchful eye on the inhabritants of the coas t and making carto­
graphic adj ustmentsr. A French passenger on the Pasigr, Jos eph Montano, remarks in his 
j ournal that " .  . . [Sarangani bay] does not have as good a reputation as I 1 lana bay . "  5 3 
Montano must have learned from his companion, Davao governor Raj al, that i l l icit trade 
was being suspected in Sarangani bay, which explains its surveilrlance by the Spanish
Navy . In January 1883, the Jesuit Fr. Ricart called for the insrtallation of a naval 
station at Glan, in the southeastern part of the bay, in order to cut communications be­
tween the inhab itants of Mindanao and Malays who frequented the outlying is lands.r5 4  In  
1884, Raj al himself, in a report to the Geographic Society of Madrid, s tressed the neces­
s ity of occupying Glan, Buayan and other points on  the bay in  order to curtail the smug­
gl ing of firearms to the Magindanao rebels.r5 5  Raj al ' s  report must have had a bearing on 
Jovel l ar ' s  decree, later during the year, which called for the naval s tation at Davao to 
be transferred to Sarangani bay . 
Perinat tells us that on April  15,  1886, Datu Diamaro as cended the Glan river with 
eight vintas and thirty- two men. He came i n  a peaceful manner at first, but, upon arri­
val at the rancherias of Datus Taup and Makampao, he tried to incite them to rise against
the Spanish s tockade at Glan. The two datus were, however, loyal to Spain, and he 
fai led. Diamaro then in irritation sei zed the supplies he wanted and s ai led to Buayan 
on the northwest shore of the bay. After his visitor ' s  departure, Datu Taup hurried to 
inform the Spanish commander of the incursrion. At Glan, he met other Sarangani datus 
who were presenting s imilar comp laints .r5 6  
Thus, in April  1886  Glan was in Spanish hands and effective control over the en­
trance to Sarangani bay was exercised. This may have happened as early as 1885,  for 
many Sarangani datus had apparently switched sides already. A Spanish military map of 
1886  indicates that in January, 1886,  Datu Uto opened a new route to the west of Bakat, 
leading to the s e a . r5 7  That he tried to use this t orturous route across the Tiruray 
mountains impl ies that Sarangani bay was closed to him by the end of 1885r. Datu 
Diamaro ' s  mysterious appearance in the bay has its own background . Diamaro was one of 
50 . Perinat , I , p . 3 0 . Ibid. 
5 2 .  Montero y Vidal, Pirater{a, p.  664 . 5 3 .  pp. 206 - 2 0 7 .  
5 4 .  " I nforme, "  p .  6 0 7 r. 5 5 .  ExpZoraoi6n, p .  187 .  
5 6 .  Perinat, I, p .  3 2 .  
5 7 .  "Cuerpo de Estado Mayor del Ej ercito . Fil ipinas. I s l e  de Mindanao . "  (Madridr?, 
Deposito de la Guerra, 1886),  Map in the Newberry Library. 
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Uto's principal lieutenants, who led the Magindanao forces that tried to oust the Span­
iards from Bakat in February and March.o5 8  When, by the beginning of April, it was clear 
that Bakat was lost, Uto in desperation must have sent Diamaro down to open up his 
southern supply line. But Diamaro failed to rally most of the Sarangani datus to his 
cause, although he succeeded in adding some thirty more vintas and seventy men to his 
fleet. Two months later, his base in the bay was destroyed by a punitive expedition sent 
out from Cotabato.o5 9  
If the Spanish occupation of Bakat was, according to Montero y Vidal, "equivalent
to the death of Ute's influence," no less was the Spanish control of Sarangani bay. The 
Magindanaos in the interior were being gradually cut off from outside support. No fire­
arms from Sulu could enter; the benefits of trade vanished. The implications of this 
situation were grasped early enough b y  the datus of sa-iZud, especially those in the 
south branch of the delta. Their resentment towards Uto (due probably to his coercive 
tactics)o, their leanings toward Spain, and not in the least their own ambitions led them 
openly to declare war against him in 1886. 
Friction between Uto and certain sultans and datus of sa-iZud had been evidenced 
since at least 1878 ,  when the Magindanaos of the south branch of the delta under Datu 
Ayunan refused to ally with Uto, who b y  then had gained the support of most of the other 
datus. In 1880 , Uto's attempt to descend to Cotabato to confer with the governor was 
blocked by Datu Buisan of Tumbao, and a battle would have ensued had it not been for the 
intervention of the Spanish garrison nearby. By this time, it was evident to the colo­
nial authorities that Buisan was at war with Uto.o6 0  In 1883, there occurred an incident 
which illustrates the basis of most of these internal rivalries. Four Zibertos had 
escaped from Tamontaka, allegedly having been "seduced" by previous escapees. No one 
had the slightest idea of the whereabouts of the four until, surprisingly, a letter 
arrived from Datu Uto stating that the fugitives had sought refuge with the Sultan of 
Talakuku (Tumbao). A few days later another letter arrived with more precise information 
on the hiding place of the four. The authorities lost no time in confronting the Sultan, 
who had no choice but to return his "guests." 1 6  This incident may appear to be petty, 
but in the Magindanao social context it is significant. The Sultan of Talakuku was the 
only other Magindanao chief , besides Uto , who could boast of an extraordinary following, 
especially slaves.o6 2  Thus , although they were nominally allies, there was also a certain 
ampunt of rivalry between them. Besides , Datu Uto knew that the Sultan was becoming very
friendly with the Spanish establishment. He could not allow fugitives from Tamontaka to 
continue to seek refuge in Talakuku and thus bolster the latter's manpower. Control of 
manpower was often the root of internal conflicts in Magindanao. 
The Talakuku Sultan's signing, in 1884, of a treaty of unconditional surrender and 
submission to Spain in return for protection against Datu Uto6 3  was the culmination of a 
process by which the chiefs of the south branch of the delta were recr�ited as allies of 
Spain against the sa-raya datus headed by Uto. This "anti-Ute faction, "  however, could 
not lift a finger against Uto as long as the latter's position was secure. The initial 
role they played was indirect: aiding the colonial government and the Jesuits in their 
program of enticing defections from the enemy's ranks.o6 � But after the fall of Bakat 
and Sarangani bay, the inhibitions of these chiefs dissolved; their aggressiveness became 
more pronounced. This mood is reflected in a message sent by Datu Uto to the Cotabato 
governor in June, 1886: 
I plead that you allow me to wage war oniy with those datus--such as Ayunan,
Gugu, Galan, Sultan of Talakuku--who have been fomenting hostilities be­
tween Spain and myself. If these datus are able to do something to me, 
you can still have them as good friends. And if I do something to them, 
58. Juanmarti to Father Superior, July 26 , 1886, CMSJ, VII, p. 67; Pastells,  Mision,
II, p. 66. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ramon Bea to Jose Ignacio Guerrico, Oct. 26 , 1880 , CMSJ, IV, p. 131. 
61. Juanmarti to Father Superior, April 7 ,  1883, CMSJ, VI, pp. 59-60. Since these 
Zibertoa had been ransomed, they seem to have been regarded as "belonging" to the 
Jesuits. 
62. Nieto MS, p. 62. 63. Saleeby, Studies, p. 61. 
64. This is hinted at in the 1885 Ute-Serina conference, where the subjects of slave­
defections and Uto's denunciations of his sa-iZud rivals seem to have gone hand in 
hand. 
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you can still have their women , to be  given to your soldierse. For these 
datus are the ones who have set Rajah Putri against the Spaniards.e6 5  
Governor Serina replied that the pro-Spanish datus were not at fault; it was Uto who 
was guilty of out rages , ass as s inations and overall rebelliousness. From the Spanish 
viewpoint this may have been true, but to Datu Uto his own actions were a jus tified re­
sponse to the undermining of  his following by the Spaniards and their native allies. He 
also must have known that , s ix days prior to the date of the above message, Datus Ayunan
and Galan , leading some eighty-seven warriors , had joined a Spanis h detachment in the 
destruction of the ranaheria of Barung which was allied to Buayan. Eight days later, 
thes e rival datus contributed 280 men to the expedition against Uto ' s  foremos t  ally, the 
Sultan of Talayan.6 6  
The month of July, 1886 , s aw a series of colonial victories over Uto ' s  vassalse- -Datu 
Kambing, Datu Kaliz (of Libungan) ,  and the Sultan of  Talayan. In September, Datu Uto 
s ued for peace, which was summarily rejected by the new Cotabato governor, Jaime San 
Feliu. As early as April, the Father Superior of Tamontaka had expressed worry at the 
bellicosity of certain members of the Spanis h forces who were not satisefied by the con­
quest of Bakat and complained that they had not penetrated into the interior, that Uto 
and most of the "renegade" s ultans and panditas were s till at large, and that " the race 
[had] not been exterminated." The Jes uit Superior thought that this attitude "displays
the great ignorance which is held of the things and the people of the Rio Grande. "e6 7  
Another Jesuit , however, had a different view of the s ituation. In September, 1886, Fr. 
Juanmarti wrote the Father Superior that he conseidered conceiliation and peace out of the 
question. He liked governor San Feliu ' s  reply to Datu Uto ' s  peace offer: the Spaniards 
had decided to implant a cluster of Christian settlements on the plains of Buayan , for 
which plan the Magindanaos need no longer occupy the banks of the river.e6 8  
San Feliu ' s  audacious plan was not to be realized owing to the arrival in Magindanao 
of the liberal governor-general, Emilio Terrero. The latter had come to punish Datu Uto 
militarily, but he was not an extremist like the Cotabato governor. The grand assault 
against Buayan, personally led by Terrero, took place in January, 1887 . The outcome was 
almost predictable as the superior forces of Spain--artillery, cavalry, gunboats and 
infantry--s lowly ascended the river, destroying every Magindanao fortification on the 
way to Buayan , including Uta's kota. On the 24th of January large cannons were installed 
at Bakat and trained on the Muslim kotas . The next day the sound of the agun was heard 
repeatedly from Uto's temporary stronghold farther up the Bakat river at Pidseandana. 
The Datu was in deep trouble; the beating of the agun was "without doubt to call together 
a j unta and to discuss with the datus what it was bes t for them to do. "e69 But the end 
was near; a few weeks later Pidsandana itself was overrun. 
On the 28th of February, 1887, Datus Kalibandung and Andig, men of great s tature in 
the Kudarangan Sultanate (northern Buayan ) ,  presented to Terrero a letter from their 
s ultan, an uncle of Uto, who offered to mediate with his nephew in order to end the de­
s tructive war. The proposal was accepted; Spanis h protection was extended to Kudaran­
gan.7 0 A week later Tambilawan, Rajah Mudah of Kudarangan and U to ' s  cousin, declared 
his loyalty to Spain in an audjence with Terrero, and as proof he offered to resetore the 
s upply of foods tuffs to the delta. The following day Datu Silungan, another uncle of 
Uto,  arrived with a peace mis s ion from his nephew composed of the mantris Boat and 
Dalandung. The conditions for peace imposed by the Spaniards were immediately accepted ,  
and the t rio promised to return the next day with the s igned t reaty.7 1  
65. Published in Perinat, I, p. 34. Rajah Putri, Uto ' s  distinguished wife, was always 
on good terms with the Spaniards, who respected and liked her. 
66. Ibid . ,  p. 33. 
6 7 .  Father Superior of Tamontaka to the Father Rector of the Ateneo Municipal de Manila, 
April 5, 1886e, CMSJ , VII, p. 59. 
68. Juanmarti to Father Superior, Sept. 20, 1886, CMSJ , VII, p. 7 2. 
69. Juanmarti to Father Superior, Feb. 9 ,  1887, CMSJ , VIeII, p. 121. See the following
first-hand accounts of the war: Perinat , II (his diary); Rincon, Diario .  Perinat 
was a member of the Terrero expedition, while Rincon covered the affair for the 
Diario de Mani la .  For s econdary accounts, see Montero y Vidal, Pirateria , Ch. 
XLIII; Pastellse, Misi6n , II (based on CMSJ , VIII ) .  
70 .  Rincon, March 9 ,  1887 , p. 170 .  
71. Ibid . ,  p. 1 7 2. 
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On March 1 0 ,  1887 , Datu Uto s ent his capitulation , s igned by hims elf ,  Rajah Putri , 
and all the principal sultans and datus of Buayan . They acknowledged themselves as 
loyal and obedient subj ects of the King of Spain, pledging henceforth not to  use any but 
the Spanish flag . Defensive pos itions which Terrero ' s  forces had not touched were to be 
destroyed. They bowed to the ruling that all Moros navigating the Pulangi and its tribu­
taries must hold s afe-conduct passes s igned by the Cotabato governor or the garrison
commandersa. Those inhabitants who committed crimes against person or property were to 
be punished accordinglya. War was not to be  made with the daius of the lower Pulangi
(sa-i tud) who had collaborated with Spain . On the other hand , the "vanquished" hoped 
that their religion and customs would be respected . They expressed their gratitude for 
the concess ions granted by Terrero:  they would be  allowed to  continue in possess ion of 
their "ancient properties " ;  their ancestral burial �rounds would be respected; and they 
would be allowed to build dwelling places in Bakata. 2 
The Terrero government ratified the above terms , allegedly on the s trength of Rajah
Putri ' s  signature .a7 3  The governor-general ' s  decision irritates Retana and Montero y
Vidal , leading them to label the Terrero campaign as an ins tance of political showman­
ship rather than substantial gain.a7 � After alla, Datu Uto had not been captured and •his 
pres tige was still  running strong among the people of sa-raya. The charge of ' 'political 
showmanship" is much too hars h ,  however , if it is seen in the light of the liberal­
conservative controversy that was raging in administrative circles at the time . Retana,
who took it  upon himself to defend the conservative pos ition in his j ournal La Pot[tiaa
de Espaija en Fitipinas , is representative of those· writers , the maj ority , in fact,  who 
placed Datu Uto in the same category as the Filipino revolutionaries , as a rebel to be  
crushed militarily and obliterated from the Magindanao scene . Terrero , on the other 
hand, represents a minority l ine of thinking in Manila which saw Uto as a legitimate 
Magindanao leader to  be  dealt with in a civil manner by Spain.  
Yet there is  substance to  the assertions of Montero and Retana that the impact of 
Terrero ' s  campaign was minimal . The destruction of Datu Uto ' s  defenses and kota and the 
procurement of a formal document of submiss ion were mere formalities compared to pre­
ceding developmentsa. The Jesuits and Cotabato officials had succeeded in winning allies 
among the datus of sa-i tud and initiating a rash of defections from the ranks of Uto ' s  
s lavesa. Spanish control had been es tablished over Sarangani bay in late 188 5 .  Strate­
gic Bakat had been occupied in early 1886a. When the Spanish es tablishment was exerting
effort to convince the sultans and datus that wealth and power were to be  gained from 
cooperating with the colonial government , the very bases of Datu Uto ' s  wealth and pres­
tige were being undermined . The consequences of this for his career would be felt 
sooner or latera. 
7 2 .  The treaty has been published in Perinat , I I ,  pp . 130 -131 (footnote) ; Montery y 
Vidal ,  Pirater!a , pp . 103 - 104 of appendix . 
7 3 .  See W"enceslaoaRetana , "Prologo , "  p .  xxxiv. 
7 4 .  Ibid . ;  Montero y Vidal , Pi�aterta , p .  689 ; Perinat , Francia ,  Parrado ,  Nieto Aguilar 
and others do not give this criticism; in fact , they go  to the opposite extreme of 
excessively prais ing Terrero ' s  victory . 
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CHAPTER V I I  
UTO ' S  DOWNFALL AND ITS AFTERMATH ( 1 8 8 7 - ca . ·  1892)  
Datu Uto ' s  defeat in March 1 88 7  did not end his career . His following was by and 
large intac t ;  the territory upriver from Bakat was entirely under his control. This 
situation was learned by Pastells when he visited the pagan tribes in the headwaters of 
the Pulangi sometime in mid- 1887e. He could feel the overpowering influence of the 
Buayan datu even in the remotest mountain settlement .  In fact ,  he unexpectedly received 
a note from Uto assuring him that his missionary activities would in no way be ob ­
structed. 1 
Painfully aware of the loss of Sarangani bay and Bakat, Datu Uto must have decided 
that the best course of action was to establish close relations with the Spanish and 
Magindanao establishment in sa-i tude. In August 1887, he sent word to Mindanao governor
Juan Salcedo , who was touring the Pulangi, requesting an audience with him . 
The datus asked him [Salcedo] for permission to fetch Utoe. Salcedo did not 
replye. Some Moros j umped into their vintas and left swiftly in search of 
Uto . Several datu-friends stayed with Salcedo, and he invited them to go
hunting for birds that were numerous in the lakese. Then as nightfall was 
apQroachinK the sound of the aqun resounded in the waterway of Bakat, and 
the Moros shouted with expressions of j oy, ...,,Uto !- · Uto·1e11· 2 
There was no doubt in the minds of the Spaniards present that Uto ' s  prestige had not 
waned in his rancheria at Bakate. But he no longer appeared to be the defiant chieftain 
of a few months earliere. Practically prostrating himself before his former enemies, he 
tried to convince them of "his peaceful intentions and of his love for Spain . " e3 Salcedo 
was willing to accept Uto ' s  entreaties, and both parted ways reassured of peace and good
relations between them. 
Coming to terms with the Spanish authorities was only the first step in Datu Uto ' s  
program. His next move was to secure the election of his brother-in- law and protege
Datu Mamaku as Raj ah Mudah and successor to the Sultan of Cotabato . �  With this diplo­
matic victory came his boast that he would exact tribute through his petty officials in 
the market of Cotabato . e5 Uto had another important ally in sa-i tud , Datu Kaliz , who had 
established himself at Libungan after the Terrero campaign . Kaliz protected the emis­
saries of Uto who were sent to collect tribute in his territorye. Cotabato governor
Adolfo Horguin reported in March 1888  that the moral influence and superiority of Datu 
Uto were being sustained in Libungan at the expense of Spanish interests .e6 
Libungan presented no problem for Uto since the datus of the north branch of the 
delta had never really been co-opted into the Spanish establishment.e7 But those on the 
south branch were differente. Loyal supporters of Spain, they were responsible for some 
of the disasters which had befallen him . Now he was bound by the 1 88 7  treaty to respect
the independence and political leanings of these datuse. Yet he still hoped to influence 
"Viaje  por el interior de la isla de Mindanao," BSGM , XXV ( 1 888),  p .  3 9 .  
2 .  Montero y Vidal, Pirater!a, p .  7 3 7 e. 
3 .  Ibide. Montero says this with obvious sarcasm. 
4 .  Horguin, "Comunicacion ,"  March 30 , 1888 , in Salcedo, p .  9 6 .  It is interesting to 
note here the similarity between Mamaku and the eighteenth- century rebel Malinog.  
Both were members of the Cotabato royal family , and yet were proteges of Buayane. 
5 .  Horguin, Zoa.  ait . Uto based t�is claim on the support he enjoyed particularly among
the Cotabato Chinese through his ally Datu Piang, a Chinese-Magindanaoe. See Pas­
tells, Miai6n, I I I ,  p .  413 ; Majul, "Chinese relationship, " p .  1 5 8 .  
6 .  Horguin, Zoa . ait .  
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them. Datu Uto tried to get the most prominent of the pro-Spanish group , Datus Ayunan
and Ara , to present themselves before him at Buayan. Was it to bribe them or to make a 
plea for unity against the foreign intruders? Governor Horguin was certainly aware of 
what could happen, and so  he firmly refused Ara and Ayunan permis sion to j ourney upriver.  
When the two datus tried to do s o ,  they were blocked by river patrolsa. Horguin s imul ­
taneously sent ultimatums to Rajah Mudah Mamaku and Datu Kal i z ,  warning them o f  the con­
sequences of disobeying Spanish laws .a8 
A maj or opportunity presented itself to Uto when the Cotabato Sultan died in 1 888 .  
His protege Mamaku being Rajah Mudah , all that was needed for his acces sion to the throne 
was the confirmation of the rumah biahara of Cotabato . But , s ays Montero y Vidal , the 
Sultanate had become so  fragmented that the majority of the datusa.awho normally composed 
the rumah biahara had become independent rulers and were complacent regarding the elec­
tion of a new sultan . This situation enabled Datu Uto to s tage "a farce of an election" 
in favor of Mamaku . When the majority of the datus got wind of this , however ,  they
staged a complaint to the governors of  Cotabato and Mindanao . Since the deceased Sultan 
left no male heir , it  was unanimous ly suggested that the Datu of Sibuguey (north of 
Zamboanga) should succeed to the thronea. The Spanish government, which shared with the 
complaining datus a deep distrus t of Uto ' s  motives , rej ected Mamaku ' s  election and de­
clared the latter tci be "unsuitable . " a9 Thus , the son of the mid.:.century Sultan Kudrat 
of Cotabato was rej ected by the Spaniards and his fellow datus because of his connections 
with Datu Uto . · He soon. transferred his res idence to Sarangani bay, wheie he lived the 
rest of his daysa.a1·0 
Meanwhile ,  things were happening in sa-raya itself compared to which Uto ' s  failures 
to extend his influence in sa-iZud are insignificanta. As we have observed , the basis of 
a Magindanao chief ' s  power and pres tige was the number of his fol lowing , of  which we may
speak of s laves and free dependents , relatives and all iesa. We have seen the Jesuit and 
government efforts in the early 1880 ' s  to subvert the datu-s lave relationship , leading
to mass defections of the latter to Tamontaka and other Spanish-protected points . There 
were defections even among high- ranking individuals in the Uta camp , examples being the 
Sultan of Talakuku who submitted in 1884  and the Sultan of Kudarangan in early 1887a. 
This trend continued in even greater proportions after Uto ' s  military defeat by Terrero . 
This phenomenon prevented him from reviving his hegemony in 'the Pulang i .  I t  was not 
that the Spaniards coerced his allies to submit but that the Spanish es tablishment be­
came increasingly a convenient recourse for those sultans and datus who , for r�asons we 
shall see ,  wanted to s ever their ties with him. 
The Sultan of Talayan ' s  break with Datu Uto in mid- 1888  is the mos t celebrated case 
in the Spanish sources , not only because of its disastrous effort on Uto but also because 
of the insight it  gives on methods of ! ' internal" conques t .  The Talayan Sultan had been 
the most faithful and trusted of Uto ' s  allies . Talayan ' s  five hundred £ighting men , 
noted for their skill and bravery in war due to their experience with the Tirurays , 
Manobos and other hill peoples who fought them, had always formed an important complement
of Buayan ' s  forces during skirmishes with the Spaniardsa. Moreover Talayan was , to use 
the words of the Cotabato governor ,  "a bulwark of Mus l im fanaticism , "  where the activi­
ties of panditas and sherifs were most concentrated .a1 1  Datu Uto ' s  defeat of 1887 , how­
ever, s eriously diminished his prestige and what the Spanish sources refer to as his 
"moral force•. "  . The pandi tasa' cal1 for unity under the Datu Buayan clashed with other,
perhaps more important , conditions for successful leadership . 
In  a half-desperate attempt to ensure the continued support of Talayan, Uto 
arranged a marriage between the son of the Sultan and a daughter of one of his concu­
binesa. The Sultan appears to have vacillated, and, when this came to the notice 'of 
g?vernor Hor�ufn, �he latterasei ze�· the opportunity �o apply th� familiar colonial tac­_tic of exploiting internal dissensions to s ecure alliesa. Horguin sought the counsel  of 
Datu Ayunan, who was a relative of the Sultan of Talakuku, who in turn had ties of 
"material interests" with the Sultan of Talayan. Through this chain of communications 
the Talayan Sultan was made to unders tand that the marriage arranged by Uto was disadvan­
tangeous since , according to some indigenous laws , the daughter of a concubine is  never 
as noble as the son of a legitimate mothera. 
Upon hearing of his ally ' s  s ecret dealings with the pro- Spanish camp , Uto posted 
some of his men to Talayan under the guise of presenting a dowrya. Having thus tricked 
their way in , they made off with the Zantakas (a symbol of rank) of the Sultan. For the 
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latter, this was the last straw. Counseled by Horguin and Ayunan, he decided to repudi­
ate the Uto-arranged marriage, thus signifying the final break. As the threat of war 
with the more powerful Uto loomed before the Talayan Sultan, the latter soon opted for
unconditional submission to Spain.o1 2  
Governor Horguin was even hesitant to accept Talayan's submission because of its 
long history of hostility to Spain. Perhaps he was unsure of the Sultan's real motives 
in submitting; was his professed friendship for Spain merely a superficial display de­
signed to obtain Spanish aid against an internal rival? Horguin nevertheless handed out 
a list of conditions, which were immediately accepted by the Sultan. Then he called for 
a bichara to be held at Cotabato, but this time the Talayans demurred. They wanted it 
held at Taviran, with Datu Ayunan as intermediary. In the first place, they wanted to 
keep in close touch with their home base which was being threatened by Uto. In the 
second place, they had come to trust Datu Ayunan. In fact, if anyone is to be given 
credit for Talayan's transfer of loyalties, it is Ayunan, not the Spaniards: 
[The Sultan of Talayan] was convinced that those who are sheltered by the 
Spanish flag live in peace respected by all who appreciate the well-being 
of the Datus Ara, Ayunan and others who, holding our delegation and pro­
tected by our forts, are compensated for with all kinds of distinctions. 
These examples made those of Talayan decide to aspire for equal preroga­
tives; not contributing a little were the Datus Ayunan and Ara who . . .  
made use of their bicharas to demonstrate . . .  the advantages of our pro­
tection, up to the point that [ the Talayans] decided to opt for the King of 
Spain unconditionally.o13 
Datu Uto's reaction was to send a force of eight hundred men to Talayan. Led by
Datu Dalgan, a relative of the Talayan Sultan, it was under the strength of this kinship 
tie that the band was able to penetrate the rancheriar' s  defenses. Once inside, they
forced the Sultan to hand over carabaos, paddy and arms. But when Dalgan tried to exact 
from the other datus, the latter resisted and a battle ensued.o1 � Noting the gravity of 
the situation, the Spanish government sent Uto a letter demanding an end to his provoca­
tions and to the hostilities. A note was also sent to his "Minister of Waro" Datu 
Kabalo, who was then in Manila paying his respects to the governor-general.oros Neverthe­
less, hostilities persisted; Kabalo hastened back to Magindanao only to join the melee. 
On February 10, 1888  governor Horguin, in a communication to the governor of Mindanao, 
strongly urged the occupation of Talayan as a means of effecting a 'final blow on Uto. 
He argued that victory would come easily since the Datus Ayunan, Ara and Butu had pledged 
to help their new ally, the Sultan of Talayan, with a relief force of seven hundred 
warriors.o1 6  
At this point, the Spanish military could have moved in and occupied Talayan at the 
invitation of the Sultan, but governor-general Terrero was no expansionist and so the 
idea was squashed. The internal conflict appears to have subsided, only to break out 
again in the middle of the year. Again it was caused by the break-up of a marriage, 
attesting to the importance of marital ties in Magindanao alliances. This time the mar­
riage of one of the Talayan Sultan's daughters with Datu Piang, a follower of Uto, did 
not materialize, and Piang was threatening to attack Talayan perhaps to recover his 
dowry. The Sultan then requested that a company of the Spanish Army should occupy his 
territory, and again Terrero refused in spite of attempts by the Mindanao governor
Salcedo to alter Manila's decision.o1 � Here is another reflection of the liberal-conser­
vative dispute that was then raging in Spanish administrative circles. The important
point to be recognized is that the Sultan of Talayan, one of Datu Uto's key allies, had 
willingly turned to Spain. The latter's policy of attraction had worked. We can be 
sure that the Sultan, a devout Muslim, had no real love for Spain. What he saw, and 
aspired for, were the benefits, such as wealth and Spanish titles, which the pro-Spanish 
datus Ayunan, Ara and other enjoyed. 
12. Ibid.r; Horguin, "Comunicacion," Feb. 10, 1888, in Salcedo, pp. 90- 9 1 .  
1 3 .  Salcedo, "Comunicacion,o" April 24, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 108. 
14. Horguin, March 30, 1888, 1n Salcedo, p. 100r. 
15. Montero y Vidal, Pirater!ar, p. 7 3 8 .  
16. Horguin, Feb. 10, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 9 2 .  
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While the conflict between the Talayan Sultan and Uto was taking place, another 
incident occurred which, says Pastells, had an even more disastrous effect on Uto's pres­
tige. Datu Abdul, another of Uto's allies, had been having an amorous relationship with 
his patron's daughter. The relationship apparently dragged on for a long time because 
Abdul could not raise the funds needed for the traditional ceremony, and wedding feast. 
Perhaps this brought pressure from the community and Uto himself� Abdul became exasper­
ated, says Pastells, and decided to quit the scene altogether. He packed all his belong­
ings, slaves and dependents (numbering almost a thousand), and even houses onto rafts 
and floated down to Tumbao to establish himself under the protection of the Spanish fort 
there. Abdul's "floating ranaheria," as it was called, caused quite a sensation in Tum­
bao and its vicinity and surely caused Uto some loss of. face. What sort of datu was he 
who could not even keep his core .following intact? Uto imm"ediately offered Abdul his 
daughter without any more conditions if only he would return to Buayan to live in his 
company. But Datu Abdul refused. Shortly thereafter, some thirty to forty families, 
mostly slaves, left Uto and sought refuge in Cotabato.o1 8  
Faced with a depletion in his ranks, Datu Uto presented his complaints to the gover­
nor of Cotabato. He did not seek action against Datu Abdul and other datus who had 
deserted him, for it was their prerogative as datus to choose their loyalties so long as 
their new patrons could provide them protection. But slaves were another matter. They
belonged to a datu, and they were the symbol of his status and prestige. 
Conferences were held in Cotabato regarding the wisdom or otherwise of restituting
Uto's slaves. Opinion was quite divided, but the Spaniards were no longer ignorant of 
the importance of slaves in the prestige system. Uto's complaints were dismissed. He 
then appealed to the governor-general through a letter in which beneath a thousand pro­
tests of gratitude he begged that his slaves be returned. The governor-general replied,
in a letter which he gave Pastells to read to Uto, that slavery was not authorized .in 
the Islands, that each individual was free to live wherever he chose, and that he could 
not force anyone to live in a predetermined place unless in special circumstances, which 
in Uto's case did not exist. Pastells concludes: ''this position completely upset the 
plans of the astute datu; the hopes he had of dominating, with ·moral and physical influ­
ence, the Moros of the Rio-Grande were dashed. . . .  "1 9  
On March 2 ,  1888 the governor of Mindanao commented with deep satisfaction that th� 
unconditional submission of Talayan had led to a deep factional split in Magindanao. 
The Sultans of Kudarangan, Talakuku and Talayan, and the Datus Ara, Ayunan, Abdul, and 
others were all poised against Datu Uto who, although himself professing submission to· 
Spain, had been led to absolute discord with the pro-Spanish chiefs.o2 0  The growth in 
numbers and prestige of this "anti-Uto faction" must be seen as one of the causes of 
further defections within Uto's proximate following. This faction was primarily based 
in sa-i lud; the balance of power was beginning to shift back to the del_ta. 
The governor of Mindanao further stated that "most of the other datus are inclined 
to Ayunan or Uto.o"2 1  Ayunan was the head of the pro-Spanish, anti-Uto faction. His 
career deserves a closer examination, for it is an illustration of how a native chief 
was able to build up his position within the framework of submission to the colonial 
master. Was Datu Ayunan merely a Spanish puppet, or did he use his association with 
Spain to further his own, basically indigenous, goals? 
Unlike the Cotabato Sultans, Ayunan was in a specially favored position. Whereas 
Cotabato became subj ect to intense colonization, the Magindanaos soon becoming a minority 
among Chinese, "Indio s , "  and Spaniards, Ayunan' s base at Taviran w_as in the center of­
the south branch of the delta, in the vicinity of an isolated Spanish fort. Here Ayunan 
could still be a Magindanao chief in the traditional style--having a retinue of slaves, 
for example- -while dealing with the colonial establishment. When, in the early 1860's, 
most of the inhabitants of sa-ilud fled upriver seeking Buayan's patronageo, he chose to 
remain where he was. Perhaps he very early perceived that the invaders did not have the 
manpower and resources effectively to dominate the Pulangi, and that, in fact, they would 
soon be somewhat dependent upon the population for their subsistence. Such was the case 
of the garrison at Taviran.o2 2  In May 1866, Ayunan was formally elected, under the aus­
pices of Spain, to head the Magindanaos of Taviran. A census taken then attributes him 
with a substantial following of three thousand.o2 3  
18. Ibid. , p . 614. 19. Ibid. , pp. 614-615. 
20. "Instruaaiones dadaso- por el Gobernador de Mindanao al del 5o° Distrito • • o. , "
March 2 ,  1888, in Salcedo, p. 116. 
21. Ibid., p. 117. 22. Burriel MS, p. 125. 23. Pastells, Misi6n, I, p. 68. 
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From 1866 to 1878, no explicit mention is made of Ayunan in the available sources. 
It is almost certain, however, that he figured prominently among the anonymous friendly
datus of the delta's south branch mentioned in the Jesuit letters. The fact that he is 
described in 1886 as belonging "body and soul" to the Spaniards and that he had assimi­
lated many Spanish customs, among them monogamous marriage, suggests that a great deal 
of interaction had taken place between him and the Jesuits at Tamontaka. 2 4  He must have 
been one of the datus who, observing the talents of the missionaries in education, medi­
cine and agriculture, broke the wall of silence between them in the late 187O's and 
early 188Oo' s. 
It has been mentioned previously that during Datu Uto's height of power in 1878 
Datu Ayunan, heading the Magindanaos of sa-iludr' s  soutohern sector, was the only inde­
pendent datu of significance who did not ally with Buayan. But in spite of his friendli­
ness with the Jesuits, he did not commit himself to an alliance with Spain until Uto's 
position was seriously threatened by various circumstances in the mid-188O's. As Saleeby 
aptly puts it, Ayunan's move was "shrewd" because he was much lower in rank than Uto and 
apparently intended to use the Spanish alliance as a means of building up his own posi­
tion. 2 5 
Sometime in late 1885 or early 1886, Ayunan declared war on Uto. He and his follow­
ers joined Colonel San Feliu's troops and other native allies (among them libertos) in 
an attack on Datu Kambing of Libungan, an ally of Uto. Rinc6n did not fail to note 
Ayunan's display of courage on behalf of Spain, the rousing cries of "Viva a Espana" 
2 6with which he egged his men on.o For this he was amply rewarded. After the battle, 
Ayunan p�titioned the governor that a captured datu and others b e  placed under his wing. 
Consent was granted with the sole condition that the captives fight on the Spanish side; 
in addition, Ayunan was placed in charge of the conquered territory. The process was 
repeated after the victory over Datu Kali's forces some months later. More captives 
came to swell Ayunan's following; more territory came under his control. It is hard to 
tell who profited most from these victories--Ayunan or Spain. 
To Datu Uto, the situation was crystal clear: Ayunan had loomed as a serious rival. 
Indeed� Ayunan was even implicated in the Spanish program of enticing his slaves to de­fect. 2 Attempts were made to assassinate Ayunan. 2 8  In 1886, two of his brothers were 
treacherously cut down b y  Uto's agents.o2 9  Toward the end of the year he retaliated by
having two datus close to Uto beheaded.o3 0  
By the time of the defections of the Sultans of Kudarangan and Talayan in 1887 and 
1888, Datu Ayunan had laid the groundwork, in terms of manpower and territory, for secur­
ing leadership of the anti-Uto faction. Presumably he had accumulated wealth through 
the food trade with Spanish forts; unfortunately, we are not told about the resources 
of this man. The possibility of gaining wealth through dealing with the Spanish estab­
lishment was, in fact, one of the reasons for the Talayan Sultan's emulation of Ayunan. 
Another reason may have been the desire to achieve status within the Spanish colonial 
framework. Datu Ayunan was fond of displaying certain prestige symbols in order to 
assert his superiority. Some of his distinctions were _ the Esoudo al Valor, awarded for 
loyalty to Spain, which he and his brothers wore on their chests, and the cane general
Moriones had given him as a gift and which he carried around together with the tradi­
tional kris on the hilt of which passages from the Koran were inscribed.o3 1  But what 
Ayunan appreciated most was the title gobernadoroillo deZ delta (petty governor of the 
delta), by which he preferred to be addressed rather than by the title datu. 3 2  This 
Spanish title elevated him from the ranks of petty datus of sa-iZudr; he was the datu of 
sa-iZud, and as such he stood as the counterpart of Datu Uto of sa-raya.  
The Spanish government was well aware that Ayunan was no mere puppet and that he 
was using his alliance with Spain to further his own interests. In 1888, governor 
24. Rincon, Dec. 12, 1886, p. 65. Ayunan had a brother named Datu Sanhuan (St. John) . 
He was assassinated. 
25. History of Sulur, p. 262. 26. Dec. 12, 1886, p. 66. 
27. There is the story of Atek, a slave of Uto, who escaped from Bakat. After several 
months of hiding, he was able to present himself to Ayunan, who in turn introduced 
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Salcedo stressed the need to watch the datu carefully without his knowledge. He warned 
Horguin not to be led by Ayunan' s  slyness to give up "impartiality" and be "a slave to 
his aspirations for prestige.o" Ayunan ' s  frequent trips to Talayan were watched; he was 
not allowed to enter Buayan territory.o3 3  It was surely feared that an alliance between 
Uto and Ayunan might materialize, thus threatening as seriously as ever the fragile 
Spanish hold over the river valley. 
But by the time of Ayunan ' s  rise to power , the Spanish establishment had less and 
less to worry about Datu Uto. After 1888 , his career was practically ended, or at least 
that is what the available sources imply. In the early 1890's General Weyler erected a 
fort at Parang-Parang, on the road between the Pulangi valley and the Illanun coast , 
thus cutting Uta off from his remaining source of smuggled arms. Additional forts were 
built in Tinunkup and Kudaranga "to close up the exits which could be used by Datu Uttu, 
no doubt the most dreadful of all Mindanao.o''o3 4  Forts were also built on the northern 
border between Magindanao and pagan territory "to prevent the said datu from continuing 
to exercise domination over the rest • . . .  "3 5  Pastells is of the opinion that fear of 
Spanish military action forced Uta to toe completely the line of the pro-Spanish datus, 
to trans£ er his residence near Cotabato "tha t he might conserve his ful 1 prestige. "·3 6 
Fear of military action is only a partial explanation, however. The Spaniards had prac­
tically drawn a net around Uto, cutting him off from all sources of slaves and firearms. 
The Spanish tactic of establishing forts to sever the local channels of communication, 
beginning with Zamboanga in the sixteenth century, reached its fullest spread toward the 
end of Datu Uta's career. This measure had consequences for his following. For example ,  
in 1893 Datu Piang and Rajah Mudah Dalgan, both prominent followers of Uta , turned 
against their patron when the latter "stopped handing over to his two rivals the lantakas 
and carbines which they requested from him.o"3 7  Bereft of wealth,  expressed in terms of 
slaves, cash and firearms , the Datu of Buayan could no longer attract a following. 
Nothing more is heard of him till his death around 1902.o3 8  
The decline of Datu Uta does not mean the waning of that ethos of which his career 
was a representation. The Pulangi valley, especially sa-raya, was never truly "pacified" 
by Spain. In 188 8 ,  when the majority of the Muslim political hierarchy was beginning to 
accept submission to Spain, the governor of Mindanao made the following statement: 
. . o. My labors have been dir�cted principally at destroying the Moro unity
which has been lamentable to us, since the sherifs who come from Mecca and 
proceed from Singapore travel about these rancherias, preaching incessantly 
the Holy War and complete unity to struggle against us.o3 9  
Steps were taken to prevent Datu Ayunan from expanding his power; indeed, he seems to 
have become a relatively minor figure in the 1890's. But perhaps it was not merely Span­
ish interference which prevented Ayunan from becoming the "successor" Qf Datu Uta. For 
a new leader was rising in Magindanao--Datu Piang. 
Datu Piang was a Chinese-Magindanao who, as we have seen, was formerly Uta's 
"Minister of Lands.o" He was married to the daughter of Datu Ayunan and, says Saleeby,  
"learned his methods.o" He allied himself with Spain and secured the latter's support
and protection. According to Saleeby, "by shrewd tactics he dispossessed his former 
master Utu of his best land, attracted most of his following and caused his downfall.o1 1 4 0  
His ranorheria was north of Baka t ,  sheltered by the new Spanish fort at · Reina Regente. 
It grew in population as Uto's followers were attracted to it. Piang was also able to 
win the support of several notable sa-raya datus, among them Ali and Djimbangan, both 
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formerly belonging to the Uto camp. But one of Piang's greatest assets, something which 
was denied Uto, was his considerable influence in Cotabato itself, where it is said that 
all the Moros as well as the Chinese supported him.o'+o1 
The Spanish government welcomed the opportunity to control the Cotabato Chinese as 
well as a vast number of Magindanaos through their friend Datu Piang. And a loyal friend 
he seemed to be, for, when he and Dalgan were in Manila at the time of the Tagalog upris­
ing, they voiced their opposition to the revolutionaries, declaring themselves true sub­
jects of Spain.o'+o2 But what the Spaniards had feared of Ayunan became a reality in Datu 
Piang. When, in 1899, the Spaniards had to evacuate the Pulangi valley after the cession 
of the Philippine Islands to the United States, Piang's loyalty to Spain vanished, but 
not his own aspirations for power. 
The reaction that set in after the Spanish withdrawal was vicious. Datu Piang de­
clared himself Sultan of Mindanao, in spite of the fact that he, a half-breed, had the 
least precedent by way of kinship ties and genealogy to back such contention. Having
gained the support of the sa-iZud datus he, together with Datus Ali and Djimbangan, de­
clared war against ther- sa-raya datus above Buayan who previously had not submitted to 
Spain and were now reluctant to recognize Piang. The triumvirate· emerged victorious; 
the prestige of Piang reached unprecedented heights. Back in Cotabato and Tamontaka the 
reaction against the remnants of Spanish and Christian rule was severe. Even before the 
Spanish evacuation, the Tamontaka Jesuits had become apprehensive when Datu Andong, son 
of pro-Spanish Datu Ara (often mentioned alongside Ayunan), began acting "with great 
arrogance,o" telling Christian converts to return to their former ranaherias where they 
had only been slaves. There had been cases of attacks on Christians and the disfiguring 
of statues of Catholic saints. With the rise of the triumvirate in September 1899, the 
members of the Provisional Government left behind by the retreating Spaniards were turned 
upon by Ali and Djimbangan, with the tacit consent of Piang. Cotabato itself was sacked;
the Church and convent badly damaged. Images, engravings and other devotional objects 
were publicly desecrated; the pent-up wrath of the Magindanaos against the Christian 
colonizers reached a peak of expression.'+ 3 Individuals sympathetic to the Philippine
Revolutionary Government at Malolos were not spared such wrath. As Delor-Angeles puts
it, the memory of "indio" participation in campaigns against the Magindanaos was still 
strong, and moreover, "it was ridiculous from the Muslim point of view for the Sultanates 
and datuships, proud of their long history of resistance to Spanish imperialism (while
their racial brethren in the north submitted), to acknowledge the authority of Malolos.1 1 '+o'
+ 
Christian Filipino revolutionary officials were executed in Cotabato; their women were 
publicly shamed.o'+o5 The rest of the Christian population fled to the hills, except the 
6Chinese who were protected by Piang.o'+
Piang's reign in Cotabato was short-lived. In December, 1899, American occupation
forces arrived in the Pulangi, putting an end to armed conflicts in sa-iZud. But the 
Americans were just another colonial power, successor to the ousted Spaniards. It is 
strangely reminiscent of the 1860's that sa-iZud was quickly pacified and Datu Piang
co-opted into the American establishment, while resistance to American rule continued in 
sa-raya. Perhaps we should not now be surprised that the resistance was led by Datu Ali, 
a descendant of the Buayan ruling family and ex-follower of Datu Uto. His career was 
brief compared with Uto ' s  owing to the greatly superior strength of the American mili­
tary, but while his career lasted it took many of the forms of his predecessors ' ,  as can 
be seen from the following account by Major General Leonard Wood: 
At the date .of writing this report [ September 1904] conditions throughout
the Province are peaceful, with the single exception of the presence of an 
outlaw in the upper Cotabato valley--Datto Ali of Kudarangan. This Moro 
(Ali) flatly refused to obey the anti-slavery law and attempted to raise 
the whole Cottabato valley in revolt . . . .  His fortifications were taken 
and destroyed in March and his following dispersed. It is believed that 
his main work was the largest ever constructed by a Moro in these Islands. 
It was larger than 20 of the largest cottas of the Lake region [Lanae ] or 
Sulu, and would have easily held a garrison of four or five-thousand men. 
It was well located, well built, well armed, and amply supplied with ammuni­
tion. There were embrasures for one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. 
85 pieces were captured, among them many large cannon of from 3 inches to 
5½ inches caliber. 
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Ali is at present at large, with an armed following of fifty or sixty men 
[ cf. Uto's "slave army"] and a miscellaneous following of a hundred or two 
people, who accompany him under compulsion from place to place, carrying 
food, etc.,  and whose personell is frequently changed. As the hereditary
datto of the upper valley [sa-raya] the people at heaft sympathize with him,
but not to the extent of openly taking up arms in large numbers.o4 7  
Datu Ali of Buayan was the last Philippine Muslim "outlaw" of renown to resist American 
rule through armed means. 
Today, on the site of Datu Uto's capital in Buayan, stands a flourishing market 
town j udged a most convenient stop-over for traders plying the Pulangi and its numerous 
tributaries. 
Once a week on market day, people from the neighboring areas flock to the 
central part of the town , which is a street that runs along the swift-flow-
. • • 4 8 1ng river . . . .  
According to a 1939 census, this town, now named Datu-Piang or Dulawan, had the largest
concentration of Magindanaos in the whole province of Cotabato. I n  1962, Maceda esti­
mated that it had the largest concentration of Muslims in the whole province.o4 9  Indeed, 
the present-day situation reflects the importance that has been given in this study to 
this center of power in sa-raya, whose prestige in the eyes of the Magindanaos came to 
eclipse that of the city of Cotabato in the nineteenth century. The former site of 
Buayan is still the seat of Muslim Magindanao civilization, while Cotabato City has come 
to be politically and culturally dominated by the Philippine National Government which 
is predominantly Christian in outlook. Today, the process of colonization that began in 
the days of Spanish rule continues, as Christian immigration into the Pulangi valley is 
encouraged with the goal of integrating the _region into the Philippine national polity
and easing population pressures elsewhere. The tendency, until recently, of the national 
government to neglect the interests of the Philippine Muslims has tended to fan resent­
ment among some groups. In early 1968, a Muslim I ndependence Movement was launched with 
headquarters at Pagalungan, the middle zone between sa-iZud and sa-raya. Sometime in 
the early eighteenth century it was in the vicinity of Pagalungan that the rebel Malinog
held out against the advancing Spanish-Cotabato forces. And it was precisely at that 
place that Datus Maghuda , Uto and others first raised the flag of resistance to the 
Spanish intrusion in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
47. "First annual report of Major General Leonard Wood, U. S. Army, Governor of Moro 
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GLOSSARY 
baniaga 
biahara 
bois 
bolo 
aaahi7, 
aaraaoa 
danao 
haji (Ar.)  
indio 
jihad (Ar.)  
juramentado (Sp. ) 
kampilan 
kris 
kota 
Zaksamana 
Zantaka 
Liberto (Sp. ) 
mantri 
maramaya 
marayao 
o lipon 
pagdato 
pandita 
prau 
putri 
rajah 
raja taut 
rajah mudah 
ranaheria (Sp. ) 
resaate (Sp. ) 
rumah biahara 
sa-i lud 
sa-raya 
sakop 
shari 'a (Ar. ) 
sherif (Ar. ) 
vinta 
wata-mama 
enslaved captives of war or hill people 
dialogue, conference 
land tax 
general purpose sword-like cutting tool 
Moluccan princely title, used in Magindanao 
rowing barge 
lake 
honorific title for one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca 
Spanish pejorative term for Malayan natives of the Philippines 
Holy War 
1•one who has made an oath" 
battle sword used by the Philippine Muslims 
dagger , supposedly endowed with magical properties 
fort 
Malay title for admiral of the royal fleet 
long, heavy brass cannon, generally smelted in Borneo and Java. 
They guarded the kotas and were a symbol of power. 
"freed-man," referring to an ex-slave 
in Magindanao, member of a datu's advisory council 
Magindanao military title 
the class of freemen, below that of datu 
debt-bondsmen 
tribute given to a datu 
Muslim priest and learned man 
outrigger vessel, fitted with sail, prowed at stem and stern 
princess 
title of Hindu origin meaning "ruler" 
"ruler of the sea," the title of the admiral of the Magindanao 
fleet 
"vice-king" and heir apparent to the sultan 
term loosely applied to settlements presided over by a datu; char­
acterized by strong kinship ties among its members 
"ransom" 
the sultanate's council of ministers, composed of the highest­
ranking datus 
"in the lower valley" 
"in the upper valley" 
free (non-slave) subjects or followers of a datu 
the Islamic Law 
(Magindanao: sarip) highly respected religious figure claiming de­
scent from the Prophet Mohammed; lower in the hierarchy than 
pandita 
outrigger sailing vessel of the Philippine Muslims; noted for its 
sail of colorful design 
"first-born male,o" also a title referring to the next in line of 
succession after rajah mudah 
6 6  
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